This paper focuses on the bridge council and free ferry services as the private organizers of public infrastructure construction in the Qing Dynasty, uncovers the legal entity ownership system and governance model wit...This paper focuses on the bridge council and free ferry services as the private organizers of public infrastructure construction in the Qing Dynasty, uncovers the legal entity ownership system and governance model with China's native origin, and reveals the attributes and characteristics of ownership by legal entities in China's traditional era. Bridge councils and free ferry services are non-profit and non-government public-interest institutions, whose members were elected by local communities. These councils were responsible for the fundraising, construction, and long-term maintenance and operation of public facilities and infrastructure at the grassroots level. They adopted open and transparent management procedures and could coordinate cross-jurisdictional affairs and mediate disputes. They possessed independent assets such as lands and fund reserves, and such exclusive legal-entity ownership received protection from the government and under the laws. Such form of legal-entity ownership provided the institutional foundation for the development of clans, temples, charitable groups, academies of classical learning, and various associations and societies. These self-organizing groups demonstrate remarkable mobilization and organizational capabilities and institutional creativity of civil society in traditional China. They served as a link between the government and communities and played a unique and active role in maintaining social order at the grassroots level.展开更多
Decentralization can alter the incentive structure of local governments and one outcome of this is debt accumulation. Based on the “Province-Managing-County” pilot policy, a fiscal decentralization reform devolving ...Decentralization can alter the incentive structure of local governments and one outcome of this is debt accumulation. Based on the “Province-Managing-County” pilot policy, a fiscal decentralization reform devolving fiscal power from the prefecture-level city to the county level, we assess the impact of fiscal decentralization on local government debt using a difference-in-differences model with a unique county-level dataset from 2011 to 2019. According to the study findings, the “Province-Managing-County” reform resulted in an average increase of 5.758 percent in the local government debt ratio across the pilot counties. Mechanism analyses suggest that this may have arisen from changes in the incentive structure, including external pressures from government assessments and internal developmental needs for promotion, leading to a rise in expenditure pressures on local governments. The role of supervision in mitigating the impact of fiscal decentralization on debt growth was also demonstrated, indicating that an appropriate supervision mechanism must be in place in conjunction with a decentralization policy.展开更多
文摘This paper focuses on the bridge council and free ferry services as the private organizers of public infrastructure construction in the Qing Dynasty, uncovers the legal entity ownership system and governance model with China's native origin, and reveals the attributes and characteristics of ownership by legal entities in China's traditional era. Bridge councils and free ferry services are non-profit and non-government public-interest institutions, whose members were elected by local communities. These councils were responsible for the fundraising, construction, and long-term maintenance and operation of public facilities and infrastructure at the grassroots level. They adopted open and transparent management procedures and could coordinate cross-jurisdictional affairs and mediate disputes. They possessed independent assets such as lands and fund reserves, and such exclusive legal-entity ownership received protection from the government and under the laws. Such form of legal-entity ownership provided the institutional foundation for the development of clans, temples, charitable groups, academies of classical learning, and various associations and societies. These self-organizing groups demonstrate remarkable mobilization and organizational capabilities and institutional creativity of civil society in traditional China. They served as a link between the government and communities and played a unique and active role in maintaining social order at the grassroots level.
基金The authors are grateful for support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Nos.71973118,72173136,and 72103208)National Social Science Foundation of China(No.20&ZD080)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities of Zhongnan University of Economics and Law(No.2722024AK004).
文摘Decentralization can alter the incentive structure of local governments and one outcome of this is debt accumulation. Based on the “Province-Managing-County” pilot policy, a fiscal decentralization reform devolving fiscal power from the prefecture-level city to the county level, we assess the impact of fiscal decentralization on local government debt using a difference-in-differences model with a unique county-level dataset from 2011 to 2019. According to the study findings, the “Province-Managing-County” reform resulted in an average increase of 5.758 percent in the local government debt ratio across the pilot counties. Mechanism analyses suggest that this may have arisen from changes in the incentive structure, including external pressures from government assessments and internal developmental needs for promotion, leading to a rise in expenditure pressures on local governments. The role of supervision in mitigating the impact of fiscal decentralization on debt growth was also demonstrated, indicating that an appropriate supervision mechanism must be in place in conjunction with a decentralization policy.
