The Impact of Financial Distress Status and Corporate Governance Structures on the Level of Voluntary Disclosure Within Annual Reports of Firms （Case Study of Non-financial Firms in Indonesia Over the Period of 2009-2011）

The purpose of this research is to examine the impact of financial distress status and corporate governance structures on the level of voluntary disclosure. We apply six independent variables, including the firm＇s financial distress status and five components of corporate governance structures, such as board independence, audit committee independence, institutional ownership, board meeting frequency, and audit committee meeting frequency. This research is carried out by examining the annual reports of 114 non-financial firms listed at the Indonesian Stock Exchange over the period of 2009-2011. To test hypotheses, we undergo two different analyses, including independent samples t-test and Multiple Linear Regression. We find that： （1） The audit committee independence and the audit committee meeting frequency have significant positive impacts on the level of voluntary disclosure; （2） The financial distress status is negatively related to the level of disclosure at various levels of significance; and （3） All the independent variables are simultaneously related to voluntary disclosure.

Arrangement for Capital Structure in the Framework of Corporate Governance

Using the method of principal component analysis, the paper conducts a systematic study on the issue of how corporate governance influences capital structure. The study manifests the results that the proportion of circulation shares, the ability that other big shareholders contend with the first biggest shareholder, the proportion of corporation-owned shares, and the frequency of directorate meetings all have a positive relationship with the liability level. Meanwhile, the concentration degree of owners＇ equity, the proportion of state-owned shares, the phenomenon that one person serves as both chairman of directorate and general manager, and the intensity of competition in product market are all negatively related to the level of debt. Finally, the scale of directorate, the proportion of independent directors as well as the percentage of management-owned shares have no significant relationship with the capital structure. The statistic analysis also shows that the proportion of independent directors of some Chinese listed companies does not meet the regulation of the CSRC. In addition, the paper tests the impacts of corporate operating characteristics on capital structure.

Study on the Current Implementation Situation of the Independent Director System in China＇s Listed Companies

The independent director system, as an effective measure to improve the corporation governance structure of China＇ s listed companies, is focused by more and more people at the capital market. In this paper, the proportion of independent directors in the board of directors, and the actual condition, compensation, and duties performing of independent directors are analyzed by taking A-share listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange as an example, so that the current implementation situation of the independent director system in China＇ s listed companies is analyzed deeply through the empirical method. Finally, suggestions for its imorovement are orooosed.

Silent Large Shareholders and Entrenched Bank Management： Evidence from the Banking Crisis in Japan

Since the beginning of the 1990s, Japanese banks have become saddled with huge amounts of non-performing loans and a significant number of them have failed. We investigate the cause of this banking crisis that has jeopardized the stability of the financial and economic system. Following Hanazaki （2001）, we argue that the deficiency of effective corporate governance of banks in Japan has caused inefficient management. Our focus here is the role of large shareholders who happen to be banks and insurers. We argue that these large shareholders appear to collude or conspire with management instead of being tough monitors. Consequently, the management became entrenched. Our empirical results show that during the 1980s these ＂entrenched banks＂ extended more lending. Even after the collapse of the bubble in the 1990s, they did not dramatically undertake restructuring to cope with the accumulated bad loans.