This paper studies a bounded discriminating domain for hybrid linear differential game with two players and two targets using viability theory. First of all, we prove that the convex hull of a closed set is also a dis...This paper studies a bounded discriminating domain for hybrid linear differential game with two players and two targets using viability theory. First of all, we prove that the convex hull of a closed set is also a discriminating domain if the set is a discriminating domain. Secondly, in order to determine that a bounded polyhedron is a discriminating domain, we give a result that it only needs to verify that the extreme points of the polyhedron meet the viability conditions. The difference between our result and the existing ones is that our result just needs to verify the finite points (extreme points) and the existing ones need to verify all points in the bounded polyhedron.展开更多
In heterogeneous network with hybrid energy supplies including green energy and on-grid energy, it is imperative to increase the utilization of green energy as well as to improve the utilities of users and networks. A...In heterogeneous network with hybrid energy supplies including green energy and on-grid energy, it is imperative to increase the utilization of green energy as well as to improve the utilities of users and networks. As the difference of hybrid energy source in stability and economy, thus, this paper focuses on the network with hybrid energy source, and design the utility of each user in the hybrid energy source system from the perspective of stability, economy and environment pollution. A dual power allocation algorithm based on Stackelberg game to maximize the utilities of users and networks is proposed. In addition, an iteration method is proposed which enables all players to reach the Stackelberg equilibrium(SE). Simulation results validate that players can reach the SE and the utilities of users and networks can be maximization, and the green energy can be efficiently used.展开更多
Public-private partnerships(PPPs)have been used by governments around the world to procure and construct infrastructural amenities.It relies on private sector expertise and funding to achieve this lofty objective.Howe...Public-private partnerships(PPPs)have been used by governments around the world to procure and construct infrastructural amenities.It relies on private sector expertise and funding to achieve this lofty objective.However,given the uncertainties of project management,transparency,accountability,and expropriation,this phenomenon has gained tremendous attention in recent years due to the important role it plays in curbing infrastructural deficits globally.Interestingly,the reasonable benefit distribution scheme in a PPP project is related to the behavior decisionmaking of the government and social capital,aswell as the performance of the project.In this paper,the government and social capital which are the key stakeholders of PPP projects were selected as the research objects.Based on the fuzzy expected value model and game theory,a hybrid method was adopted in this research taking into account the different risk preferences of both public entities and private parties under the fuzzy demand environment.To alleviate the problem of insufficient utilization of social capital in a PPP project,this paper seeks to grasp the relationship that exists between the benefit distribution of stakeholders,their behavioral decision-making,and project performance,given that they impact the performance of both public entities and private parties,as well as assist in maximizing the overall utility of the project.Furthermore,four game models were constructed in this study,while the expected value and opportunity-constrained programming model for optimal decision-making were derived using alternate perspectives of both centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making.Afterward,the optimal behavioral decision-making of public entities and private parties in four scenarios was discussed and thereafter compared,which led to an ensuing discussion on the benefit distribution system under centralized decision-making.Lastly,based on an example case,the influence of different confidence levels,price,and fuzzy uncertainties of PPP projects on the equilibrium strategy results of both parties were discussed,giving credence to the effectiveness of the hybrid method.The results indicate that adjusting different confidence levels yields different equilibriumpoints,and therefore signposts that social capital has a fair perception of opportunities,as well as identifies reciprocal preferences.Nevertheless,we find that an increase in the cost coefficient of the government and social capital does not inhibit the effort of both parties.Our results also indicate that a reasonable benefit distribution of PPP projects can assist them in realizing optimum Pareto improvements over time.The results provide us with very useful strategies and recommendations to improve the overall performance of PPP projects in China.展开更多
随着分布式能源的发展,传统用户具备发电能力而成为产消者(production and consumption users,PCU)的趋势愈演愈烈,该文主要研究了同一微能网下大量产消者的协同运行问题。电价不确定性和产消者响应给微能网协同不同利益主体的PCU之间...随着分布式能源的发展,传统用户具备发电能力而成为产消者(production and consumption users,PCU)的趋势愈演愈烈,该文主要研究了同一微能网下大量产消者的协同运行问题。电价不确定性和产消者响应给微能网协同不同利益主体的PCU之间的调度带来困难。在此背景下提出考虑产消者响应与电价不确定性的微能网与产消者混合博弈优化策略。首先,构建产消者响应模型和电价不确定性模型,引入效用函数来描述PCU的满意程度,采用鲁棒优化和机会约束方法描述电价的不确定性与新能源出力的不确定性。其次,构建混合博弈模型,即上层微能网运营商(integrated energy operator,IEO)与下层PCU之间的主从博弈模型和下层PCU联盟之间的合作博弈模型。上层IEO作为主从博弈的领导者以运行成本最小化为目标,通过为产消者制定电价、热价引导产消者的用能需求;下层产消者作为跟随者,以效益最大为目标通过合作方式对IEO的决策进行产消者响应。PCU之间的合作博弈以纳什议价的方式进行,将PCU模型等效为联盟收益最大化和合作分配两个子问题。基于KKT条件利用Big-M法和Mc Cormick包络法将双层问题转换为单层混合整数线性规划问题求解主从博弈,结合交替方向乘子法(alternating direction multiplier method,ADMM)求解下层合作博弈。结果表明,该文所提策略有效协调了微能网与PCU的调度并保证了PCU合作联盟的公平性。展开更多
This study utilizes hot dry rock(HDR)geothermal energy,which is not affected by climate,to address the capacity allocation of photovoltaic(PV)-storage hybrid power systems(HPSs)in frigid plateau regions.The study repl...This study utilizes hot dry rock(HDR)geothermal energy,which is not affected by climate,to address the capacity allocation of photovoltaic(PV)-storage hybrid power systems(HPSs)in frigid plateau regions.The study replaces the conventional electrochemical energy storage system with a stable HDR plant assisted by a flexible thermal storage(TS)plant.An HPS consisting of an HDR plant,a TS plant,and a PV plant is proposed.Game approaches are introduced to establish the game pattern model of the proposed HPS as the players.The annualized income of each player is used as the payoff function.Furthermore,non-cooperative game and cooperative game approaches for capacity allocation are proposed according to the interests of each player in the proposed HPS.Finally,the proposed model and approaches are validated by performing calculations for an HPS in the Gonghe Basin,Qinghai,China as a case study.The results show that in the proposed non-cooperative game approach,the players focus only on the individual payoff and neglect the overall system optimality.The proposed cooperative game approach for capacity allocation improves the flexibility of the HPS as well as the payoff of each game player.Thereby,the HPS can better satisfy the power fluctuation rate requirements of the grid and increase the equivalent firm capacity(EFC)of PV plants,which in turn indirectly guarantees the reliability of grid operation.展开更多
基金supported by National Science Foundation of China(11171221)Doctoral Program Foundation of Institutions of Higher Education of China(20123120110004)+2 种基金Natural Science Foundation of Shanghai(14ZR1429200)Innovation Program of Shanghai Municipal Education Commission(15ZZ073)Key Research Project Plan of Institutions of Higher of Henan Province(17A120010)
文摘This paper studies a bounded discriminating domain for hybrid linear differential game with two players and two targets using viability theory. First of all, we prove that the convex hull of a closed set is also a discriminating domain if the set is a discriminating domain. Secondly, in order to determine that a bounded polyhedron is a discriminating domain, we give a result that it only needs to verify that the extreme points of the polyhedron meet the viability conditions. The difference between our result and the existing ones is that our result just needs to verify the finite points (extreme points) and the existing ones need to verify all points in the bounded polyhedron.
基金supported by the Beijing Natural Science Foundation (4142049)863 project No. 2014AA01A701the Fundamental Research Funds for Central Universities of China No. 2015XS07
文摘In heterogeneous network with hybrid energy supplies including green energy and on-grid energy, it is imperative to increase the utilization of green energy as well as to improve the utilities of users and networks. As the difference of hybrid energy source in stability and economy, thus, this paper focuses on the network with hybrid energy source, and design the utility of each user in the hybrid energy source system from the perspective of stability, economy and environment pollution. A dual power allocation algorithm based on Stackelberg game to maximize the utilities of users and networks is proposed. In addition, an iteration method is proposed which enables all players to reach the Stackelberg equilibrium(SE). Simulation results validate that players can reach the SE and the utilities of users and networks can be maximization, and the green energy can be efficiently used.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.62141302)the Humanities Social Science Programming Project of the Ministry of Education of China(No.20YJA630059)+2 种基金the Natural Science Foundation of Jiangxi Province of China(No.20212BAB201011)the China Postdoctoral Science Foundation(No.2019M662265)the Research Project of Economic and Social Development in Liaoning Province of China(No.2022lslybkt-053).
文摘Public-private partnerships(PPPs)have been used by governments around the world to procure and construct infrastructural amenities.It relies on private sector expertise and funding to achieve this lofty objective.However,given the uncertainties of project management,transparency,accountability,and expropriation,this phenomenon has gained tremendous attention in recent years due to the important role it plays in curbing infrastructural deficits globally.Interestingly,the reasonable benefit distribution scheme in a PPP project is related to the behavior decisionmaking of the government and social capital,aswell as the performance of the project.In this paper,the government and social capital which are the key stakeholders of PPP projects were selected as the research objects.Based on the fuzzy expected value model and game theory,a hybrid method was adopted in this research taking into account the different risk preferences of both public entities and private parties under the fuzzy demand environment.To alleviate the problem of insufficient utilization of social capital in a PPP project,this paper seeks to grasp the relationship that exists between the benefit distribution of stakeholders,their behavioral decision-making,and project performance,given that they impact the performance of both public entities and private parties,as well as assist in maximizing the overall utility of the project.Furthermore,four game models were constructed in this study,while the expected value and opportunity-constrained programming model for optimal decision-making were derived using alternate perspectives of both centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making.Afterward,the optimal behavioral decision-making of public entities and private parties in four scenarios was discussed and thereafter compared,which led to an ensuing discussion on the benefit distribution system under centralized decision-making.Lastly,based on an example case,the influence of different confidence levels,price,and fuzzy uncertainties of PPP projects on the equilibrium strategy results of both parties were discussed,giving credence to the effectiveness of the hybrid method.The results indicate that adjusting different confidence levels yields different equilibriumpoints,and therefore signposts that social capital has a fair perception of opportunities,as well as identifies reciprocal preferences.Nevertheless,we find that an increase in the cost coefficient of the government and social capital does not inhibit the effort of both parties.Our results also indicate that a reasonable benefit distribution of PPP projects can assist them in realizing optimum Pareto improvements over time.The results provide us with very useful strategies and recommendations to improve the overall performance of PPP projects in China.
文摘随着分布式能源的发展,传统用户具备发电能力而成为产消者(production and consumption users,PCU)的趋势愈演愈烈,该文主要研究了同一微能网下大量产消者的协同运行问题。电价不确定性和产消者响应给微能网协同不同利益主体的PCU之间的调度带来困难。在此背景下提出考虑产消者响应与电价不确定性的微能网与产消者混合博弈优化策略。首先,构建产消者响应模型和电价不确定性模型,引入效用函数来描述PCU的满意程度,采用鲁棒优化和机会约束方法描述电价的不确定性与新能源出力的不确定性。其次,构建混合博弈模型,即上层微能网运营商(integrated energy operator,IEO)与下层PCU之间的主从博弈模型和下层PCU联盟之间的合作博弈模型。上层IEO作为主从博弈的领导者以运行成本最小化为目标,通过为产消者制定电价、热价引导产消者的用能需求;下层产消者作为跟随者,以效益最大为目标通过合作方式对IEO的决策进行产消者响应。PCU之间的合作博弈以纳什议价的方式进行,将PCU模型等效为联盟收益最大化和合作分配两个子问题。基于KKT条件利用Big-M法和Mc Cormick包络法将双层问题转换为单层混合整数线性规划问题求解主从博弈,结合交替方向乘子法(alternating direction multiplier method,ADMM)求解下层合作博弈。结果表明,该文所提策略有效协调了微能网与PCU的调度并保证了PCU合作联盟的公平性。
基金supported in part by the Joint Fund Project of National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.U1766203)the Key R&D and Transformation Plan of Qinghai Province(No.2021-GX-109)the Basic Research Project of Qinghai Province(No.2020-ZJ-741)。
文摘This study utilizes hot dry rock(HDR)geothermal energy,which is not affected by climate,to address the capacity allocation of photovoltaic(PV)-storage hybrid power systems(HPSs)in frigid plateau regions.The study replaces the conventional electrochemical energy storage system with a stable HDR plant assisted by a flexible thermal storage(TS)plant.An HPS consisting of an HDR plant,a TS plant,and a PV plant is proposed.Game approaches are introduced to establish the game pattern model of the proposed HPS as the players.The annualized income of each player is used as the payoff function.Furthermore,non-cooperative game and cooperative game approaches for capacity allocation are proposed according to the interests of each player in the proposed HPS.Finally,the proposed model and approaches are validated by performing calculations for an HPS in the Gonghe Basin,Qinghai,China as a case study.The results show that in the proposed non-cooperative game approach,the players focus only on the individual payoff and neglect the overall system optimality.The proposed cooperative game approach for capacity allocation improves the flexibility of the HPS as well as the payoff of each game player.Thereby,the HPS can better satisfy the power fluctuation rate requirements of the grid and increase the equivalent firm capacity(EFC)of PV plants,which in turn indirectly guarantees the reliability of grid operation.