Brentano in 1870s was the first to introduce intentionality to mean “conscious of”. At the end of the 1960s, a version of this view was developed by analytic American philosophy to construct a theory of meaningful l...Brentano in 1870s was the first to introduce intentionality to mean “conscious of”. At the end of the 1960s, a version of this view was developed by analytic American philosophy to construct a theory of meaningful language. That led Dennett to claim that intentionality was mainly a feature of sentence, not mental states. In contrast, Searle in 1990s rejected the Brentanian thesis and explained intentionality by a biological naturalism. Thereafter, radical eliminativists such as Churchland claimed that all philosophical arguments merited replacement by neuroscientific knowledge. Unfortunately, very few neurophysiological studies attempted to scientifically tackle the problem raised by intentionality. The issue now emerging is a new conception of intentionality based on phenomenological, neurobiological and quantum theories, such as: 1) the notion of “intentional arc” proposed in the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty;2) the neurobiological and quantum model of Freeman, in which self-organizing pathways are accompanied by quantum transitions in controlling intentionality in brain;3) the recent hypothesis that some visuo-motor neurons would be involved in controlling these self-organized pathways;4) the quantum models of Vitiello and Globus, in which a thermofield (dissipative) system governs the dynamic dialog of dual quantum modes between environment and brain. Based on this conception of mind-world interactions, it implicitly appears that intentionality might be a fundamental force which draws us irreversibly towards the future. An alternative hypothesis based on this promising proposal is argued.展开更多
In the phenomenological tradition intentionality is considered to be an essential property of consciousness. Philosophers from this tradition （Brentano, Husserl, Sartre, etc.） generally share the following two commi...In the phenomenological tradition intentionality is considered to be an essential property of consciousness. Philosophers from this tradition （Brentano, Husserl, Sartre, etc.） generally share the following two commitments： （i） intentionality is an essential property of consciousness; and （ii） all intentional states are directed at, and are intentionally related to, objects. This view of consciousness has two pressing problems. Firstly, philosophers such as John Searle and David Rosenthal have suggested raw feelings and some forms of seemingly undirected and thus non-intentional feelings as counterexamples to the essential intentionality of conscious states. Secondly, some analytical philosophers and Husserlian scholars inspired by Frege, such as Smith and Follesdal, deny that every intentional state is related to a correlative object. This paper presents a Husserlian view concerning the essential intentionality of consciousness. It will be shown that both problems can be successfully dealt with from an essentially Husserlian and phenomenological perspective.展开更多
The main purpose of this paper is to respond to the questions what is mind and consciousness and where this resides.The answers are based on the frontline Informational Model of Human Body and Living Structures(IMHBLS...The main purpose of this paper is to respond to the questions what is mind and consciousness and where this resides.The answers are based on the frontline Informational Model of Human Body and Living Structures(IMHBLS),which shows that mind and consciousness can be described by the activity of the Informational System of the Human Body and Living Structures(ISHBLS),consisting of seven informational components,each of them with specific activity and functions,inter-correlated to support the immaterial/informational manifestation of the body expressed by mind and consciousness.The basic concept of matter-related and virtual information results as a consequence of the operability of the physics,chemistry,biologic,or mathematics laws,which actually act as informational operators,such processes are informationally driven and manifested finally as a“media-like functions”of mind and consciousness,on the“screen/display”of prefrontal cortex.The mind is therefore described as the capacity of every individual to access the data field of own life experience,where the thought acts as an informational operator,which can activate the required information from internal/external reality.Consciousness is the result of the info-representation of the explored reality,accumulated by the momentary connection,and compared/combined with the life experience,serving as judgment reference/criteria.The question is discussed in relation with the localization of consciousness,showing that this resides in the brain,as a result of the activity of ISHBLS.The discussion on the experimental evidences concerning the minimal basic components necessary and sufficient to sustain consciousness,compared with the results of the informational model,indicates the cortico-thalamus axis,in a full agreement each other.One of the basic findings is that the activation of consciousness is operated in two steps,one consisting in a feed-forward reception and another in feedback perception for recognition of the info-significance,which is fully supported by the recently reported experimental results.The phenomena of intuition,inspiration,premonition,“deja vue”,retrocausality,and intentionality are discussed.This model unifies the eastern and western concepts/models on consciousness and mind,explaining the energetic Yung/Yin Chinese model by YES/NO-informational Bit-type behavior,the Plato’s ideas/forms by“information”concept as a participating component of reality,Aristotle’s materialist view with matter structuration(assisted by information),and archaic model of the seven“chakras”at human,as vital informational centers connected with the body.展开更多
The paper aims at reconstructing the conception of descriptive analysis shared by Brentano and the early Husserl.According to this shared conception,the descriptive analysis consists in the articulation of the multi-l...The paper aims at reconstructing the conception of descriptive analysis shared by Brentano and the early Husserl.According to this shared conception,the descriptive analysis consists in the articulation of the multi-layered part-whole structure of consciousness.Focusing on the problem of intentional reference,the paper shows how they make different distinctions among parts of consciousness to carry out the descriptive analyses thus defined.Further,it shows how such a difference is closely connected to the two philosophers'views on the nature of intentional reference.展开更多
文摘Brentano in 1870s was the first to introduce intentionality to mean “conscious of”. At the end of the 1960s, a version of this view was developed by analytic American philosophy to construct a theory of meaningful language. That led Dennett to claim that intentionality was mainly a feature of sentence, not mental states. In contrast, Searle in 1990s rejected the Brentanian thesis and explained intentionality by a biological naturalism. Thereafter, radical eliminativists such as Churchland claimed that all philosophical arguments merited replacement by neuroscientific knowledge. Unfortunately, very few neurophysiological studies attempted to scientifically tackle the problem raised by intentionality. The issue now emerging is a new conception of intentionality based on phenomenological, neurobiological and quantum theories, such as: 1) the notion of “intentional arc” proposed in the philosophy of Merleau-Ponty;2) the neurobiological and quantum model of Freeman, in which self-organizing pathways are accompanied by quantum transitions in controlling intentionality in brain;3) the recent hypothesis that some visuo-motor neurons would be involved in controlling these self-organized pathways;4) the quantum models of Vitiello and Globus, in which a thermofield (dissipative) system governs the dynamic dialog of dual quantum modes between environment and brain. Based on this conception of mind-world interactions, it implicitly appears that intentionality might be a fundamental force which draws us irreversibly towards the future. An alternative hypothesis based on this promising proposal is argued.
文摘In the phenomenological tradition intentionality is considered to be an essential property of consciousness. Philosophers from this tradition （Brentano, Husserl, Sartre, etc.） generally share the following two commitments： （i） intentionality is an essential property of consciousness; and （ii） all intentional states are directed at, and are intentionally related to, objects. This view of consciousness has two pressing problems. Firstly, philosophers such as John Searle and David Rosenthal have suggested raw feelings and some forms of seemingly undirected and thus non-intentional feelings as counterexamples to the essential intentionality of conscious states. Secondly, some analytical philosophers and Husserlian scholars inspired by Frege, such as Smith and Follesdal, deny that every intentional state is related to a correlative object. This paper presents a Husserlian view concerning the essential intentionality of consciousness. It will be shown that both problems can be successfully dealt with from an essentially Husserlian and phenomenological perspective.
文摘The main purpose of this paper is to respond to the questions what is mind and consciousness and where this resides.The answers are based on the frontline Informational Model of Human Body and Living Structures(IMHBLS),which shows that mind and consciousness can be described by the activity of the Informational System of the Human Body and Living Structures(ISHBLS),consisting of seven informational components,each of them with specific activity and functions,inter-correlated to support the immaterial/informational manifestation of the body expressed by mind and consciousness.The basic concept of matter-related and virtual information results as a consequence of the operability of the physics,chemistry,biologic,or mathematics laws,which actually act as informational operators,such processes are informationally driven and manifested finally as a“media-like functions”of mind and consciousness,on the“screen/display”of prefrontal cortex.The mind is therefore described as the capacity of every individual to access the data field of own life experience,where the thought acts as an informational operator,which can activate the required information from internal/external reality.Consciousness is the result of the info-representation of the explored reality,accumulated by the momentary connection,and compared/combined with the life experience,serving as judgment reference/criteria.The question is discussed in relation with the localization of consciousness,showing that this resides in the brain,as a result of the activity of ISHBLS.The discussion on the experimental evidences concerning the minimal basic components necessary and sufficient to sustain consciousness,compared with the results of the informational model,indicates the cortico-thalamus axis,in a full agreement each other.One of the basic findings is that the activation of consciousness is operated in two steps,one consisting in a feed-forward reception and another in feedback perception for recognition of the info-significance,which is fully supported by the recently reported experimental results.The phenomena of intuition,inspiration,premonition,“deja vue”,retrocausality,and intentionality are discussed.This model unifies the eastern and western concepts/models on consciousness and mind,explaining the energetic Yung/Yin Chinese model by YES/NO-informational Bit-type behavior,the Plato’s ideas/forms by“information”concept as a participating component of reality,Aristotle’s materialist view with matter structuration(assisted by information),and archaic model of the seven“chakras”at human,as vital informational centers connected with the body.
基金supported by the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science(KAKENHI,Project No.18K12186).
文摘The paper aims at reconstructing the conception of descriptive analysis shared by Brentano and the early Husserl.According to this shared conception,the descriptive analysis consists in the articulation of the multi-layered part-whole structure of consciousness.Focusing on the problem of intentional reference,the paper shows how they make different distinctions among parts of consciousness to carry out the descriptive analyses thus defined.Further,it shows how such a difference is closely connected to the two philosophers'views on the nature of intentional reference.
