Game Analysis of Regulation for Online Prescription Drugs under Customer Feedback Mechanism

Objective To study the way to better regulate the online sales of prescription drugs,and to provide reference for the adjustment of relevant policies since the online sales of prescription drugs has become an inevitable trend.Methods A game model was constructed for the strategy choice of pharmaceutical e-commerce platform,customers and government departments based on differential game theory and Nash equilibrium game model to analyze the pure strategy Nash equilibrium,Nash equilibrium dominant strategy of each subject and the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium under different conditions.Besides,Matlab was used to carry out simulation analysis.Results and Conclusion The study shows that:(1)Improving the credibility of the government and reducing the cost of government regulation can not only make the pharmaceutical e-commerce platform operate with high quality,but also give greater play to government functions;(2)The greater the influence of social evaluation on pharmaceutical e-commerce platforms,the lower the cost of high-quality operation of pharmaceutical e-commerce platform,and the greater the probability of customer choosing real evaluation strategy;(3)The greater the customers’perception of potential risk,the greater the compensation,and the lower the cost of reporting.Then,the greater the probability that government departments will choose strict regulation.Finally,the model solution and simulation analysis are combined to provide countermeasures and suggestions for the safety regulation of online sales of prescription drugs.

Distributed game strategy for unmanned aerial vehicle formation with external disturbances and obstacles

We investigate a distributed game strategy for unmanned aerial vehicle(UAV)formations with external disturbances and obstacles.The strategy is based on a distributed model predictive control(MPC)framework and Levy flight based pigeon inspired optimization(LFPIO).First,we propose a non-singular fast terminal sliding mode observer(NFTSMO)to estimate the influence of a disturbance,and prove that the observer converges in fixed time using a Lyapunov function.Second,we design an obstacle avoidance strategy based on topology reconstruction,by which the UAV can save energy and safely pass obstacles.Third,we establish a distributed MPC framework where each UAV exchanges messages only with its neighbors.Further,the cost function of each UAV is designed,by which the UAV formation problem is transformed into a game problem.Finally,we develop LFPIO and use it to solve the Nash equilibrium.Numerical simulations are conducted,and the efficiency of LFPIO based distributed MPC is verified through comparative simulations.

Air combat decision-making of multiple UCAVs based on constraint strategy games

Game theory can be applied to the air combat decision-making problem of multiple unmanned combat air vehicles(UCAVs).However,it is difficult to have satisfactory decision-making results completely relying on air combat situation information,because there is a lot of time-sensitive information in a complex air combat environment.In this paper,a constraint strategy game approach is developed to generate intelligent decision-making for multiple UCAVs in complex air combat environment with air combat situation information and time-sensitive information.Initially,a constraint strategy game is employed to model attack-defense decision-making problem in complex air combat environment.Then,an algorithm is proposed for solving the constraint strategy game based on linear programming and linear inequality(CSG-LL).Finally,an example is given to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach.

Evolutionary Games in Two-Layer Networks with the Introduction of Dominant Strategy

We study evolutionary games in two-layer networks by introducing the correlation between two layers through the C-dominance or the D-dominance. We assume that individuals play prisoner＇s dilemma game （PDG） in one layer and snowdrift game （SDG） in the other. We explore the dependences of the fraction of the strategy cooperation in different layers on the game parameter and initial conditions. The results on two-layer square lattices show that, when cooperation is the dominant strategy, initial conditions strongly influence cooperation in the PDG layer while have no impact in the SDG layer. Moreover, in contrast to the result for PDG in single-layer square lattices, the parameter regime where cooperation could be maintained expands significantly in the PDG layer. We also investigate the effects of mutation and network topology. We find that different mutation rates do not change the cooperation behaviors. Moreover, similar behaviors on cooperation could be found in two-layer random networks.

On Topics in Quantum Games

This work concentrates on simultaneous move non-cooperating quantum games. Part of it is evidently not new, but it is included for the sake self consistence, as it is devoted to introduction of the mathematical and physical grounds of the pertinent topics, and the way in which a simple classical game is modified to become a quantum game (a procedure referred to as a quantization of a classical game). The connection between game theory and information science is briefly stressed, and the role of quantum entanglement (that plays a central role in the theory of quantum games), is exposed. Armed with these tools, we investigate some basic concepts like the existence (or absence) of a pure strategy and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and its relation with the degree of entanglement. The main results of this work are as follows: 1) Construction of a numerical algorithm based on the method of best response functions, designed to search for pure strategy Nash equilibrium in quantum games. The formalism is based on the discretization of a continuous variable into a mesh of points, and can be applied to quantum games that are built upon two-players two-strategies classical games, based on the method of best response functions. 2) Application of this algorithm to study the question of how the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium is related to the degree of entanglement (specified by a continuous parameter γ ). It is shown that when the classical game GC has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium that is not Pareto efficient, then the quantum game GQ with maximal entanglement (γ = π/2) has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. By studying a non-symmetric prisoner dilemma game, it is found that there is a critical value 0γc such that for γγc there is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium and for γ≥γc there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. The behavior of the two payoffs as function of γ starts at that of the classical ones at (D, D) and approaches the cooperative classical ones at (C, C) (C = confess, D = don’t confess). 3) We then study Bayesian quantum games and show that under certain conditions, there is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in such games even when entanglement is maximal. 4) We define the basic ingredients of a quantum game based on a two-player three strategies classical game. This requires the introduction of trits (instead of bits) and quantum trits (instead of quantum bits). It is proved that in this quantum game, there is no classical commensurability in the sense that the classical strategies are not obtained as a special case of the quantum strategies.

Revenue-sharing contract to coordinate independent participants within the supply chain

To improve the performance of the supply chain with one supplier and multiple retailers under deterministic price-sensitive customer demand, an optimal strategy is proposed based on knowledge discovery. First the decentralized system in which the supplier and the retailers are independent, profit-maximizing participants with the supplier acting as a Stackelberg game leader is studied. Numerical examples illustrate the importance of the coordination. The conventional quantity discount mechanism needs to be modified to coordinate the supply chain, so a revenue-sharing contract is proposed to coordinate such supply chain. Lastly, a special decision under certain demand rates is studied. The pricing and replenishment policies can be decided sequentially, which yields much less loss comparing with optimal decision when the demand rates are sufficiently large.

Autonomous Maneuver Decisions via Transfer Learning Pigeon-Inspired Optimization for UCAVs in Dogfight Engagements

This paper proposes an autonomous maneuver decision method using transfer learning pigeon-inspired optimization(TLPIO)for unmanned combat aerial vehicles(UCAVs)in dogfight engagements.Firstly,a nonlinear F-16 aircraft model and automatic control system are constructed by a MATLAB/Simulink platform.Secondly,a 3-degrees-of-freedom(3-DOF)aircraft model is used as a maneuvering command generator,and the expanded elemental maneuver library is designed,so that the aircraft state reachable set can be obtained.Then,the game matrix is composed with the air combat situation evaluation function calculated according to the angle and range threats.Finally,a key point is that the objective function to be optimized is designed using the game mixed strategy,and the optimal mixed strategy is obtained by TLPIO.Significantly,the proposed TLPIO does not initialize the population randomly,but adopts the transfer learning method based on Kullback-Leibler(KL)divergence to initialize the population,which improves the search accuracy of the optimization algorithm.Besides,the convergence and time complexity of TLPIO are discussed.Comparison analysis with other classical optimization algorithms highlights the advantage of TLPIO.In the simulation of air combat,three initial scenarios are set,namely,opposite,offensive and defensive conditions.The effectiveness performance of the proposed autonomous maneuver decision method is verified by simulation results.

Effect of Noisy Fitness in Real-Time Strategy Games Player Behaviour Optimisation Using Evolutionary Algorithms

This paper investigates the performance and the results of an evolutionary algorithm （EA） specifically designed for evolving the decision engine of a program （which, in this context, is called bot） that plays Planet Wars. This game, which was chosen for the Google Artificial Intelligence Challenge in 2010, requires the bot to deal with multiple target planets, while achieving a certain degree of adaptability in order to defeat different opponents in different scenarios. The decision engine of the bot is initially based on a set of rules that have been defined after an empirical study, and a genetic algorithm （GA） is used for tuning the set of constants, weights and probabilities that those rules include, and therefore, the general behaviour of the bot. Then, the bot is supplied with the evolved decision engine and the results obtained when competing with other bots （a bot offered by Google as a sparring partner, and a scripted bot with a pre-established behaviour） are thoroughly analysed. The evaluation of the candidate solutions is based on the result of non-deterministic battles （and environmental interactions） against other bots, whose outcome depends on random draws as well as on the opponents＇ actions. Therefore, the proposed GA is dealing with a noisy fitness function. After analysing the effects of the noisy fitness, we conclude that tackling randomness via repeated combats and reevaluations reduces this effect and makes the GA a highly valuable approach for solving this problem.

Riemann Hypothesis, Catholic Information and Potential of Events with New Techniques for Financial and Other Applications

In this research we are going to define two new concepts: a) “The Potential of Events” (EP) and b) “The Catholic Information” (CI). The term CI derives from the ancient Greek language and declares all the Catholic (general) Logical Propositions () which will true for every element of a set A. We will study the Riemann Hypothesis in two stages: a) By using the EP we will prove that the distribution of events e (even) and o (odd) of Square Free Numbers (SFN) on the axis Ax(N) of naturals is Heads-Tails (H-T) type. b) By using the CI we will explain the way that the distribution of prime numbers can be correlated with the non-trivial zeros of the function ζ(s) of Riemann. The Introduction and the Chapter 2 are necessary for understanding the solution. In the Chapter 3 we will present a simple method of forecasting in many very useful applications (e.g. financial, technological, medical, social, etc) developing a generalization of this new, proven here, theory which we finally apply to the solution of RH. The following Introduction as well the Results with the Discussion at the end shed light about the possibility of the proof of all the above. The article consists of 9 chapters that are numbered by 1, 2, …, 9.

关于多目标气动优化设计中伴随方法与对策理论的耦合研究(英文)

The tighten couplings of game strategies with adjoint methods for multi-criterion aerodynamic design optimization are ad-dressed. Its numerical implementation is also described in details. In cooperative game,adjoint methods are coupled in parallel to compute Pareto front collaboratively. Conversely in a Nash game,adjoint methods are coupled in each player s decision making to achieve Nash equilibrium competitively. In Stackelberg game,adjoint methods used by players are nested hierarchically through incomp...

尺度政治视角下的流域生态补偿政府主体博弈--以新安江流域为例

China's policy on ecological compensation(eco-compensation)in watershed ecosystems is of economic,social and environmental significance for China's ecological governance and protection of natural areas.It involves balancing the interests of regional stakeholders,coordinating the development of regional environments and establishing effective cooperation models,making it a classic topic for geographical research.This study introduces the concept of institutional"stickiness"to the theory of politics of scale to analyze the features and mechanisms of the game behavior of government entities in the process of implementing watershed eco-compensation in the Xin'an River Basin.Our results show the following:government entities at various levels,including the central,provincial and municipal governments,experienced the three stages of game strategy of competition,cooperation and"coopetition";building a government community of shared interests can promote watershed eco-compensation,and"appropriate intervention"by the central government is key to achieving inter-provincial watershed eco-compensation;there was clear institutional stickiness during the transition from a"vertical"model of watershed eco-compensation to a"vertical-horizontal"model,with government entities using policy innovations and social participation to limit and reduce stickiness so as to reshape the watershed eco-compensation system;scalar jumping is the core mechanism that promoted eco-compensation in the study basin,and government entities shaped the discourse on watershed eco-compensation by redistributing powers and capital and creating informal constraints,which promoted the transformation of eco-compensation from a"strong state–weak society"structural model,to a"strong state–strong society"model in the Xin'an River Basin.These results can provide theoretical support for the construction of inter-regional watershed eco-compensation mechanisms,provide a scientific basis for the rational evaluation and guidance of watershed eco-compensation practices,and promote the coordinated and sustainable socioeconomic development of watersheds.