The Emergence of Illiberal Democracy in the European Union:The Hungarian Case

In 2010,the Hungarian government established so-called“illiberal democracy.”Western courtiers have looked on with bewilderment over the past eight years at this political trajectory of Hungary.Some post-Communist countries that were committed to common European values,have already been implementing this illiberal democracy model.The perceived interests of the“nation”are taking centre stage and governments are subject to far fewer checks and balances.They are turning instead towards an alternative social,political,and economic model,in which the cultivation of traditional values and distinct national identities are of paramount ideological importance.This new model is frequently characterised by widespread,systematic state corruption,and an increasingly authoritarian political culture.The paper tries to shed light on the reasons of development of illiberal democracy in the European Union by examining the case in Hungary.Furthermore,the paper defines the price of partially giving up certain principles of liberal democracy,such as checks and balances,political pluralism,economic equality of market constituents,or the rule of law,in return of hoped greater economic and state efficiency.

Upscaling Illiberalism： Class, Contradiction, and the Rise and Rise of the Populist Right in Post- socialist Central Europe

Recent liberal political science analysis has highlighted media, manipu- lation, and populist political trickery in the apparently sudden rise of the new Right in Europe and the USA. I suggest that a robust engagement with the actual social transformations over which liberalism has presided since 1989 is imperative. Anthropological work on class processes and the rise of neo-nationalist populism in Central and Eastern Europe has been strong in developing a more relational, pro- cessual, and embedded vision. In the current paper, I am looking at the phases and spaces of the rise of iUiberalism as a popular political sensibility in Central and Eastern Europe. In particular, I am interested in its gradual upscaling to the level of the nation state and, through the ＂Visegrad bloc＂ to the EU. I argue that both the emergence and step-by-step upscaling of illiberal political sensibilities are explained by class relational processes and the regionally uneven Polanyi-type ＂counter- movements＂ against liberalizations that they brought forth.

On the Crisis of Democracy

In the last three decades of the 20th century, important political changes occurred in all regions of the world, making the institutions of many existing political systems closer to the ideals of democracy. But as happened in other moments of history, those processes of democratization, even when successful, always occurred through advances and retreats. Thus, contemporary political practices, procedures, and institutions embody democratic ideals only partially. In many nations, in the present, the rule of law, civil, and political rights, and institutional mechanisms for citizens’ control of governments remain ineffective or underdeveloped. Thus, a double concern prevails among analysts: on the one hand, the regression to authoritarianism in some countries after the processes of political changes—Russia, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Turkey being the paradigmatic examples;the emergence of semi-democracies, i.e., hybrid or illiberal regimes, which have provoked a new interest in the study of patterns of institutional design, the critical role of civil society, different political-cultural developments, authoritarian legacies in the context of the new democracies, competitive authoritarianism and new dictatorships. On the other hand, the acknowledgement of intrinsic limits of the historical development of the democratic regime even in the case of old democracies, i.e., the fact that political equality, active citizen participation, and effective control of abuse of power have never been fully realized in practice. This is the general context in which many analysts and part of the public opinion sustain that there is a crisis of democracy. The general diagnosis refers to the decreasing trust in political elites, political parties, parliaments, governments, and to the dissatisfaction with the regime among democrats;it refers also to the weaker and sometimes erratic performance of democratic institutions and particularly to the failure of the representative system. The picture is completed with the growing rates of partisan misalignment, electoral volatility, and declining civic participation. All this seems to indicate that democracy is inconceivable without crisis. This chapter discusses this scenario. The crisis of democracies is examined from a critical perspective, and the main objective is to understand the different dimensions of its nature and its consequences.

The Biopolitical Incarnation of Populism:A Voice From Poland

In the presented paper,the author starts with diagnosing the state of research on populism and biopolitics simultaneously.The author states that most often in the literature the topic of populism(Laclau,Mouffe,Mudde,and Panizza)is considered separately from the problems related to biopolitics(Foucault,Negri,Agamben,and Esposito).The author would like to change this separation by bringing these two discourses closer together.The author’s main aim is to rethink populism from a biopolitical perspective,i.e.,to implement national politics over the population.Furthermore,the author reconstructs the logic of such biopolitical populism with the example of Poland,and as a consequence,the program of the“Law and Justice Party(PiS)”,which,after coming to power in 2015,introduced a new policy of“legal populism”,closely related to the conservative“procreative policy”(prohibition of abortion),and the family-oriented economy(financial supplement for each family for the second child,the so-called“500 plus”program).

Is There Such Thing as ＇Populist Constitutionalism＇？ The Case of Hungary

The paper deals with recent deviations from the shared values of con- stitutionalism towards a kind of ＇populist, illiberal constitutionalism＇ introduced by Hungary＇s new constitution in 2011. The populism of FIDESZ was directed against all elites, including the ones that designed the 1989 constitutional system （in which FIDESZ also participated）, claiming that it was time for a new revolution. This is why PM Viktor Orban characterized the results of the 2010 elections as a ＇revo- lution of the ballot boxes＇. His intention with this revolution was to eliminate all checks and balances, and even the parliamentary rotation of governing parties. His vision for a new constitutional order----one in which his political party occupies the centre stage of Hungarian political life and puts an end to debates over values has now been entrenched in the new constitution. The paper argues that this current Hungarian constitutional system was made possible by FIDESZ＇ anti-pluralist nationalist populism, but is not necessarily based on a true commitment to expressing the will of the people via ＇illiberal constitutionalism＇. The populist government rather misuses the country＇s lack of constitutional culture. Adherence to constitutional patriotism would mean that FIDESZ would have to endorse what John Rawls once called ＇constitutional essentials＇. The core of this kind of con- stitutional patriotism is a constitutional culture centred on universalist liberal democratic norms and values. Instead, the current Hungarian constitutional system is confronted with unconstitutional patriotism, a kind of nationalism that violates constitutional essentials in the name of ＇national constitutional identity＇.