A Forward-Secure Multi-Receiver Signcryption Scheme

In order to protect historical ciphertext when the private key leaked in the broadcasting system,the forward-secure multi-receiver signcryption scheme is designed based on the generic graded multilinear mapping encoding structure,which effectively prevents illegal access from intruder to the ciphertext in the past time period when the private key in current time period is revealed.Through the generalization of the existing multilinear mapping encoding system,it proposes the generic graded multilinear mapping encoding structure and the generic graded decision Diffie-Hellman problem.Because of the generic graded multilinear mapping encoding system adopted,almost all candidate multilinear mapping encoding systems can automatically adapt to our scheme.Under the assumption of generic graded decision Diffie-Hellman problem,it has proved that the scheme has the information confidentiality and unforgeability in the current time period.After putting forward the security model of forward-secure multi-receiver signcryption scheme,and under the assumption of generic graded decision Diffie-Hellman problem,it has proved that the scheme has the message forward-confidentiality and forward-unforgeability.Compared with other forward-secure public key encryption schemes,the relationship between our scheme and time periods is sub-linear,so it is less complex.

Forward-Secure Blind Signature Schemes Based on the Variants of EIGamal

Due to forward-secure-digital-signature＇s capability of effectively reducing loss caused by exposure of secret keys and significant in-application benefits of blind signature aiming at protecting senders＇ privacy, they have been hot spots for decades in the field of cryptography. Illuminated by the integration of forward secure digital signature and blind signature, based on the variants of E1Gamal and assumption of difficulty in solving the discrete logarithm problem in galois field, a forward-secure weak blind signature scheme and a forward-secure strong blind signature scheme are proposed and their security is analyzed thoroughly in this paper. It turns out that forward security, blindness and aptitude of resisting forging attack demonstrated by these two schemes benefit a lot theoretically and practically.

A fully dynamic forward-secure group signature from lattice

A forward-secure group signature(FSGS)ensures the unforgeability of signatures in the past time period despite signing secret key is leaked in the current time period.As we know,traditional FSGS schemes are mostly relying on number-theoretic assumptions unable to resist quantum attacks.Therefore,we present an efficient lattice-based fully dynamic(ie.users can flexibly join or quit the group)forward-secure group signature(DFSGS)by combining an improved version of FSGS scheme proposed by Ling.Based on an efficient zero-knowledge argument,we construct argument of knowledge of the committed value and the plaintext that help with privacy protection.Our DFSGS scheme is proved to be anonymous and forward-secure traceable relying on short integer solution and learning with errors assumptions in random oracle model.Moreover,the lengths of group public key and signature of our DFSGS scheme have been improved,and the length of user secret key has no connection with the quantity of group members.

New forward-secure signature schemes with untrusted update

In this paper, we present two forward-secure signature schemes （FSS） with untrusted update. Our constructions use ideas from the work of Abdalla et al. [1] and Kozlov and Reyzin [2] in their forward-secure digital signature schemes. Our schemes are proven to be forward-secure based on the hardness of factoring in the random oracle model. Both schemes use the same method to encrypt the private key and are more efficient than Libert scheme [3] without adding any burden to the original forward-secure schemes.

AN EFFICIENT FORWARD SECURE GROUP SIGNATURE SCHEME WITH REVOCATION

Up to now, how to construct an efficient secure group signature scheme, which needs not to reset the system when some group members' signing keys are exposed, is still a difficult problem. A construction concerning revocation of group members is an ideal one if it satisfies forward security which makes it more attractive for not sacrificing the security of past signatures of deleted members. This paper analyses the problem and gives a construction in which the group manager can be un-trustworthy. The scheme is efficient even when the number of revoked members is large.