Reflect on the benefits and costs of the current approaches in the European Union and the People’s Republic of China.To the conclusion that State Owned Enterprises(SOE)’s and more generally state conduct should be f...Reflect on the benefits and costs of the current approaches in the European Union and the People’s Republic of China.To the conclusion that State Owned Enterprises(SOE)’s and more generally state conduct should be fully covered by competition law.展开更多
State-owned enterprises(SOEs)are important components of the Chinese economy.Although SOEs are generally considered inefficient in operations,China’s economy,which relies heavily on SOEs,has been highly successful ov...State-owned enterprises(SOEs)are important components of the Chinese economy.Although SOEs are generally considered inefficient in operations,China’s economy,which relies heavily on SOEs,has been highly successful over the last four decades.This indicates the importance of SOEs in China’s past and future economic success.Therefore,in this study,we review the literature on economic theories and 40 years of practice of Chinese SOEs and discuss implications for future research.Our review consists of four parts:the theories of SOEs and their reform,the performance and financing strategies of SOEs,corporate governance in SOEs,and corporate social responsibility in SOEs.展开更多
Chinese outward direct investment （ODI） is expanding at an unprecedented rate. The present study augments the understanding of the determinants and drivers of Chinese ODI. It reviews the literature on Chinese 0191 a...Chinese outward direct investment （ODI） is expanding at an unprecedented rate. The present study augments the understanding of the determinants and drivers of Chinese ODI. It reviews the literature on Chinese 0191 and analyzes investment by state-owned enterprises （SOE） for the period 2003-2008, focusing specifically on the differences between the determinants of Chinese investment in developed （OECD） and developing （non-OECD） economies. In addition, the study assesses the appropriateness of the general framework used for investigating ODI determinants （Dunning＇s eclectic paradigm） to analyze the experience of Chinese SOE. The findings indicate that Dunning＇s eclectic paradigm provides an excellent theoretical framework for analyzing the determinants of Chinese SOE investment in developed countries, and provides a good starting point for analysis of Chinese investment in developing countries. However, Dunning＇s specification requires refinement for developing countries. This paper finds a distinct difference between the motivations for Chinese SOE investment in developed and developing countries.展开更多
This article examines the reception of Western corporate governance models and standards into the Chinese system of corporate governance. It investigates how China has adapted these models to fit in with its political...This article examines the reception of Western corporate governance models and standards into the Chinese system of corporate governance. It investigates how China has adapted these models to fit in with its political, economic, and cultural norms in relation to its state owned enterprises （SOEs）, a large number of which are now listed in onthe Fortune Global 500 list. Overall, the study highlights that firstly, the importance of culture in the shaping and functioning of human behavior as well as that of institutions, and in their subsequent path dependence; and secondly the limited impact of property rights, minority shareholder rights, and financial markets as arbiters of the destination of investment funds.展开更多
Executive turnover is important in the governance of state-owned enterprises(SOEs). Herein, we focus on the executive turnover of China's SOEs, and the implementation of related evaluation mechanisms under differe...Executive turnover is important in the governance of state-owned enterprises(SOEs). Herein, we focus on the executive turnover of China's SOEs, and the implementation of related evaluation mechanisms under different levels of government intervention. We collect executive turnover data of listed Chinese SOEs from 1999 to 2012, and find that about half of the SOE executives leave office within two terms, which is in line with government recommendations. Moreover, we find that more than a third of executives leave after less than one term, and nearly 20% after more than two terms, highlighting the uncertainty and unpredictability of executive appointments in SOEs. We also find that the executive evaluation mechanism for SOEs is implemented differently under different levels of government intervention. SOEs under weak intervention, such as those controlled indirectly by governments, controlled with low shareholdings, from non-regulated industries or in the Eastern regions, prefer the market-oriented evaluation method, which places more weight on executives' economic performance. In contrast, those under strong intervention prefer the government-oriented evaluation method, which is characterized by policy burden.展开更多
A growing number of developed country governments in recent years have adopted a hostile attitude towards foreign direct investments undertaken in their markets by state-owned enterprises （SOEs）, the latter often ba...A growing number of developed country governments in recent years have adopted a hostile attitude towards foreign direct investments undertaken in their markets by state-owned enterprises （SOEs）, the latter often based in China. The broad reason for this hostility is the belief that state-owned enterprises pursue non-commercial objectives with resulting damage to host economies. This paper argues that the empirical evidence shows SOEs are increasingly exhibiting market-owned behavior. Furthermore, any adverse consequences of non-commercial behavior are likely to be realized primarily by the SOEs themselves.展开更多
文摘Reflect on the benefits and costs of the current approaches in the European Union and the People’s Republic of China.To the conclusion that State Owned Enterprises(SOE)’s and more generally state conduct should be fully covered by competition law.
基金financial support of the National Social Science Fund of China Key Research Project(No.17ZDA086):Research on Reforms and Innovations of Monitoring System in State-Owned Enterprises.
文摘State-owned enterprises(SOEs)are important components of the Chinese economy.Although SOEs are generally considered inefficient in operations,China’s economy,which relies heavily on SOEs,has been highly successful over the last four decades.This indicates the importance of SOEs in China’s past and future economic success.Therefore,in this study,we review the literature on economic theories and 40 years of practice of Chinese SOEs and discuss implications for future research.Our review consists of four parts:the theories of SOEs and their reform,the performance and financing strategies of SOEs,corporate governance in SOEs,and corporate social responsibility in SOEs.
文摘Chinese outward direct investment （ODI） is expanding at an unprecedented rate. The present study augments the understanding of the determinants and drivers of Chinese ODI. It reviews the literature on Chinese 0191 and analyzes investment by state-owned enterprises （SOE） for the period 2003-2008, focusing specifically on the differences between the determinants of Chinese investment in developed （OECD） and developing （non-OECD） economies. In addition, the study assesses the appropriateness of the general framework used for investigating ODI determinants （Dunning＇s eclectic paradigm） to analyze the experience of Chinese SOE. The findings indicate that Dunning＇s eclectic paradigm provides an excellent theoretical framework for analyzing the determinants of Chinese SOE investment in developed countries, and provides a good starting point for analysis of Chinese investment in developing countries. However, Dunning＇s specification requires refinement for developing countries. This paper finds a distinct difference between the motivations for Chinese SOE investment in developed and developing countries.
文摘This article examines the reception of Western corporate governance models and standards into the Chinese system of corporate governance. It investigates how China has adapted these models to fit in with its political, economic, and cultural norms in relation to its state owned enterprises （SOEs）, a large number of which are now listed in onthe Fortune Global 500 list. Overall, the study highlights that firstly, the importance of culture in the shaping and functioning of human behavior as well as that of institutions, and in their subsequent path dependence; and secondly the limited impact of property rights, minority shareholder rights, and financial markets as arbiters of the destination of investment funds.
文摘Executive turnover is important in the governance of state-owned enterprises(SOEs). Herein, we focus on the executive turnover of China's SOEs, and the implementation of related evaluation mechanisms under different levels of government intervention. We collect executive turnover data of listed Chinese SOEs from 1999 to 2012, and find that about half of the SOE executives leave office within two terms, which is in line with government recommendations. Moreover, we find that more than a third of executives leave after less than one term, and nearly 20% after more than two terms, highlighting the uncertainty and unpredictability of executive appointments in SOEs. We also find that the executive evaluation mechanism for SOEs is implemented differently under different levels of government intervention. SOEs under weak intervention, such as those controlled indirectly by governments, controlled with low shareholdings, from non-regulated industries or in the Eastern regions, prefer the market-oriented evaluation method, which places more weight on executives' economic performance. In contrast, those under strong intervention prefer the government-oriented evaluation method, which is characterized by policy burden.
文摘A growing number of developed country governments in recent years have adopted a hostile attitude towards foreign direct investments undertaken in their markets by state-owned enterprises （SOEs）, the latter often based in China. The broad reason for this hostility is the belief that state-owned enterprises pursue non-commercial objectives with resulting damage to host economies. This paper argues that the empirical evidence shows SOEs are increasingly exhibiting market-owned behavior. Furthermore, any adverse consequences of non-commercial behavior are likely to be realized primarily by the SOEs themselves.
