By reviewing the research on the effect of corporate merger, we find that knowledge is still limited to the effect of corporate merger on industrial structure. In this article, firstly we study the effect of horizonta...By reviewing the research on the effect of corporate merger, we find that knowledge is still limited to the effect of corporate merger on industrial structure. In this article, firstly we study the effect of horizontal merger on market structure, then explore the effect of market performance on industrial structure. Finally we present a new model that can explain how horizontal merger improves the adjustment of industrial structure.展开更多
Mergers have become an important means for low-carbon manufacturers to improve their efficiency and competitiveness.This paper studies the impact of horizontal mergers between asymmetric low-carbon manufacturers on pr...Mergers have become an important means for low-carbon manufacturers to improve their efficiency and competitiveness.This paper studies the impact of horizontal mergers between asymmetric low-carbon manufacturers on product diversity,profits,consumer surplus,and the environment.In the premerger model,we consider two asymmetric manufacturers in terms of market potential that produce two products and compete on prices and carbon emissions.In the postmerger model,the two asymmetric manufacturers merge into one firm.The merged manufacturer can either continue to produce two products and collude on both products'prices and carbon emissions or enjoy both production and green technology investment cost savings to produce only one product.Our result suggests that when the merged manufacturer produces two products,the merger does not necessarily lead to higher prices,which stands in sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom.Furthermore,the merger always benefits the manufacturer but harms consumers.When the merged manufacturer chooses to produce only one product,however,we confirm that the merger can lead to a win-win-win outcome,i.e.,the manufacturer,customers,and environment all become better off if either the production or investment savings are salient.The conventional wisdom shows that salient costing savings lead to price reduction.Nevertheless,we show that the merged manufacturer can charge consumers higher prices to provide lower-emission products.In addition,we show that improving investment(production)cost savings is more effective for the merged manufacturer if these two cost savings are salient(not salient).Finally,the merged manufacturer should not reduce diversity if these two cost savings are relatively low because the profit and consumer surplus may be simultaneously lower.We also extend our base model to the case where there exist three manufacturers in the premerger model and the merged firm still operates in a competitive market.展开更多
Abstract We consider a sequential merger game between Cournot firms with ho- mogeneous product and quadratic cost. A large slope of the marginal cost function or a small slope of inverse market demand are both predict...Abstract We consider a sequential merger game between Cournot firms with ho- mogeneous product and quadratic cost. A large slope of the marginal cost function or a small slope of inverse market demand are both predicted to increase the incentive to merge. The profitability of any merger increases with the number of mergers hav- ing already taken place. Thus, mergers tend to occur in waves in industries that have experienced exogenous shocks affecting firms＇ cost or demand. We also show some mergers that are not profitable for merged firms in the short-run may take place in the early stage of a wave.展开更多
文摘By reviewing the research on the effect of corporate merger, we find that knowledge is still limited to the effect of corporate merger on industrial structure. In this article, firstly we study the effect of horizontal merger on market structure, then explore the effect of market performance on industrial structure. Finally we present a new model that can explain how horizontal merger improves the adjustment of industrial structure.
基金This paper was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.72001048 and 72102080the Guangdong Basic and Applied Basic Research Foundation under Grant Nos.2019A1515011767,2019A1515110848,2021A1515011969,and 2021A1515011876the Planning Projects of Philosophy and So-cial Science of Guangdong under Grant No.GD19YGL12.
文摘Mergers have become an important means for low-carbon manufacturers to improve their efficiency and competitiveness.This paper studies the impact of horizontal mergers between asymmetric low-carbon manufacturers on product diversity,profits,consumer surplus,and the environment.In the premerger model,we consider two asymmetric manufacturers in terms of market potential that produce two products and compete on prices and carbon emissions.In the postmerger model,the two asymmetric manufacturers merge into one firm.The merged manufacturer can either continue to produce two products and collude on both products'prices and carbon emissions or enjoy both production and green technology investment cost savings to produce only one product.Our result suggests that when the merged manufacturer produces two products,the merger does not necessarily lead to higher prices,which stands in sharp contrast to the conventional wisdom.Furthermore,the merger always benefits the manufacturer but harms consumers.When the merged manufacturer chooses to produce only one product,however,we confirm that the merger can lead to a win-win-win outcome,i.e.,the manufacturer,customers,and environment all become better off if either the production or investment savings are salient.The conventional wisdom shows that salient costing savings lead to price reduction.Nevertheless,we show that the merged manufacturer can charge consumers higher prices to provide lower-emission products.In addition,we show that improving investment(production)cost savings is more effective for the merged manufacturer if these two cost savings are salient(not salient).Finally,the merged manufacturer should not reduce diversity if these two cost savings are relatively low because the profit and consumer surplus may be simultaneously lower.We also extend our base model to the case where there exist three manufacturers in the premerger model and the merged firm still operates in a competitive market.
文摘Abstract We consider a sequential merger game between Cournot firms with ho- mogeneous product and quadratic cost. A large slope of the marginal cost function or a small slope of inverse market demand are both predicted to increase the incentive to merge. The profitability of any merger increases with the number of mergers hav- ing already taken place. Thus, mergers tend to occur in waves in industries that have experienced exogenous shocks affecting firms＇ cost or demand. We also show some mergers that are not profitable for merged firms in the short-run may take place in the early stage of a wave.
