The low-cost RFID tags have very limited computing and storage resources and this makes it difficult to completely solve their security and privacy problems. Lightweight authentication is considered as one of the most...The low-cost RFID tags have very limited computing and storage resources and this makes it difficult to completely solve their security and privacy problems. Lightweight authentication is considered as one of the most effective methods to ensure the security in the RFID system. Many light-weight authentication protocols use Hash function and pseudorandom generator to ensure the anonymity and confidential communication of the RFID system. But these protocols do not provide such security as they claimed. By analyzing some typical Hash-based RFID authentication protocols, it is found that they are vulnerable to some common attacks. Many protocols cannot resist tracing attack and de-synchronization attack. Some protocols cannot provide forward security. Gy?z? Gódor and Sándor Imre proposed a Hash-based authentication protocol and they claimed their protocol could resist the well-known attacks. But by constructing some different attack scenarios, their protocol is shown to be vulnerable to tracing attack and de-synchronization attack. Based on the analysis for the Hash-based authentication protocols, some feasible suggestions are proposed to improve the security of the RFID authentication protocols.展开更多
RFID(Radio Frequency IDentification)系统射频标签结构简单,且与阅读器间采用无线方式传输数据,易产生隐私泄露和受到安全攻击。针对该问题,文中提出通过双向轻权认证协议来保护RFID系统的安全性和隐私。该协议通过随机化标签的秘密...RFID(Radio Frequency IDentification)系统射频标签结构简单,且与阅读器间采用无线方式传输数据,易产生隐私泄露和受到安全攻击。针对该问题,文中提出通过双向轻权认证协议来保护RFID系统的安全性和隐私。该协议通过随机化标签的秘密信息再哈希的方法生成会话消息,标签与阅读器间采用二次相互认证,提升了协议的安全性。该协议通过哈希运算确保认证过程中会话信息的保密传输和完整性,通过对标签端每次发出会话消息的随机化确保了消息的新鲜性,系统秘密信息的更新确保协议满足前向安全性。RFID认证协议不仅能抵抗窃听、追踪、重放、去同步化等攻击,还能满足RFID系统的安全性和隐私保护需要。展开更多
文摘The low-cost RFID tags have very limited computing and storage resources and this makes it difficult to completely solve their security and privacy problems. Lightweight authentication is considered as one of the most effective methods to ensure the security in the RFID system. Many light-weight authentication protocols use Hash function and pseudorandom generator to ensure the anonymity and confidential communication of the RFID system. But these protocols do not provide such security as they claimed. By analyzing some typical Hash-based RFID authentication protocols, it is found that they are vulnerable to some common attacks. Many protocols cannot resist tracing attack and de-synchronization attack. Some protocols cannot provide forward security. Gy?z? Gódor and Sándor Imre proposed a Hash-based authentication protocol and they claimed their protocol could resist the well-known attacks. But by constructing some different attack scenarios, their protocol is shown to be vulnerable to tracing attack and de-synchronization attack. Based on the analysis for the Hash-based authentication protocols, some feasible suggestions are proposed to improve the security of the RFID authentication protocols.
文摘RFID(Radio Frequency IDentification)系统射频标签结构简单,且与阅读器间采用无线方式传输数据,易产生隐私泄露和受到安全攻击。针对该问题,文中提出通过双向轻权认证协议来保护RFID系统的安全性和隐私。该协议通过随机化标签的秘密信息再哈希的方法生成会话消息,标签与阅读器间采用二次相互认证,提升了协议的安全性。该协议通过哈希运算确保认证过程中会话信息的保密传输和完整性,通过对标签端每次发出会话消息的随机化确保了消息的新鲜性,系统秘密信息的更新确保协议满足前向安全性。RFID认证协议不仅能抵抗窃听、追踪、重放、去同步化等攻击,还能满足RFID系统的安全性和隐私保护需要。
