Central environmental protection inspection and carbon emission reduction: A tripartite evolutionary game model from the perspective of carbon neutrality

Since the carbon neutrality target was proposed,many countries have been facing severe challenges to carbon emission reduction sustainably.This study is conducted using a tripartite evolutionary game model to explore the impact of the central environmental protection inspection(CEPI)on driving carbon emission reduction,and to study what factors influence the strategic choices of each party and how they interact with each other.The research results suggest that local governments and manufacturing enterprises would choose strategies that are beneficial to carbon reduction when CEPI increases.When the initial willingness of all parties increases 20%,50%—80%,the time spent for the whole system to achieve stability decreases from 100%,60%—30%.The evolutionary result of“thorough inspection,regulation implementation,low-carbon management”is the best strategy for the tripartite evolutionary game.Moreover,the smaller the cost and the larger the benefit,the greater the likelihood of the three-party game stability strategy appears.This study has important guiding significance for other developing countries to promote carbon emission reduction by environmental policy.

The evolution of central environmental protection inspection policy attention in China: An investigation based on inspection reports

The central environmental protection inspection (CEPI) system in China is a significant institutional innova‐tion in national environmental governance. The CEPI applies a joint supervision strategy to address salient en‐vironmental issues and strictly enforce the environmental responsibilities of local governments. This study col‐lects and organizes CEPI inspection reports covering three stages that encompass the first round, the “look back”, and the second round, applying text analysis to obtain sample data and conduct statistical quantifica‐tion of word frequency in inspection reports and identify notable changes. The study explores the allocation of CEPI attention between policy objectives and the intensity of policy instruments. We determine that in con‐junction with public opinion feedback, the CEPI conducts targeted inspections and focuses more on pollutant governance, which has high severity and can be addressed quickly. The CEPI fills the gap of normalized gover‐nance with a campaign-style governance approach. Regarding the intensity of policy measures, the CEPI pri‐marily uses economic incentive policy instruments, supplemented by command-and-control and public guid‐ance approaches, advancing the sustainability of regulatory effectiveness through economic, social, and politi‐cal activities. This study extends knowledge in the field of CEPI policy priorities and implementation, expand‐ing the literature related to outcomes of environmental policy in developing countries.

The Impact of Central Environmental Inspections on the Perception of Respect for Human Rights and Its Empirical Analysis

To develop China’s human rights cause with a people-centered approach,we should pay close attention to the concrete experiences of the general public regarding the protection of human rights.Deepening the research on the perception of respect for human rights can contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of the practical achievements of the hu man rights cause.Public environmental rights,as a new type of human rights,have become an important aspect of the development of the human rights cause in the new era.The central envi ronmental inspection,as an authoritative and interventionist vertical governance mechanism,promotes the implementation of environmental policies by local Party committees and govern ments and strengthens environmental information disclosure and public participation in environ mental matters.As a result,it contributes to the realization of public environmental rights and stimulates public perception of respect for human rights.Among them,the“look-back inspec tion is an important component of the central environmental inspection,and its implemen tation consolidates and enhances the previous inspection work.An empirical analysis based on the World Values Survey’s data for China indicates that residents in the provinces that have underg one“look-back inspections are more inclined to believe that human rights are adequately re spected compared to residents in the provinces that have not underwent such inspections.It suggests that the advancement and improvement of the central environmental inspection system promote improvements in ecological environment quality and contribute to enhancing the public percep tion of respect for human rights.

Distribution of chlorophyll a, photosynthesis and their relations to the environmental factors in the Central South China Sea

Some studies have been made on the variation of primary productivity in the Central South ChinaSea. This paper studies comprehensively the characteristics of chlorophyll a distributions in time andspace and the primary productivity, as well their relations to the environmental factors.Materals and methods During the comprehensive investigation in the Central South China Sea from September 1983 toDecember 1984, the distributions of chlorophyll a and primary productivity were studied. Figure 1shows the sampling stations and their range of investigation.

Does Chinese Environmental Policy Affect Income Inequality? Evidence from the Central Environmental Protection Inspection

This paper investigates the effect of environmental policy on income inequality.It focuses on the central environmental protection inspection led by the central government in China.Using a diference-in-diferences approach,it finds evidence that environmental regulation decreased the per capita income and enlarged the gap between urban and rural income while showing an insignificant effect on employment.Although the policy can reduce pollution levels and bring environmental benefits in aggregate,the findings of this study suggest that the regulations appear to have reduced the proportion of manufacturing industry and hindered general innovation and investment from entrepreneurs,which resulted in greater inequality.Rural residents suffered more from environmental regulation due to relatively high migration costs and their disadvantaged human resources on the aspects of health,education level,and skills.The local government's execution incentive can also play a key role in the effectiveness of environmental policy.Regions with lower GDP growth targets and younger government leaders were affected significantly with regard to the income growth of local residents and the urban-rural income gap.

Frozen Quantum Coherence for a Central Two-Qubit System in a Spin-Chain Environment

We investigate the dynamics of coherence for a central two-qubit system coupled to an XY spin chain with the Dzyaloshinsky–Moriya interaction. It is found that a sudden transition of coherence exists near the critical point in the weak-coupling case, and an oscillatory envelope appears in the strong-coupling case. In both cases the freezing phenomenon of coherence can be found.

Environment and economic feasibility of municipal solid waste central sorting strategy： a case study in Beijing

Although Beijing has carried out municipal solid waste （MSW） source separation since 1996, it has largely been ineffective. In 2012, a ＂Green House＂ program was established as a new attempt for central sorting. In this study, the authors used material flow analysis （MFA） and cost benefit analysis （CBA） methods to investigate Green House＇s environment and economic feasibility. Results showed that the program did have significant environmental benefits on waste reduction, which reduced the amount of waste by 34%. If the Green House program is implemented in a residential community with wet waste ratio of 66%, the proportion of waste reduction can reach 37%. However, the Green House is now running with a monthly loss of 1982 CNY. This is mainly because most of its benefits come from waste reduction （i.e., 5878 CNY per month）, which does not turn a monetary benefit, but is instead distributed to the whole of society as positive environmental externalities. Lack of government involvement, small program scale, and technical/managerial deficiency are three main barriers of the Green House. We, thus, make three recommendations： involve government authority and financial support, expand the program scale to separate 91.4 tons of waste every month, and use more professional equipment/technologies. If the Green House program can successfully adopt these suggestions, 33.8 tons of waste can be reduced monthly, and it would be able to flip the loss into a profit worth 35034 CNY.