The relationship between options and agency costs in levered firms is studied by modeling the effect of executive stock options on the manager's investment strategy in levered firms. Stock options do not necessari...The relationship between options and agency costs in levered firms is studied by modeling the effect of executive stock options on the manager's investment strategy in levered firms. Stock options do not necessarily aggravate agency costs in levered firms. The corporate governance affects agency costs greatly. If debt-holders were entitled to design executive stock options together with stockholders, by allocating power properly between stockholders and debt-holders, firm value could be enhanced greatly. The following way of allocating power between the two parties is proposed: the exercise price should be the weighted average of the stockholders' and debt-holders' suggested exercise prices. The weight allocated to debt-holders is positively related to the amount of debts that debt-holders lend to stockholders.展开更多
文摘The relationship between options and agency costs in levered firms is studied by modeling the effect of executive stock options on the manager's investment strategy in levered firms. Stock options do not necessarily aggravate agency costs in levered firms. The corporate governance affects agency costs greatly. If debt-holders were entitled to design executive stock options together with stockholders, by allocating power properly between stockholders and debt-holders, firm value could be enhanced greatly. The following way of allocating power between the two parties is proposed: the exercise price should be the weighted average of the stockholders' and debt-holders' suggested exercise prices. The weight allocated to debt-holders is positively related to the amount of debts that debt-holders lend to stockholders.
