Based on China＇s provincial panel data from 2004 to 2014,the net effect and threshold characteristics of local governments＇ fiscal expenditure structure on environmental pollution were tested with the nonlinear pane...Based on China＇s provincial panel data from 2004 to 2014,the net effect and threshold characteristics of local governments＇ fiscal expenditure structure on environmental pollution were tested with the nonlinear panel threshold model. The results showed that the net effect of fiscal expenditure structure on regional pollution emission intensity had significant inverted V-shaped single threshold characteristics. Besides,the threshold value of economic density was 6. 039 6 million yuan/km^2,and that of population density was 201 people/km^2. That is,the fiscal expenditure structure inclining to productive expenditure was relatively conducive to the promotion of pollution reduction in the areas with low economic density or low population density. The fiscal expenditure structure inclining to non-productive expenditure was relatively conducive to the promotion of pollution reduction in the areas with high economic density or high population density.展开更多
Being responsible mainly to their superiors, decision-makers at the county level in China pursue the maximum growth rate rather than their residents’ welfare. This leads to a preference for productive expenditure in ...Being responsible mainly to their superiors, decision-makers at the county level in China pursue the maximum growth rate rather than their residents’ welfare. This leads to a preference for productive expenditure in their fiscal decisions. An empirical test based on 2,067 counties (cities) provides robust evidence for the existence of productive expenditure bias at the county level. Such bias causes a serious impediment to the construction of a system of public finance and the transformation to public service-oriented government in China. An appropriate solution to this problem is to gradually enhance incentives for county- level governments to satisfy the demands of local residents.View full textDownload full text展开更多
基金Supported by Project for Key Subject Construction of Shanghai Open University(ZDXK1601)Scientific Research Project of Shanghai Science and Technology Committee(13DZ2252200)Humanities and Social Sciences Foundation of Ministry of Education of China(16YJC790097)
文摘Based on China＇s provincial panel data from 2004 to 2014,the net effect and threshold characteristics of local governments＇ fiscal expenditure structure on environmental pollution were tested with the nonlinear panel threshold model. The results showed that the net effect of fiscal expenditure structure on regional pollution emission intensity had significant inverted V-shaped single threshold characteristics. Besides,the threshold value of economic density was 6. 039 6 million yuan/km^2,and that of population density was 201 people/km^2. That is,the fiscal expenditure structure inclining to productive expenditure was relatively conducive to the promotion of pollution reduction in the areas with low economic density or low population density. The fiscal expenditure structure inclining to non-productive expenditure was relatively conducive to the promotion of pollution reduction in the areas with high economic density or high population density.
基金the support of the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant No.:70773010)the Key Project of the Chinese Ministry of Education(Grant No.:309007)
文摘Being responsible mainly to their superiors, decision-makers at the county level in China pursue the maximum growth rate rather than their residents’ welfare. This leads to a preference for productive expenditure in their fiscal decisions. An empirical test based on 2,067 counties (cities) provides robust evidence for the existence of productive expenditure bias at the county level. Such bias causes a serious impediment to the construction of a system of public finance and the transformation to public service-oriented government in China. An appropriate solution to this problem is to gradually enhance incentives for county- level governments to satisfy the demands of local residents.View full textDownload full text
