Based on Iran's sixth development plan,the country's oil and gas industry requires an investment of about$200 bn in the next five years to increase production.The Iranian government,to attract and motivate int...Based on Iran's sixth development plan,the country's oil and gas industry requires an investment of about$200 bn in the next five years to increase production.The Iranian government,to attract and motivate international oil company investment in their oil and gas fields,has presented a new type of risk service contract:the Iranian Petroleum Contract(IPC).This paper summarizes the features of the IPC and presents mathematical models of its fiscal regime for the benefit and guidance of both the National Iranian Oil Company(NIOC)and the contractors.Next,adopting bargaining game theory provides a mathematical model for reaching a win-win situation between the NIOC and the contractor.Finally,a numerical example is given and a sensitivity analysis performed to illustrate the implementation of the proposed models.The contractor and the NIOC may use these models when preparing their proposal and in the course of actual negotiations to calculate their internal rate of return,remuneration fee,and net present value for developing the fields at different conditions of their bargaining power,and derive a logical bargain to protect their best possible interests.展开更多
Wireless cooperative communications require appropriate power allocation （PA） between the source and relay nodes. In selfish cooperative communication networks, two partner user nodes could help relaying information...Wireless cooperative communications require appropriate power allocation （PA） between the source and relay nodes. In selfish cooperative communication networks, two partner user nodes could help relaying information for each other, but each user node has the incentive to consume his power solely to decrease its own symbol error rate （SER） at the receiver. In this paper, we propose a fair and efficient PA scheme for the decode-and-forward cooperation protocol in selfish cooperative relay networks. We formulate this PA problem as a two-user cooperative bargaining game, and use Nash bargaining solution （NBS） to achieve a win-win strategy for both partner users. Simulation results indicate that the NBS is fair in that the degree of cooperation of a user only depends on how much contribution its partner can make to decrease its SER at the receiver, and efficient in the sense that the SER performance of both users could be improved through the game.展开更多
Energy saving income distribution mode is of great significance to the energy industry.With the continuous application of new technologies,the problem of excess energy saving income distribution has become one of the ...Energy saving income distribution mode is of great significance to the energy industry.With the continuous application of new technologies,the problem of excess energy saving income distribution has become one of the obstacles to the appreciation of energy performance.At present,the distribution of risk and income is mainly based on the contribution of risk and income,which has some limitations.The benefit distribution of energy saving negotiation between energy saving service companies and clients can be regarded as a bargaining process where an effective range satisfying both parties can be obtained.This provides a new perspective in solving the problem of excess energy saving income distribution in energy management contract projects.展开更多
虚拟电厂(virtual power plant,VPP)可以通过先进的控制技术对海量分散的分布式能源进行有效聚合,为实现低碳发展提供了有效途径。为促进VPP在碳减排方面的积极作用,提出了一种VPP联盟和配电网多主体协同优化框架。首先,基于碳排放流理...虚拟电厂(virtual power plant,VPP)可以通过先进的控制技术对海量分散的分布式能源进行有效聚合,为实现低碳发展提供了有效途径。为促进VPP在碳减排方面的积极作用,提出了一种VPP联盟和配电网多主体协同优化框架。首先,基于碳排放流理论制定了电-碳综合定价方法,激励VPP低碳运行。其次,考虑多个VPP之间采用合作联盟的形式进行共享交易,构建一种基于纳什议价理论的多VPP电碳点对点(peer-to-peer,P2P)交易机制模型,实现资源共享的同时兼顾个体利益和联盟效益。在此基础上,建立一种基于电-碳综合价格引导VPP间电碳P2P交易的VPP联盟-配电网协同优化双层模型。上层模型是多VPP之间电碳P2P最优交易问题,采用自适应步长交替方向乘子法实现多VPP间的分布式求解。下层模型则是配电网的最优经济调度问题。最后,通过算例验证了所提模型和方法的有效性。展开更多
文摘Based on Iran's sixth development plan,the country's oil and gas industry requires an investment of about$200 bn in the next five years to increase production.The Iranian government,to attract and motivate international oil company investment in their oil and gas fields,has presented a new type of risk service contract:the Iranian Petroleum Contract(IPC).This paper summarizes the features of the IPC and presents mathematical models of its fiscal regime for the benefit and guidance of both the National Iranian Oil Company(NIOC)and the contractors.Next,adopting bargaining game theory provides a mathematical model for reaching a win-win situation between the NIOC and the contractor.Finally,a numerical example is given and a sensitivity analysis performed to illustrate the implementation of the proposed models.The contractor and the NIOC may use these models when preparing their proposal and in the course of actual negotiations to calculate their internal rate of return,remuneration fee,and net present value for developing the fields at different conditions of their bargaining power,and derive a logical bargain to protect their best possible interests.
基金supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 60972059)Project Funded by the Priority Academic Program Development of Jiangsu Higher Education Institutions (PAPD)+3 种基金Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities of China (Nos. 2010QNA27 and 2011QNB26)China Postdoctoral Science Foundation (No. 20100481185)the Ph. D. Programs Foundation of Ministry of Education of China (Nos. 20090095120013 and 20110095120006)Talent Introduction Program, and Young Teacher Sailing Program of China University of Mining and Technology
文摘Wireless cooperative communications require appropriate power allocation （PA） between the source and relay nodes. In selfish cooperative communication networks, two partner user nodes could help relaying information for each other, but each user node has the incentive to consume his power solely to decrease its own symbol error rate （SER） at the receiver. In this paper, we propose a fair and efficient PA scheme for the decode-and-forward cooperation protocol in selfish cooperative relay networks. We formulate this PA problem as a two-user cooperative bargaining game, and use Nash bargaining solution （NBS） to achieve a win-win strategy for both partner users. Simulation results indicate that the NBS is fair in that the degree of cooperation of a user only depends on how much contribution its partner can make to decrease its SER at the receiver, and efficient in the sense that the SER performance of both users could be improved through the game.
文摘Energy saving income distribution mode is of great significance to the energy industry.With the continuous application of new technologies,the problem of excess energy saving income distribution has become one of the obstacles to the appreciation of energy performance.At present,the distribution of risk and income is mainly based on the contribution of risk and income,which has some limitations.The benefit distribution of energy saving negotiation between energy saving service companies and clients can be regarded as a bargaining process where an effective range satisfying both parties can be obtained.This provides a new perspective in solving the problem of excess energy saving income distribution in energy management contract projects.
文摘虚拟电厂(virtual power plant,VPP)可以通过先进的控制技术对海量分散的分布式能源进行有效聚合,为实现低碳发展提供了有效途径。为促进VPP在碳减排方面的积极作用,提出了一种VPP联盟和配电网多主体协同优化框架。首先,基于碳排放流理论制定了电-碳综合定价方法,激励VPP低碳运行。其次,考虑多个VPP之间采用合作联盟的形式进行共享交易,构建一种基于纳什议价理论的多VPP电碳点对点(peer-to-peer,P2P)交易机制模型,实现资源共享的同时兼顾个体利益和联盟效益。在此基础上,建立一种基于电-碳综合价格引导VPP间电碳P2P交易的VPP联盟-配电网协同优化双层模型。上层模型是多VPP之间电碳P2P最优交易问题,采用自适应步长交替方向乘子法实现多VPP间的分布式求解。下层模型则是配电网的最优经济调度问题。最后,通过算例验证了所提模型和方法的有效性。
