Fiscal Pressure, Inter-Industrial Allocation of Land and Agglomerations Effects

Land is a production factor that supports industrial development and also an important resource for increasing local government revenue.The scientific allocation of land has a positive effect on applying a new development philosophy.Based on the data of China's micro land transaction,this paper constructs the industrial dispersion indicator of land transfer to discuss about how short-term fiscal pressure affects allocation of land resources among industries and then analyzes its impacts on agglomeration effects.The results show that the greater the short-term fiscal pressure,the higher the dispersion of land transfer among industries,which holds true after going through a series of robustness tests.Further analyses show that the dispersion of land transfer among industries deteriorates the policy orientation of giving priority to key industries.Finally,the practice of dispersion of land transfer among industries weakens agglomeration economies.The research results of this paper show that local governments'strategy of land transfer among induestries for coping with short-term fiscal pressure has the characteristics of"increasing fiscal revenues and weakening the role of industrial guidance."This means that in the new stage of development,local governments urgently need to enhance their understanding of the multiple functions of land and avoid impairing industrial development for addressing the shortterm fiscal pressure.

Local Governments＇ Fiscal Pressure and the Dependence on Polluting Industries in China

Using a large, unique county-level panel dataset for China from 1998 to 2006, this paper investigates the relationship between local governments ＇fiscal pressure and their preference for developing polluting industries. The results show that there exist fiscal pressure effects; namely, a positive link between the fiscal pressure faced by a county and its industrial tax dependence on polluting industries. We also investigate the heterogeneity of the fiscal pressure effects and find that fiscal pressure effects are significant only when local fiscal pressure is sufficiently high up to a certain point, and when there are more earmarked transfers. In contrast to the situation in east China, fiscal pressure effects in central and west China are more pronounced Therefore, when dealing with environmental problems, policy-makers need to take local governments＇ fiscal conditions into account.

Fiscal Pressure,Land Finance and Ratchet Effects of House Prices

In this paper,we focus on the issues of local governments’fiscal pressure,land finance and house prices,and systematically analyze how local governments’fiscal pressure and land finance lead to China’s ratcheting up of house prices.The results show that to release the fiscal pressure,local governments tend to increase land revenue and obtain high real estate related revenue by raising house prices.In this sense,the increase of the land transfer price will result in the increase of the cost of real estates,and eventually leading to the increase of house prices.That is to say,local governments’fiscal pressure will not only result in the increase of house prices directly but also consolidate the ratchet effects of house prices.

Fiscal pressure and local economic growth--An experiment from China income tax sharing system reform

In this paper,we construct an“as-if”DID model on the basis of the 2002“Income Tax Sharing System”reform and evaluate the changes in local fiscal pressure based on an exogenous shock that redefines the tax sharing rules between the central government and local governments.By using the DMSP/OLS satellite data at the city-level,we empirically examine the impact of fiscal pressure on the economic growth.We find that fiscal pressure significantly increase the satellite lighting.Furthermore,we obtain the findings as follows.Firstly,the incentive effects of fiscal pressure effects are less profound in cities that receive considerable intergovernmental transfers from high levels of governments.Secondly,the local governments are more likely to help the growth of real estate industry,which can reciprocally bring them considerable sales taxation.However,this homogenized growth pattern might be detrimental for economic diversification and finally enhance the risk of economical fluctuation.Finally,the fiscal pressure created by the reform restricts the extent to which jurisdictions compete with each other.However,the tax competition still exists because local governments are able to lower the tax rate once they gain enough revenues from land-sales.This paper provides a new explanation for China’s high-speed growth in addition to expenditure decentralization or administration decentralization.It also offers extra evidence for exploring the growth incentives of local government within the framework of China’s decentralization.

The Causes and Consequences of China's Municipal Amalgamations:Evidence from Population Redistribution

Along with China's urbanization,the spatial redistribution of the country's population has led to difficulties for local governance,especially in areas experiencing population outflows.Municipal amalgamation is an ffctive response.This study uses administrative system code data that are accurate at the community and village level to verify the causal relationship between migration and village or community municipal amalgamation.It shows that migration has been an important reason for municipal amalgamation.Counties with greater population outflow have experienced more frequent amalgamation,manifesting a decrease in the numbers of villages and communities.This study,also examined the consequences of this amalgamation,finding that it can significantly alleviate local governments'fiscal pressures and promote public services in the long term.It is of great importance for improving the grassroots governance of population outflow areas during rapid urbanization in China.

Policy Innovation Diffusion and PPP Spatial Distribution

Since 2014,PPP policy has been promoted rapidly in China.Based on the theory of policy innovation diffusion,this paper explores the formation mechanism of PPP spatial disequilibrium at the micro level using Chinese municipal-level panel data from 2014 to 2019.According to the research,the innovation diffusion of China’s PPP policy at the local-government level exhibits R-shaped non-progressive characteristics and is influenced by both internal and external factors.On the internal side,the debt pressure of local governments is an important determinant with an inverted U-shaped influence on PPP policy.On the external side,imitation and competition among neighboring local governments are the main external determinants.This spatial strategic interaction occurs not only in same-province regions with close proximity and similar economic development but also in different-province regions with close proximity.The above studies offer certain insights into optimizing the spatial distribution pattern of PPP and guarding against fiscal risks.