By using the data of the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market---a share market as a sample from 2003 to 2007 to analyze the relationship between corporation performance and top executive alteration, ...By using the data of the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market---a share market as a sample from 2003 to 2007 to analyze the relationship between corporation performance and top executive alteration, different succession modes get different efficiency. The result shows that： The decline of company performance will cause the top executive turnover, and that the possibility of top executive turnover in non-state-owned listed companies is higher than that of the state-owned companies. In the routine turnover sample, the performance level of the internal succession is better than that of the external succession. In the non-routine turnover sample, the results are reversed. For further analysis, the main sources of the improvement for performance are items of below-the-line and non-recurring profit and loss, rather than the company＇s operating revenue.展开更多
Executive turnover is important in the governance of state-owned enterprises(SOEs). Herein, we focus on the executive turnover of China's SOEs, and the implementation of related evaluation mechanisms under differe...Executive turnover is important in the governance of state-owned enterprises(SOEs). Herein, we focus on the executive turnover of China's SOEs, and the implementation of related evaluation mechanisms under different levels of government intervention. We collect executive turnover data of listed Chinese SOEs from 1999 to 2012, and find that about half of the SOE executives leave office within two terms, which is in line with government recommendations. Moreover, we find that more than a third of executives leave after less than one term, and nearly 20% after more than two terms, highlighting the uncertainty and unpredictability of executive appointments in SOEs. We also find that the executive evaluation mechanism for SOEs is implemented differently under different levels of government intervention. SOEs under weak intervention, such as those controlled indirectly by governments, controlled with low shareholdings, from non-regulated industries or in the Eastern regions, prefer the market-oriented evaluation method, which places more weight on executives' economic performance. In contrast, those under strong intervention prefer the government-oriented evaluation method, which is characterized by policy burden.展开更多
This paper examines whether economic uncertainty increases executive turnover.The negative perception perspective and business change theory suggest that executives are more likely to leave their jobs during periods o...This paper examines whether economic uncertainty increases executive turnover.The negative perception perspective and business change theory suggest that executives are more likely to leave their jobs during periods of corporate distress.However,the additive effects of internal and external risk are thought to prompt firms to carefully consider executive turnover,thereby reducing the likelihood of executive changes.Based on the literature,we propose a checkand-balance hypothesis for the relationship between external uncertainty and executive change,according to which the optimal superposition of the internal and external risks stemming from increased external uncertainty would be to avoid a wave of executive departures.Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2019 and the China economic policy uncertainty index of Baker et al.(2013),we examine the impact of economic policy uncertainty on executive turnover and our results support the check-and-balance hypothesis.Our findings enhance our understanding of how economic policy uncertainty affects executive turnover,and enrich the literature on corporate risk management and strategic management.展开更多
文摘By using the data of the listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock market---a share market as a sample from 2003 to 2007 to analyze the relationship between corporation performance and top executive alteration, different succession modes get different efficiency. The result shows that： The decline of company performance will cause the top executive turnover, and that the possibility of top executive turnover in non-state-owned listed companies is higher than that of the state-owned companies. In the routine turnover sample, the performance level of the internal succession is better than that of the external succession. In the non-routine turnover sample, the results are reversed. For further analysis, the main sources of the improvement for performance are items of below-the-line and non-recurring profit and loss, rather than the company＇s operating revenue.
文摘Executive turnover is important in the governance of state-owned enterprises(SOEs). Herein, we focus on the executive turnover of China's SOEs, and the implementation of related evaluation mechanisms under different levels of government intervention. We collect executive turnover data of listed Chinese SOEs from 1999 to 2012, and find that about half of the SOE executives leave office within two terms, which is in line with government recommendations. Moreover, we find that more than a third of executives leave after less than one term, and nearly 20% after more than two terms, highlighting the uncertainty and unpredictability of executive appointments in SOEs. We also find that the executive evaluation mechanism for SOEs is implemented differently under different levels of government intervention. SOEs under weak intervention, such as those controlled indirectly by governments, controlled with low shareholdings, from non-regulated industries or in the Eastern regions, prefer the market-oriented evaluation method, which places more weight on executives' economic performance. In contrast, those under strong intervention prefer the government-oriented evaluation method, which is characterized by policy burden.
基金The project funded by the National Natural Science Foundation of China:a study on the timing of stock repurchase of Chinese listed companies:theory,demonstration and policy(No.71373162)
文摘This paper examines whether economic uncertainty increases executive turnover.The negative perception perspective and business change theory suggest that executives are more likely to leave their jobs during periods of corporate distress.However,the additive effects of internal and external risk are thought to prompt firms to carefully consider executive turnover,thereby reducing the likelihood of executive changes.Based on the literature,we propose a checkand-balance hypothesis for the relationship between external uncertainty and executive change,according to which the optimal superposition of the internal and external risks stemming from increased external uncertainty would be to avoid a wave of executive departures.Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2010 to 2019 and the China economic policy uncertainty index of Baker et al.(2013),we examine the impact of economic policy uncertainty on executive turnover and our results support the check-and-balance hypothesis.Our findings enhance our understanding of how economic policy uncertainty affects executive turnover,and enrich the literature on corporate risk management and strategic management.
