The solvability of the coupled Riccati differential equations appearing in the differential game approach to the formation control problem is vital to the finite horizon Nash equilibrium solution.These equations(if so...The solvability of the coupled Riccati differential equations appearing in the differential game approach to the formation control problem is vital to the finite horizon Nash equilibrium solution.These equations(if solvable)can be solved numerically by using the terminal value and the backward iteration.To investigate the solvability and solution of these equations the formation control problem as the differential game is replaced by a discrete-time dynamic game.The main contributions of this paper are as follows.First,the existence of Nash equilibrium controls for the discretetime formation control problem is shown.Second,a backward iteration approximate solution to the coupled Riccati differential equations in the continuous-time differential game is developed.An illustrative example is given to justify the models and solution.展开更多
Unbalanced agricultural production decision becomes the great block that influences the effective distribution of social resources, national grain security, social stability and economic development. This paper took t...Unbalanced agricultural production decision becomes the great block that influences the effective distribution of social resources, national grain security, social stability and economic development. This paper took the game theory as an analyzed tool to describe the interactional processes among the peasants, and set up the game theory model of independent decision and joint decision by peasants. It was shown that the government's positive guide and the market environment macroscopically controlled by the government could effectively increased the peasants' income展开更多
The fuzzy non-cooperative game with fuzzy payoff function is studied. Based on fuzzy set theory with game theory, the fuzzy Nash equilibrium of fuzzy non-cooperative games is proposed. Most of researchers rank fuzzy n...The fuzzy non-cooperative game with fuzzy payoff function is studied. Based on fuzzy set theory with game theory, the fuzzy Nash equilibrium of fuzzy non-cooperative games is proposed. Most of researchers rank fuzzy number by its center of gravity or by the real number with its maximal membership. By reducing fuzzy number into a real number, we lose much fuzzy information that should be kept during the operations between fuzzy numbers. The fuzzy quantities or alternatives are ordered directly by Yuan's binary fuzzy ordering relation. In doing so, the existence of fuzzy Nash equilibrium for fuzzy non-cooperative games is shown based on the utility function and the crisp Nash theorem. Finally, an illustrative example in traffic flow patterns of equilibrium is given in order to show the detailed calculation process of fuzzy Nash equilibrium.展开更多
We define generalized quantum games by introducing the coherent payoff operators and propose a simple scheme to illustrate it.The scheme is implemented with a single spin qubit system and a two-entangled-qubit system....We define generalized quantum games by introducing the coherent payoff operators and propose a simple scheme to illustrate it.The scheme is implemented with a single spin qubit system and a two-entangled-qubit system.The Nash Equilibrium Theorem is proved for the models.展开更多
A class of quasi-equilibrium problems and a class of constrained multiobjective games were introduced and studied in generalized convex spaces without linear structure. First, two existence theorems of solutions for q...A class of quasi-equilibrium problems and a class of constrained multiobjective games were introduced and studied in generalized convex spaces without linear structure. First, two existence theorems of solutions for quasi-equilibrium problems are proved in noncompact generalized convex spaces. Then, ar applications of the quasi-equilibrium existence theorem, several existence theorems of weighted Nash-equilibria and Pareto equilibria for the constrained multiobjective games are established in noncompact generalized convex spaces. These theorems improve, unify, and generalize the corresponding results of the multiobjective games in recent literatures.展开更多
In this work, an improvement of the results presented by [1] Abellanas et al. (Weak Equilibrium in a Spatial Model. International Journal of Game Theory, 40(3), 449-459) is discussed. Concretely, this paper investigat...In this work, an improvement of the results presented by [1] Abellanas et al. (Weak Equilibrium in a Spatial Model. International Journal of Game Theory, 40(3), 449-459) is discussed. Concretely, this paper investigates an abstract game of competition between two players that want to earn the maximum number of points from a finite set of points in the plane. It is assumed that the distribution of these points is not uniform, so an appropriate weight to each position is assigned. A definition of equilibrium which is weaker than the classical one is included in order to avoid the uniqueness of the equilibrium position typical of the Nash equilibrium in these kinds of games. The existence of this approximated equilibrium in the game is analyzed by means of computational geometry techniques.展开更多
A scalar equilibrium (SE) is defined for n-person prescriptive games in normal form. When a decision criterion (notion of rationality) is either agreed upon by the players or prescribed by an external arbiter, the res...A scalar equilibrium (SE) is defined for n-person prescriptive games in normal form. When a decision criterion (notion of rationality) is either agreed upon by the players or prescribed by an external arbiter, the resulting decision process is modeled by a suitable scalar transformation (utility function). Each n-tuple of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities is transformed into a nonnegative scalar value between 0 and 1. Any n-tuple yielding a largest scalar value determines an SE, which is always a pure strategy profile. SEs can be computed much faster than Nash equilibria, for example;and the decision criterion need not be based on the players’ selfishness. To illustrate the SE, we define a compromise equilibrium, establish its Pareto optimality, and present examples comparing it to other solution concepts.展开更多
In economics, buyers and sellers are usually the main sides in a market. Game theory can perfectly model decisions behind each “player” and calculate an outcome that benefits both sides. However, the use of game the...In economics, buyers and sellers are usually the main sides in a market. Game theory can perfectly model decisions behind each “player” and calculate an outcome that benefits both sides. However, the use of game theory is not lim-ited to economics. In this paper, I will introduce the mathematical model of general sum game, solutions and theorems surrounding game theory, and its real life applications in many different scenarios.展开更多
This work concentrates on simultaneous move non-cooperating quantum games. Part of it is evidently not new, but it is included for the sake self consistence, as it is devoted to introduction of the mathematical and ph...This work concentrates on simultaneous move non-cooperating quantum games. Part of it is evidently not new, but it is included for the sake self consistence, as it is devoted to introduction of the mathematical and physical grounds of the pertinent topics, and the way in which a simple classical game is modified to become a quantum game (a procedure referred to as a quantization of a classical game). The connection between game theory and information science is briefly stressed, and the role of quantum entanglement (that plays a central role in the theory of quantum games), is exposed. Armed with these tools, we investigate some basic concepts like the existence (or absence) of a pure strategy and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and its relation with the degree of entanglement. The main results of this work are as follows: 1) Construction of a numerical algorithm based on the method of best response functions, designed to search for pure strategy Nash equilibrium in quantum games. The formalism is based on the discretization of a continuous variable into a mesh of points, and can be applied to quantum games that are built upon two-players two-strategies classical games, based on the method of best response functions. 2) Application of this algorithm to study the question of how the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium is related to the degree of entanglement (specified by a continuous parameter γ ). It is shown that when the classical game G<sub>C</sub> has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium that is not Pareto efficient, then the quantum game G<sub>Q</sub> with maximal entanglement (γ = π/2) has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. By studying a non-symmetric prisoner dilemma game, it is found that there is a critical value 0γ<sub>c</sub> such that for γγ<sub>c</sub> there is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium and for γ≥γ<sub>c </sub>there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. The behavior of the two payoffs as function of γ starts at that of the classical ones at (D, D) and approaches the cooperative classical ones at (C, C) (C = confess, D = don’t confess). 3) We then study Bayesian quantum games and show that under certain conditions, there is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in such games even when entanglement is maximal. 4) We define the basic ingredients of a quantum game based on a two-player three strategies classical game. This requires the introduction of trits (instead of bits) and quantum trits (instead of quantum bits). It is proved that in this quantum game, there is no classical commensurability in the sense that the classical strategies are not obtained as a special case of the quantum strategies.展开更多
聚类是一种典型且重要的数据挖掘方法,但现有聚类算法大多需要人为指定聚类的数量,并且聚类结果对参数敏感.针对上述不足,本文提出一种基于子博弈完美均衡的启发式聚类算法(Heuristic Clustering algorithm based on Sub-game Perfect E...聚类是一种典型且重要的数据挖掘方法,但现有聚类算法大多需要人为指定聚类的数量,并且聚类结果对参数敏感.针对上述不足,本文提出一种基于子博弈完美均衡的启发式聚类算法(Heuristic Clustering algorithm based on Sub-game Perfect Equilibrium,HCSPE).该算法充分挖掘数据点自身的分布特征信息,通过启发式方法得到自适应的参数值,从而使数据点局部密度属性值的得出具有客观性和普适性,降低了聚类结果对参数的敏感性.基于博弈的思想,综合局部密度和相对距离两个属性形成数据点的竞争力,依靠竞争机制完成聚类数量的自动计算以及聚类中心的确定.在多个规模和类型均不相同的数据集上的实验结果表明,本文所提出算法的性能指标整体优于其他算法,并且聚类结果更符合客观所需.展开更多
文摘The solvability of the coupled Riccati differential equations appearing in the differential game approach to the formation control problem is vital to the finite horizon Nash equilibrium solution.These equations(if solvable)can be solved numerically by using the terminal value and the backward iteration.To investigate the solvability and solution of these equations the formation control problem as the differential game is replaced by a discrete-time dynamic game.The main contributions of this paper are as follows.First,the existence of Nash equilibrium controls for the discretetime formation control problem is shown.Second,a backward iteration approximate solution to the coupled Riccati differential equations in the continuous-time differential game is developed.An illustrative example is given to justify the models and solution.
文摘Unbalanced agricultural production decision becomes the great block that influences the effective distribution of social resources, national grain security, social stability and economic development. This paper took the game theory as an analyzed tool to describe the interactional processes among the peasants, and set up the game theory model of independent decision and joint decision by peasants. It was shown that the government's positive guide and the market environment macroscopically controlled by the government could effectively increased the peasants' income
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (70771010)
文摘The fuzzy non-cooperative game with fuzzy payoff function is studied. Based on fuzzy set theory with game theory, the fuzzy Nash equilibrium of fuzzy non-cooperative games is proposed. Most of researchers rank fuzzy number by its center of gravity or by the real number with its maximal membership. By reducing fuzzy number into a real number, we lose much fuzzy information that should be kept during the operations between fuzzy numbers. The fuzzy quantities or alternatives are ordered directly by Yuan's binary fuzzy ordering relation. In doing so, the existence of fuzzy Nash equilibrium for fuzzy non-cooperative games is shown based on the utility function and the crisp Nash theorem. Finally, an illustrative example in traffic flow patterns of equilibrium is given in order to show the detailed calculation process of fuzzy Nash equilibrium.
文摘We define generalized quantum games by introducing the coherent payoff operators and propose a simple scheme to illustrate it.The scheme is implemented with a single spin qubit system and a two-entangled-qubit system.The Nash Equilibrium Theorem is proved for the models.
文摘A class of quasi-equilibrium problems and a class of constrained multiobjective games were introduced and studied in generalized convex spaces without linear structure. First, two existence theorems of solutions for quasi-equilibrium problems are proved in noncompact generalized convex spaces. Then, ar applications of the quasi-equilibrium existence theorem, several existence theorems of weighted Nash-equilibria and Pareto equilibria for the constrained multiobjective games are established in noncompact generalized convex spaces. These theorems improve, unify, and generalize the corresponding results of the multiobjective games in recent literatures.
文摘In this work, an improvement of the results presented by [1] Abellanas et al. (Weak Equilibrium in a Spatial Model. International Journal of Game Theory, 40(3), 449-459) is discussed. Concretely, this paper investigates an abstract game of competition between two players that want to earn the maximum number of points from a finite set of points in the plane. It is assumed that the distribution of these points is not uniform, so an appropriate weight to each position is assigned. A definition of equilibrium which is weaker than the classical one is included in order to avoid the uniqueness of the equilibrium position typical of the Nash equilibrium in these kinds of games. The existence of this approximated equilibrium in the game is analyzed by means of computational geometry techniques.
文摘A scalar equilibrium (SE) is defined for n-person prescriptive games in normal form. When a decision criterion (notion of rationality) is either agreed upon by the players or prescribed by an external arbiter, the resulting decision process is modeled by a suitable scalar transformation (utility function). Each n-tuple of von Neumann-Morgenstern utilities is transformed into a nonnegative scalar value between 0 and 1. Any n-tuple yielding a largest scalar value determines an SE, which is always a pure strategy profile. SEs can be computed much faster than Nash equilibria, for example;and the decision criterion need not be based on the players’ selfishness. To illustrate the SE, we define a compromise equilibrium, establish its Pareto optimality, and present examples comparing it to other solution concepts.
文摘In economics, buyers and sellers are usually the main sides in a market. Game theory can perfectly model decisions behind each “player” and calculate an outcome that benefits both sides. However, the use of game theory is not lim-ited to economics. In this paper, I will introduce the mathematical model of general sum game, solutions and theorems surrounding game theory, and its real life applications in many different scenarios.
文摘This work concentrates on simultaneous move non-cooperating quantum games. Part of it is evidently not new, but it is included for the sake self consistence, as it is devoted to introduction of the mathematical and physical grounds of the pertinent topics, and the way in which a simple classical game is modified to become a quantum game (a procedure referred to as a quantization of a classical game). The connection between game theory and information science is briefly stressed, and the role of quantum entanglement (that plays a central role in the theory of quantum games), is exposed. Armed with these tools, we investigate some basic concepts like the existence (or absence) of a pure strategy and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and its relation with the degree of entanglement. The main results of this work are as follows: 1) Construction of a numerical algorithm based on the method of best response functions, designed to search for pure strategy Nash equilibrium in quantum games. The formalism is based on the discretization of a continuous variable into a mesh of points, and can be applied to quantum games that are built upon two-players two-strategies classical games, based on the method of best response functions. 2) Application of this algorithm to study the question of how the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium is related to the degree of entanglement (specified by a continuous parameter γ ). It is shown that when the classical game G<sub>C</sub> has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium that is not Pareto efficient, then the quantum game G<sub>Q</sub> with maximal entanglement (γ = π/2) has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. By studying a non-symmetric prisoner dilemma game, it is found that there is a critical value 0γ<sub>c</sub> such that for γγ<sub>c</sub> there is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium and for γ≥γ<sub>c </sub>there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. The behavior of the two payoffs as function of γ starts at that of the classical ones at (D, D) and approaches the cooperative classical ones at (C, C) (C = confess, D = don’t confess). 3) We then study Bayesian quantum games and show that under certain conditions, there is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in such games even when entanglement is maximal. 4) We define the basic ingredients of a quantum game based on a two-player three strategies classical game. This requires the introduction of trits (instead of bits) and quantum trits (instead of quantum bits). It is proved that in this quantum game, there is no classical commensurability in the sense that the classical strategies are not obtained as a special case of the quantum strategies.
文摘聚类是一种典型且重要的数据挖掘方法,但现有聚类算法大多需要人为指定聚类的数量,并且聚类结果对参数敏感.针对上述不足,本文提出一种基于子博弈完美均衡的启发式聚类算法(Heuristic Clustering algorithm based on Sub-game Perfect Equilibrium,HCSPE).该算法充分挖掘数据点自身的分布特征信息,通过启发式方法得到自适应的参数值,从而使数据点局部密度属性值的得出具有客观性和普适性,降低了聚类结果对参数的敏感性.基于博弈的思想,综合局部密度和相对距离两个属性形成数据点的竞争力,依靠竞争机制完成聚类数量的自动计算以及聚类中心的确定.在多个规模和类型均不相同的数据集上的实验结果表明,本文所提出算法的性能指标整体优于其他算法,并且聚类结果更符合客观所需.