The potential harms of goodwill impairment avoidance: Evidence based on future performance and stock prices

The rapidly increasing volume of goodwill assets in the capital market generates potential risks due to the possibility of an untimely recognition of goodwill impairment.In this paper,we investigate the financial consequences of goodwill impairment avoidance based on firms’future performance and stock prices.Using Chinese A-share listed firms with goodwill balances,we find that avoiding goodwill impairments negatively affects a firm’s performance growth and increases its risk of a future stock price crash.These adverse effects continue for the three years following the goodwill impairment avoidance.Our results indicate that goodwill impairment avoidance has detrimental impacts on a firm’s future performance and stock price and that these impacts are persistent.Our conclusions are helpful for regulators on how to prevent the risks hidden in goodwill impairment recognition and maintain the stable development of the financial market.

Do goodwill impairments affect audit opinions?Evidence from China

There has been a steady growth of goodwill impairments in the Chinese stock market since the adoption of the impairment approach in accounting.The influence of goodwill impairments on a firm’s financial position and profitability give reason to doubt its current and future performance.We examine whether auditors,as a crucial external monitor,identify the information risks of goodwill impairments and express their concerns about financial reporting quality in their audit opinions.Using a sample of firms listed on China’s Ashare market from 2007 to 2017,we test the association between goodwill impairments and the type of audit opinion received in the same financial period.Our findings are as follows.First,the probability of receiving a modified opinion increases with the amount of goodwill impairments.Second,the positive association between goodwill impairments and modified audit opinions is driven primarily by earnings management risks.Third,this positive association is more salient when auditors are industry experts and there is no auditor–client mismatch.Fourth,auditors are more sensitive to the amount of goodwill impairments than to their mere existence.Overall,we document that auditors perceive goodwill impairments as a signal of information risks and communicate their concerns to investors to avoid litigation.