A systematic fuzzy approach is developed to model fuzziness and uncertainties in the preferences of decision makers involved in a conflict. This unique fuzzy preference formulation is used within the paradigm of the G...A systematic fuzzy approach is developed to model fuzziness and uncertainties in the preferences of decision makers involved in a conflict. This unique fuzzy preference formulation is used within the paradigm of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution in which a given dispute is modeled in terms of decision makers, each decision maker＇s courses of actions or options, and each decision maker＇s preferences concerning the states or outcomes which could take place. In order to be able to determine the stability of each state for each decision maker and the possible equilibria or resolutions, a range of solution concepts describing potential human behavior under conflict are defined for use with fuzzy preferences. More specifically, strong and weak definitions of stability are provided for the solution concepts called Nash, general metarational, symmetric metarational, and sequential stability. To illustrate how these solution concepts can be conveniently used in practice, they are applied to a dispute over the contamination of an aquifer by a chemical company located in Elmira, Ontario, Canada.展开更多
Insightful theorems are established on interrelationships among coalition and noncooperative stability concepts defined within the paradigm of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution. More specifically, the newly defi...Insightful theorems are established on interrelationships among coalition and noncooperative stability concepts defined within the paradigm of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution. More specifically, the newly defined coalition stability def＇mitions that are considered are coalition Nash stability （CNash）, coalition general metarationality （CGMR）, coalition symmetric metarationality （CSMR） and coalition sequential stability （CSEQ）, along with their earlier-defined noncooperative versions. A range of interesting new theorems are derived to establish connections among these coalition stability concepts as well as between noncooperative and coalition stability definitions. Applications with respect to the games of Prisoner＇s Dilemma and Chicken, as well as a groundwater contamination dispute, demonstrate how the various stability definitions can be applied in practice and confirm the validity of some of the theorems as well as point out, by example, certain types of relationships which cannot hold.展开更多
基金funded by a Discovery Grant from the Natural Science and Engineering Research Council(NSERC)of Canada as well as a grant from the Government of Saudi Arabia.
文摘A systematic fuzzy approach is developed to model fuzziness and uncertainties in the preferences of decision makers involved in a conflict. This unique fuzzy preference formulation is used within the paradigm of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution in which a given dispute is modeled in terms of decision makers, each decision maker＇s courses of actions or options, and each decision maker＇s preferences concerning the states or outcomes which could take place. In order to be able to determine the stability of each state for each decision maker and the possible equilibria or resolutions, a range of solution concepts describing potential human behavior under conflict are defined for use with fuzzy preferences. More specifically, strong and weak definitions of stability are provided for the solution concepts called Nash, general metarational, symmetric metarational, and sequential stability. To illustrate how these solution concepts can be conveniently used in practice, they are applied to a dispute over the contamination of an aquifer by a chemical company located in Elmira, Ontario, Canada.
文摘Insightful theorems are established on interrelationships among coalition and noncooperative stability concepts defined within the paradigm of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution. More specifically, the newly defined coalition stability def＇mitions that are considered are coalition Nash stability （CNash）, coalition general metarationality （CGMR）, coalition symmetric metarationality （CSMR） and coalition sequential stability （CSEQ）, along with their earlier-defined noncooperative versions. A range of interesting new theorems are derived to establish connections among these coalition stability concepts as well as between noncooperative and coalition stability definitions. Applications with respect to the games of Prisoner＇s Dilemma and Chicken, as well as a groundwater contamination dispute, demonstrate how the various stability definitions can be applied in practice and confirm the validity of some of the theorems as well as point out, by example, certain types of relationships which cannot hold.
