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The Effect of Spillovers on R&D Level
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作者 Wang Yan +2 位作者 Li Chu-lin 《Wuhan University Journal of Natural Sciences》 CAS 2003年第01A期9-14,共6页
This paper emphasizes the effect of spillovers on R&D (Research and Development) level. When competing firms have spillovers to each other in R&D, cooperation will always increase fi... This paper emphasizes the effect of spillovers on R&D (Research and Development) level. When competing firms have spillovers to each other in R&D, cooperation will always increase firms' profits. Only if the positive spillover is large enough, the cooperative R&D level will be larger than the non\|cooperative R&D level. The cooperative level will be smaller than the non\|cooperative level if the positive spillover is small enough. However, the cooperative level is always smaller than the non\|cooperative level while there're negative spillovers to each other. R&D levels are the function of the spillover and will change with the spillover. The changing regularity is related to the sign of spillover and to whether they're cooperative or not. Spillovers made by the competing firms are usually different. When spillovers are small enough, the larger the spillover obtained from the other, the smaller the firm will invest in R&D; inversely, when the spillover is large enough, the larger spillovers obtains from the other, the larger the firm will invest in R&D. 展开更多
关键词 SPILLOVER cooperative and non\|cooperative r&d l evel PROFIT
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NEW PROSPEROUS FIELD FOR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIONS——R&D TECHNOLOGIES OF AUTO PRODUCTS
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《中国汽车(英文版)》 1995年第2期3-4,共2页
With the rapid development of China auto industry, the Chinese Government and the auto industry itself have given more and more attention to the upgrading self-R&D capacity of auto products. Ten years later, it is... With the rapid development of China auto industry, the Chinese Government and the auto industry itself have given more and more attention to the upgrading self-R&D capacity of auto products. Ten years later, it is predicted that the national economy and living standard will be improved greatly, and there will be a peak of the procurement 展开更多
关键词 NEW PROSPEROUS FIELD FOR INTERNATIONAL cooperationS r&d TECHNOLOGIES OF AUTO PRODUCTS more
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A Bounded Commitment in Vertical Collaborations of New Product Development
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作者 Zehui GE Zhengkun REN +1 位作者 Qiying HU Yiheng JIA 《Journal of Systems Science and Information》 CSCD 2021年第2期154-174,共21页
Uncertainty is a main source of opportunistic behaviors in research and development cooperations,which challenges strategic decisions ranging from investments to operations.To avoid opportunism arising in cooperations... Uncertainty is a main source of opportunistic behaviors in research and development cooperations,which challenges strategic decisions ranging from investments to operations.To avoid opportunism arising in cooperations,commitments(either formal contracts or informal communications)are generally made in advance by members of an alliance.However,how does a commitment encourage R&D investments and ultimately enhance the total performance,without loss of flexibility in ex post operations?This study attempts to answer this by investigating a bounded commitment in the context of vertical collaborations in a supply chain.In this exploratory study,a 3-stage game model is used(by backward induction)to examine a two-echelon supply chain under a bounded commitment in NPD.Our analysis shows that upstream R&D investment is stimulated more and that both members are better off under the bounded commitment.At the same time,when the relative bargaining power between the supplier and the manufacturer falls into an appropriate area,it is possible to reach a bounded commitment,and the manufacturer is more sensitive to this relationship.Finally,the bounded commitment restrains opportunistic behaviors,but there is no strong sign that an increase in the ratio of the order outside the chain to the inside one can make firms better. 展开更多
关键词 new product development r&d cooperation supply chain management COMMITMENT opportunistic behavior
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