Executive Compensation and Corporate Financial Performance： Empirical Evidences on Brazilian Industrial Companies

This survey investigated the relationship between executive compensation and the financial performance of companies. It is hypothesized that a company can utilize its pay system to direct executives＇ efforts toward its strategic business objectives, thus contributing to higher levels of corporate financial performance. The survey data consisted of a secondary and non-probabilistic sample of 44 Brazilian industrial companies. In order to operationalize the independent remuneration variable, the authors used average monthly salary, average variable salary, and three indices that were created for this survey： benefits, career, and development. These indices measure the access to benefits, mechanisms for stimulating and supporting careers, and mechanisms to encourage education and professional development that companies offer to their directors, vice presidents, and chief executive officers （CEOs）, who are referred to in this paper by the term ＂executive＂. The remuneration data are from fiscal year 2006. In order to operationalize the financial performance variable, two accounting indicators were used： sales growth and return on equity （ROE） for fiscal years 2006 and 2007. The size of the companies was used as a control variable. The results of a multiple regression analysis do not support the hypothesis that there is a positive and significant relationship between executive compensation and corporate financial performance.

Executive Compensation： Is It Right？

Issues are arising regarding the large amount of money provided to top executives in many compames tor Uaetr bonuses and incentives. These huge amounts for executive compensation are being questioned in comparison to the dividends received by stockholders. Four companies are analyzed： Citigroup, Starbucks, General Electric （GE）, and Kraft Foods. Present issues faced by Citigroup show that the company＇s provision in their executive compensation is not acceptable, On the other hand, Starbucks, GE, and Kraft Foods are the companies that follow legal rules provided by the Securities and Exchange Commission （SEC） in providing compensations to executives. Thus, they are good exemplars to other companies.

Executive Compensation and Firm Performance in Japan： The Role of Keiretsu Memberships and Bank-Appointed Monitors＊

This paper examines the relations between the disciplinary role of Japanese relationship-oriented corporate governance mechanisms, such as keiretsu memberships and bank-appointed directors, and pay for performance sensitivity in Japan. Previous studies show that pay for performance sensitivity of Japanese executive compensation is positive and almost the same as in a market-oriented system like that of the United States of America （USA）. However, previous studies do not investigate how Japanese corporate governance mechanisms like financial keiretsu ties and bank-appointed directors affect pay for performance sensitivity. This paper finds that the disciplinary mechanism of keiretsu memberships and bank-appointed monitors did not function well in Japan in the 1990s.

Empirical Study of the Relations between Executive Compensation Gap and R&D Investment in Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Enterprises

Objective To study the correlation between executive compensation gap and R&D investment of pharmaceutical manufacturing enterprises in China by taking 53 pharmaceutical manufacturing companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2015 to 2017 as research samples. Methods Multiple linear regression methods was used to study the relationship and influence between executive compensation gap and R&D investment in pharmaceutical manufacturing industry based on championship theory and principal-agent theory. Results and Conclusion There is a significant positive correlation between executive compensation gap in pharmaceutical manufacturing industry and enterprise R&D investment. Listed pharmaceutical manufacturing enterprises should design reasonable salary gap between senior executives and carry out reasonable research and development activities to promote the sustainable development of pharmaceutical manufacturing enterprises. This study provides theoretical basis for optimizing executive compensation gap and increasing R&D investment in pharmaceutical manufacturing industry.

Knowledge Graph of China's Executive Compensation Gap:Visual Analysis Based on CiteSpace

This study selected 473 local research articles on executive compensation from core journals in the China Academic Journals(CNKI)full-text database and the Chinese Social Sciences Citation Index(CSSCI)from 2003 to 2020.Then,the bibliometric analysis method was adopted and conducted in regard to the number of articles published,authors,research institutions,high-frequency keywords,etc.In view of the increasing studies of this field,this study showed that a few scholars and institutions with high academic influence have been involved in the research on executive compensation gap in China.The results from this study revealed that the research on the relationship between executive compensation gap and firm performance as well as the moderating variables between them were topics of interests.In the context of the increasing compensation gap which had become a global interest,the research on management power and promotion incentives have established their significance as important research frontiers.

CEO Emotional Intelligence level and Compensation： Evidence From Tunisia

This article focuses on the impact of emotions on Tunisian chief executive officer （CEO） compensation. It examines specifically the role of executives＇ emotional intelligence （El） level and their emotional biases, namely optimism in explaining compensation plans. An empirical study was conducted in this respect, by using a questionnaire as a method of data collection, on a sample of 100 Tunisian companies＇ leaders. This research paper translates an original approach, since it highlights the behavioral aspects role in explaining the CEO＇s compensation policy level. To the best of the knowledge, this represents the first study in the Tunisian context that explored this area of research. Actually, the results show that Tunisian leaders may be subject to certain emotions thereby impacting their compensation characteristics. Indeed, they opt at first to contribute to the organizational performance by establishing a mutual trust within the organizational structure in order to achieve the objectives already set up. However, this could be done at the expense of their compensation plans

高管薪酬结构与企业创新——基于高管风险承担视角

创新是企业获得技术优势的重要行为,有助于国家实现高水平科技自立自强,高管是企业做出创新决策的主体。以2008—2021年中国沪深A股上市公司为研究对象,对高管薪酬结构影响企业创新的效应及作用机制进行了实证检验。研究发现,随着高管薪酬结构中股权薪酬比例的提升,企业创新投入水平呈先上升后下降的倒“U”型趋势。进一步地,以激励物的Delta指数和Vega指数为度量的高管风险承担在薪酬结构影响企业创新的路径中发挥了中介作用。异质性分析表明,高管股权薪酬对企业创新的正向激励效果仅显著存在于非国有企业和位于高市场化程度地区的企业当中。因此,企业要制定合理的薪酬结构,适当提高股权薪酬占比,并注重改善激励环境提升高管的风险承担能力,为企业创新创造良好的内外部环境。

全球化与高管薪酬--基于中国上市公司的经验证据

基于2003—2021年A股制造业上市公司数据,本文从FDI流入的角度实证检验了全球化对高管薪酬的影响及其作用机制。研究发现,全球化显著提高了高管薪酬。该结论在考虑了内生性问题、控制同时期其他政策影响以及遗漏变量问题后依然稳健。此外,进一步研究后发现,全球化主要通过公司治理中的独立董事治理影响高管薪酬,市场机制的作用有限。拓展性研究还发现,全球化对高管薪酬的作用表现出异质性。全球化在非垄断行业和国有企业中具有更大的影响。相较于普通高管,权力型高管在全球化中受益更多,这意味着随着全球化的进展,企业内部高管之间的不平等在加剧。本文的发现提供了全球化对高管薪酬具有积极影响的中国证据,有助于丰富国际贸易与顶端收入分配领域的文献。

薪酬治理、研发创新与企业上市:基于联想集团的案例研究

从定位及规则角度看,科创板最显著的标签就是企业的科创属性。企业在上市时,应把握各板块特点,识别适合发行人的属性,找准公司上市定位,以促进公司的可持续发展。本文以联想集团申报科创板上市为例,分析其科创投入与科创属性、高管薪酬治理,探究其上市过程中存在的问题,对其他红筹企业回归A股具有一定的启示意义。

媒体关注下高管薪酬激励对企业价值的影响研究

以2012-2019年沪深A股上市公司数据为研究对象,探究媒体关注下高管薪酬激励对企业价值的影响。研究结果表明:高管薪酬激励有利于提升企业价值,而无论媒体来源于网络还是报刊,媒体报道数和媒体负面报道数均对二者关系存在积极影响。通过对企业产权属性的划分,发现上述关系在非国有企业中表现得更为突出。

高管纵向兼任对国有企业创新绩效的影响——以风险承担为中介

高管纵向兼任现象在我国国有企业中普遍存在,对企业经营管理和投资决策均产生直接影响。本文基于代理问题和最优契约理论,以2013—2020年中国A股国有企业为样本,研究高管纵向兼任对国有企业创新绩效的作用机制。结果表明:高管纵向兼任对国有企业创新绩效有正向影响;风险承担在高管纵向兼任与国有企业创新绩效的关系中发挥中介作用;信息披露质量以风险承担为中介在高管纵向兼任与国有企业创新绩效的关系中起正向调节作用;高管薪酬粘性以风险承担为中介在高管纵向兼任与国有企业创新绩效的关系中起负向调节作用。本文引入信息披露质量和高管薪酬粘性作为调节变量,拓展了高管纵向兼任与企业创新绩效关系的研究,并为设计国有企业的信息披露制度以及高管人员的薪酬契约制度提供实践指导。

智能制造、内部控制、高管薪酬与企业创新持续性

智能制造是制造强国建设的主攻方向,是制造业高质量发展的重要手段。文章以智能制造试点示范项目为准自然实验,借助双重差分模型探讨智能制造、内部控制和企业创新持续性之间的关系,并考察高管薪酬的调节作用。研究发现:智能制造能提升制造业企业的创新持续性,且对不同产权性质的企业存在异质性;内部控制在智能制造与企业创新持续性之间起部分中介作用;高管薪酬在内部控制与企业创新持续性之间起负向调节作用。为提升企业创新持续性,文章提出要进一步扩大智能制造试点示范规模、加强企业间交流学习、提升专业化生产服务能力和内部控制水平等。

高管薪酬差距、竞争地位与企业绩效

基于锦标赛和行为决策理论,以2010—2020年A股上市公司面板数据为对象,实证探讨高管薪酬差距、竞争地位与企业绩效之间的关系。研究得出:(1)我国上市公司高管薪酬差距与企业绩效呈正相关,即高管薪酬差距的扩大有助于提升企业绩效;(2)企业竞争地位对高管薪酬差距与企业绩效的正向关系产生正向调节作用。该研究为锦标赛理论提供了新的实证支持,对企业建立合理薪酬体系、增强竞争地位具有重要的实践启示。

高管薪酬激励、真实盈余管理和企业高质量发展

选取2010—2022年沪深A股上市公司的面板数据,检验高管薪酬激励对企业全要素生产率的影响,探究真实盈余管理在其中是否发挥中介作用,根据产权性质进行异质性分析。结果表明:高管薪酬激励与企业全要素生产率之间存在显著正向关系,同时真实盈余管理在其中发挥部分中介作用;异质性检验发现在非国有企业中,高管薪酬激励显著抑制真实盈余管理行为,而国有企业中并不显著。基于此,从“奖”与“惩”两方面为促进企业高质量发展提出建议。

薪酬监管对央企风险承担的影响研究——基于《薪酬制度改革方案》准自然实验的证据

尽管精确地评估薪酬监管政策对企业激励机制的影响具有重要的学术意义和政策价值,但囿于数据以及识别策略,当前研究还存在诸多争议和不足.本研究利用2015年初中央政府针对央企实施的《中央管理企业负责人薪酬制度改革方案》这一国家治理机制对高管薪酬构成的外生冲击,考察薪酬激励对央企风险承担行为产生的影响.研究发现相对于高管薪酬不受该改革方案影响的央企而言,受到影响的央企其风险承担水平显著降低;并且企业竞争程度越小、控制链层级越长、高管晋升预期越大,该薪酬改革方案对央企风险承担水平的负向影响越小,可见薪酬管制作为公司外部治理机制在一定程度上与这三个因素呈现替代关系.进一步研究发现,该改革方案还改变了央企的高风险投、融资行为.具体表现为债务融资率更低,创新投入规模更大但创新产出却更低.上述检验结果意味着与企业发展相适应的激励机制是提升央企风险承担水平的必要前提.因此,本研究有助于增进对央企高管薪酬契约的理解和认识,从而对推动和深化以高质量发展为目标的国企综合性改革具有重要的政策含义.

扩大还是缩小:ESG表现对企业内部薪酬差距的影响

在企业改善ESG表现的过程中,高管发挥了关键作用并承担了较大风险,使得高管在企业内的地位和在薪酬谈判中的议价能力得以提升,并能够获得更多的风险报酬,进而导致高管与普通员工之间的薪酬差距扩大。采用高管平均薪酬与普通员工平均薪酬之比来衡量企业的内部薪酬差距,以2009—2022年沪深A股上市公司为样本,研究发现:企业ESG表现改善显著提高了高管的平均薪酬,但对普通员工的平均薪酬没有显著影响,从而扩大了企业内部薪酬差距;ESG表现改善能够通过增强高管议价能力和增加高管风险承担两条路径来扩大普通员工与高管之间的薪酬差距;ESG表现改善对企业内部薪酬差距的扩大作用在规模较大的企业、员工议价能力较弱的企业、高新技术行业企业、高污染行业企业中更为显著。因此,在大力推动ESG发展的过程中,应重视企业ESG表现改善的内部薪酬差距扩大效应,并通过完善薪酬分配机制、提高普通员工议价能力等方式有效抑制企业内部薪酬差距的扩大。

企业薪酬水平与经营绩效——基于上市物流企业的数据分析

企业的薪酬激励与经营绩效之间具有较为深刻的关系,文章以2007—2020年物流业上市公司的相关数据研究企业薪酬水平与经营绩效之间的关系,研究发现高管薪酬与物流企业的经营绩效之间是显著的正相关关系;员工薪酬的增加也会推动物流企业经营绩效的提升;相较于员工薪酬而言,高管的薪酬提高更能提升企业经营绩效,最后针对研究结果提出了相关建议。

政府支持、高管激励对企业研发投入的影响——基于创业板上市企业的模糊集定性比较分析

政府与企业层面影响企业研发投入的因素已受到学术界广泛关注。现有文献多专注于讨论单一因素的“净效应”,忽视了多因素层面的协同影响效应。通过运用模糊集定性比较分析(fsQCA)方法对创业板上市的104家高新技术企业进行分析,探究政府与企业两个层面的主要因素如何协同影响企业的研发投入。结果表明,政府支持与高管激励存在6条不同的路径可促使高新技术企业进行高研发投入,具体可归纳为企业主导型、政府推动型和联手推动型3类模式,其中企业主导型最常见。研究结论从各层面因素协同影响的视角对企业研发投入提供了新解读,为创业企业根据政府支持情况匹配较为恰当的高管激励提供了借鉴参考。

监管距离、高管薪酬激励与企业环境信息披露——基于中国重污染行业上市公司的实证研究

以2008-2020年中国重污染行业上市公司为研究样本,实证考察监管距离对企业环境信息披露的影响及高管薪酬激励对上述关系的调节效应。研究发现:监管距离对企业环境信息披露产生显著负向影响,高管薪酬激励强化两者之间的负向影响关系。融合经济地理学与信息不对称理论,拓宽了企业环境信息披露影响因素的文献研究,为推动数字经济时代政府对企业的监管提供了全新视角,为完善企业环境信息披露、高管薪酬制度提供了经验启示。

跨境并购与高管薪酬——来自上市企业的经验证据

本文使用2012—2019年实施跨境并购的上市企业数据,结合倾向得分匹配法和双重差分法,考察跨境并购对高管薪酬的实际影响、作用机制与差异化特征。结果表明,跨境并购显著提升了中国上市企业高管薪酬,且在并购后第3年仍然发挥作用。进一步研究发现,跨境并购对高管薪酬的影响兼具相对合理的市场渠道和不合理的非市场渠道。市场渠道表现为跨境并购能让有海外经历的高管获取更高的薪酬;非市场渠道包括跨境并购使得权力更大的高管获得更高的薪酬以及跨境并购增加了高管的超额薪酬。本文厘清了中国上市企业跨境并购影响高管薪酬的作用渠道,不仅对“一带一路”倡议背景下企业高管薪酬激励具有一定参考意义,而且为中国企业“走出去”的进一步实践提供有益的启示。