GAMES ANALYSIS OF INSURANCE PRICING UNDER CONSIDERING MORAL HAZARD

This paper first gives an explanation of moral hazard in the insurance field,and then offers a game theory model about insurance pricing according to the non zero sum game analysis between the insurer and the insured when moral hazard exists.On the basis of the game analysis,this paper also presents a lowest pricing formula and studies the cost of moral hazard simultaneously.

Study on the Price Design and Contract Stability of "Company + Farmer" Model with Time Preference under Double Moral Hazards

The double moral hazard of ＂company ＋ farmer＂ and the time preference cost of company and farmer was analyzed. According to static game model, it re-vealed that the reason for low compliance rate of ＂company ＋ farmer＂ model was the existence of market risk, namely, the fluctuation of market price, and the stable market price in contracts was actualy a kind of interval, instead of a specific value. Furthermore, the effect of default penalty, market transaction cost and time prefer-ence cost on the stability of contract was studied. The results showed that default penalty, market transaction cost and time preference cost had positive influence on the price interval range of a contract.

The Effect of Reputation to the Moral Hazard in C2C E-Market with Game Theory

It is well known that the reputation is the basis of a seller to survive and gain trust from customers in a competitive business environment. But as the existence of information asymmetry between buyer and seller, the moral hazard problem is the key obstacle that impedes the benefits of related shareholders and reduces the efficiency of total market. It is crucial to design a control mechanism to avoid the negative impact of moral hazard. This paper studies the principal and agent relationship between buyer and seller in C2C e-market;because of the influence of information asymmetry, many customers suffered from being cheated by sellers with defective products in practice. These frequent cases will deteriorate long term relationship between sellers and buyers. Here we focus on the analysis of the causes of moral risks and the effect of reputation on oral risk with repeated game theory. The purpose of this paper is to help both firms and customers effectively avoid morality risk and realize a win-win situation.

Venture Capital Finance-Eliminating Double Sided Moral Hazards through Trade-off between Economic and Behavioural Economic Aspects-A Case Analysis

Venture capital finance has two aspects,the economic aspect and the behavioural economic aspect.The economic aspect includes issues such as conflict of interest between the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist(VC),asymmetric information,moral hazard,and compensation issues for both the parties.The behavioural economic aspect is related to relational factors such as empathy and a feeling of fairness and trust shown by both the parties.Therefore,while deciding the financer,entrepreneur should consider both relational aspect and value add services of the financier and strike optimal trade-off.The ensuing case analysis has been carried out focusing on elimination of double-sided moral hazards through a proper trade-off between economy and behavioural economic theories(aspects).The performance of the venture can be enhanced by balancing both of these theories in practice.An equity distribution that represents economic reward is a source of motivation for both the parties to put optimal efforts towards the success of the venture.This was seen in the case analysis,when the parties perceived the initial equity distribution agreement as fair,the satisfaction level of all the parties increased,leading to the reduction in the possibility of double-sided moral hazard and ensuring the success of the venture.Moreover,the analysis shows that information sharing and two-way communication increases trust and improves decision quality.It further focusses on how feedback and proper work distribution results in efficiency of performance for each of the stakeholders,leading to reduced probability of double-sided moral hazards.

Prevention of the Member＇s Moral Hazard in a Dynamic Alliance

Moral hazard is an important factor threatening stability of dynamic alliance. Firstly, the paper describes the problem of moral hazard in dynamic alliance and introduces the Tirole Model of moral hazard prevention. Then, by introducing a third-party system into dynamic alliance, a model of incomplete information dynamic game theory is formulated in the principal-agent framework. The model shows the dynamic consistency between a member＇s income and the dynamic alliance＇s profit, and that moral hazard can be prevented by an allocation policy With both characteristics of incentive measures and supervision, which is designed by a third-party system. Finally, the composition of the third-party system is discussed.

A PENALTY FUNCTION METHOD FOR THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT PROBLEM WITH AN INFINITE NUMBER OF INCENTIVE-COMPATIBILITY CONSTRAINTS UNDER MORAL HAZARD

In this paper,we propose an iterative algorithm to find the optimal incentive mechanism for the principal-agent problem under moral hazard where the number of agent action profiles is infinite,and where there are an infinite number of results that can be observed by the principal.This principal-agent problem has an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints,and we transform it into an optimization problem with an infinite number of constraints called a semi-infinite programming problem.We then propose an exterior penalty function method to find the optimal solution to this semi-infinite programming and illustrate the convergence of this algorithm.By analyzing the optimal solution obtained by the proposed penalty function method,we can obtain the optimal incentive mechanism for the principal-agent problem with an infinite number of incentive-compatibility constraints under moral hazard.

Analysis of Moral Hazard in Engineering Agent Construction System

Analyze the moral hazard issues in the construction agency system,and enumerate the performance of moral hazard.Deeply analyze the causes,start with strengthening supervision and perfecting incentive measures,eliminate the impact of moral hazard,and give play to the advantages of agent construction.

融资道德风险下订单农业供应链成员信任决策研究

基于订单农业供应链中农户转移资金用途的道德风险问题,考虑农户受资金约束和农户互惠动机,构建公司与农户的序贯互惠信任博弈模型,通过农户完全理性、农户具有互惠动机但公司不提供担保融资、农户具有互惠动机且公司提供担保融资3种情形,分析订单价格、生产成本和融资利率对供应链成员信任的影响及信任决策问题.结果发现:当公司不提供担保融资时,无论农户是否具有互惠动机,双方都不能建立信任互惠关系;当公司提供担保融资且农户具有互惠动机时,则存在3种序贯互惠均衡,在互惠动机满足一定条件时可以实现双方互信;最后,通过算例分析订单价格、生产成本和融资利率对农户互惠敏感程度和守信用概率的影响,提出增强农户互惠动机,设置合理的利益共享和监督机制及丰富订单农业融资服务等建议.

DRG付费下医疗服务供方道德风险表现与防范对策

目的:梳理医保支付方式改革下医疗服务供方道德风险的行为表现,提出防范的对策建议。方法:收集35家样本医院DRG结算数据,对编码人员进行问卷调查,对相关部门工作人员进行访谈,探究医疗服务供方道德风险的疑点与特征。结果:DRG付费引发医疗服务供方新的道德风险行为,在医疗服务前期、中期、后期有不同的表现形式,给患者、医保基金和医疗机构造成了不利影响。结论:DRG付费下要加强对医疗服务供方监管,创新监管模式,完善医保沟通渠道,建立协商谈判机制,加强诊疗规范,提高编码能力,防范新型道德风险行为。

医疗保险会引致道德风险吗?——以城乡居民医保为例

文章使用2005—2018年中国老年健康影响因素跟踪调查的五期平衡面板数据,使用双向固定效应模型,分析参加城乡居民医保对老年人道德风险的影响。研究发现,参保并不会引致老年人不健康行为增多的事前道德风险,但会带来医疗费用支出上涨的事后道德风险;年龄越小、健康状况变差的老年人在参保后更易出现医疗费用支出上涨的事后道德风险;相较于城镇居民医保,老年人在参加新农合后更易出现医疗费用支出上涨的事后道德风险,参保引致的事后道德风险主要来源于门诊支出上涨。这启示我们一是要清晰认识医疗卫生政策评估的多维属性,二是要创新城乡居民基本医疗保险制度的发展理念。

基于双边道德风险的社区团购平台动态契约研究

基于社区团购模式中平台和团长之间的委托代理关系,构建了两阶段动态博弈模型,将社区团购平台的解聘补偿和团长的过度自信引入模型中,通过博弈推导和数值仿真给出两阶段最优动态契约设计,并分析这些因素对委托和代理方行为选择的影响,探讨其对双边道德风险的规制作用。结果表明:解聘补偿机制增加了社区团购平台的违约成本,降低平台道德风险。同时解聘倾向弱化了棘轮效应的负面影响,提高了团长第一期的努力程度,对团长第二期的努力程度没有直接作用,但会通过影响第二期的固定支付来影响双方的委托代理关系,对团长的道德风险起到间接规制作用。团长的过度自信倾向在一定程度上可以提高团长的努力程度,降低团长的道德风险,增加其收益。平台对团长资质和能力的动态修正可以影响团长的努力程度及其分成比例。因此,需要严把团长资质能力的早期识别,加强动态考核和定期培训以提升团长的业务能力和努力水平;同时设置合理的团长解聘补偿机制,完善动态激励契约;通过规制双边的道德风险,完善社区团购模式。

绿色生产背景下经营规模对农户技术效率的影响研究——基于福建省葡萄种植户的调查数据

基于当前农业绿色生产的重要发展背景,以福建省内六地市314个葡萄种植户的微观调查数据为支撑,运用面向投入规模报酬可变的DEA模型测度农户技术效率水平,并构建Tobit模型,实证避雨栽培的绿色生产模式下经营规模对农户技术效率的影响。结果表明:适度规模化经营有助于农户提高绿色生产的技术效率,葡萄种植面积的适度区间为0.67~3.33 hm^(2),但随着经营规模增加,要素配置难度和雇工道德风险上升将会给农户造成一定的效率损失。因此,农户在实际生产中应根据自身要素禀赋状况选择合适的经营规模,不宜盲目扩张。

传统银行借贷、金融科技与中小企业融资

针对中小企业具有显著的现金流不确定和信息非对称的特征,本文基于连续时间合约理论建立一个理论模型,研究传统银行借贷与互联网金融两种方式下的最优贷款合约及其对中小企业融资影响的区别。模型推导发现:两种借贷方式下最优融资合约存在,均是企业家与债权人在私有收益与长期贷款激励下权衡的结果;最优贷款合约比市场贷款合约更能提高企业价值,且企业现金流的波动率越高,最优贷款利率越高、企业价值越低;两种借贷方式的最优贷款利率无实质差别,借助金融科技不会降低企业贷款的违约风险溢价,但能够降低融资边际成本;金融科技可以将企业信誉成本这一内生性资产作为类抵押资产,有效降低中小企业获得贷款的门槛,提高金融普惠性。此外,企业家应当面临适度的市场风险暴露以激励其尽职工作,从而提高借贷双方的期望总收益。

我国灵活就业群体的工伤保障研究——政策现状与发展方向

数字经济的快速发展推动灵活就业群体的迅速扩张,灵活就业占比已经超过全部就业人群的1/4。灵活就业群体的工伤保障缺失问题愈发凸显。对中国灵活就业群体的发展壮大历程和工伤保险政策演变进行了梳理研究,对工伤保险存在的整体覆盖面低、参保人数高和享受保障人数少、低风险职业参保比例高和高风险职业参保比例低以及保险基金结余高的突出问题作了分析。以平台就业为例,发现灵活就业工伤保障缺失的原因包括劳动关系的缺失、社会保险缴纳成本较高并存在明显的道德风险问题。基于引导灵活就业群体社会保障正规化的角度,从顶层法律完善、机制设计、加强保障水平和强化配套等方面提出政策建议。

沉默的羔羊:畜牧代管下的道德风险与弱监管

熟人社会规范向契约市场规范过渡的背景下,传统牧区畜牧代管现象开始普遍化。代理人利用信息优势实现事后机会主义行为,委托人则采用弱监管策略应对道德风险。以新疆克拉玛依市小拐乡为案例,深入分析代牧人道德风险和委托人自发性弱监管行为的背景、发生机制和收益分配。通过分析契约设计并构建嵌入非正式制度的博弈模型,研究发现:代牧弱监管的产生与村庄产业结构、农牧户收入结构以及代牧市场类型有关。对比市场化下的工资制与承包制契约,弱违约和弱监管主要存在于工资制代牧合同中,“沉默的羔羊”本质是代牧契约中的收益分配问题,代牧人以“固定工资+浮动工资”形式获取更多剩余。委托人监督策略受到契约惩罚机制和道德声誉机制相对强度的调节,道德声誉机制占优时,委托人弱监管行为符合经济理性。促进传统农牧村庄转型,既要尊重村庄及其产业发展的自然规律,正视非正式制度的重要作用,也要适度优化契约设计,探索新型合作托养模式。

双边道德风险下委托代理产学研合作创新的博弈模型研究

深化校企产学研合作创新是推动科技成果转化赋能企业提质增效的重要动力,然而近年虚假、无实质性内容的产学研合作层出不穷,为此从双边道德风险视角探讨了地方政府、高校或科研机构、科技企业与科研人员之间产学研创新合作的委托代理关系,构建了相关科技企业与科研人员的进化博弈模型,从策略的进化稳定性方面进行了分析.结果表明:地方政府、高校或科研机构应加强委托代理产学研虚假合作的督查与惩罚力度,并适当减少高校或科研机构对科研人员的工作量奖励;提高科技企业与科研人员积极协同的总收益有益于推进双方的委托代理产学研合作创新.

考虑成本信息不对称的信息安全外包契约设计

本文考虑客户企业和管理安全服务提供商(MSSP)合作保护客户企业信息安全的问题。双方的安全努力不可验证性会导致努力程度低下,MSSP成本信息不对称会导致服务低效性。首先,以社会福利最优作为基准,本文分析了努力不可验证对双边退款契约设计的影响。然后,本文分析了MSSP私有成本信息导致服务低效的问题,提出了甄别MSSP私有成本信息的契约,最后通过算例分析验证了本文的重要结论。研究表明:信息安全合作外包中的双边退款契约会因安全服务的特性产生双重道德风险问题。客户企业采取措施来验证MSSP的努力水平以缓解双重道德风险问题有成本上界。当MSSP拥有私有成本信息时,甄别契约具有“高端不扭曲”和“低端向下扭曲”的特点。在私有成本信息下,无论MSSP是高成本类型还是低成本类型,由于信息缺乏,客户企业都会遭受损失。MSSP成本的市场分布相近或者服务合作重要程度越高,客户企业越需要采取措施来甄别MSSP的成本。本研究对信息安全管理领域客户企业外包的决策具有重要的参考意义。

我国社区居民医疗健康保障体系的多元委托代理关系探析

在我国人口老龄化、居民健康保健意识增强和医疗保健服务需求不断增加的背景下,政府加快了社区居民医疗健康保障体系建设。在该体系中,居民作为最终需求者与政府和社区基层医疗机构之间形成了复杂的多元委托代理关系。本文从经济学角度出发,首先运用委托代理理论探讨社区居民医疗健康保障主体之间的委托代理关系;其次分析多元委托代理关系各主体之间的博弈行为;再次揭示社区居民健康保障体系建设中由于参与主体间信息不对称、监管不到位而产生的道德风险行为;最后从解决信息不对称问题和完善监督约束机制两个角度提出降低我国社区健康保障体系中道德风险的有效途径。

Research on Credit Default Swaps Pricing Considering Moral Hazard Incentive under Reduce-Form Model

Equilibrium pricing of credit default swaps(CDS)promotes efficient identification of credit risk in the market,which in turn leads to efficient allocation of resources.However,even when CDS have been priced in equilibrium,i.e.,when premiums are equal to anticipated payments,the moral hazard incentives of CDS buyers increase with CDS transactions.Consequentially,it becomes an interesting research direction to study the impact of moral hazard incentives on the trading mechanism or pricing of derivatives(CDS).Most of the existing literature on the impact of moral hazard incentives in CDS pricing on derivatives trading mechanisms takes a macro perspective and focuses on the agreement risk effect.The literature exploring the analysis of the impact of moral hazard on the probability of agreement default from a micro perspective is not yet available.With this in mind,this paper focuses on the mechanisms by which“fraud”,an extreme manifestation of micro-moral hazard incentives,affects the probability of default.This paper introduces for the first time the concept of“claiming fraud”by credit protection buyers,which is different from the macro perspective of moral hazard incentives,and thus defines a specific extreme form of moral hazard incentives.Meanwhile,to address the intrinsic feature of the lack of economic explanatory power of the reduce-form model,this paper introduces a moral hazard incentive factor into the reduce-form model,and proposes a moral hazard state variable as a function of the asset value of the reference entity,which gives the reduce-form model strong economic explanatory power,and the default predictability is reduced by the description of the reduce-form model.In terms of the object of study,this paper considers the issue of moral hazard incentives in the presence of claiming fraud in two reference entities to further explore the impact of moral hazard incentives on default protection at the micro level in terms of cyclic default.Finally,based on the analysis of the results of the numerical simulation experiments,it is proposed that increasing the number of reference assets for CDS buyers will help to reduce the moral hazard incentives of the buyer,and thus the anticipated payments to the buyer,i.e.,we attempt to endogenize the credit risk of an asset by allowing the asset holder to choose the probability of the asset going up or down,which helps to understand the phenomenon of moral hazard incentives in CDS trading.

投保农户兼业化对农业保险道德风险的影响效应及实证检验——以玉米种植保险为例

随着农户“兼业化”程度的不断提高,越来越多的农户农业经营与非农就业同时存在,兼业使农户增强收入风险分散能力的同时,容易降低其风险防范意识。基于这一问题,探究兼业对农户投保农业保险的态度及行为的影响,进而引起道德风险问题具有重要现实意义。本文一是分析投保农户发生农业保险道德风险的内在机理,并设计对应的调研问卷问题组,构建评价投保农户道德风险水平的指标体系。二是利用2021年对山东省1108户玉米种植农户的调查数据,采用Tobit模型研究兼业化对农业保险道德风险的影响效应。结果表明,兼业化对道德风险具有显著的增加效应,同时经过替换解释变量、样本缩尾处理、添加固定效应进行稳健性及内生性一系列检验发现,估计结果依然稳健。三是基于降低农业保险道德风险的目的,从兼业程度的角度提出吸引专业性劳动力返乡、改善农业资本投入结构、合理设置免赔额、提升农户保险意识以及保险公司针对性加强查勘五个方面的对策建议。