The designing of incentive strategy when the follower’s objective functions have Parameters unknown to the leader is investigated in this paper. A desinging approach named IncentiveStrategy with Unknown but Bounded ...The designing of incentive strategy when the follower’s objective functions have Parameters unknown to the leader is investigated in this paper. A desinging approach named IncentiveStrategy with Unknown but Bounded error (ISUBB) is proposed. A simple example is given to explain the use of ISUBS.展开更多
This paper designs an incentive Stackelberg strategy for the discrete-time stochastic systems with mean-field terms.Sufficient conditions for the existence of such a design are suggested.Moreover,the incentive strateg...This paper designs an incentive Stackelberg strategy for the discrete-time stochastic systems with mean-field terms.Sufficient conditions for the existence of such a design are suggested.Moreover,the incentive strategy is obtained as a feedback form including the deviation of the state and its mathematical expectation.Also,the stability analysis is involved.It is found that the stability can be guaranteed by the follower.In addition,the specific algorithm is proposed and its effectiveness is checked by two examples.展开更多
In order to make strategic decision on firms’ sharing reward program( SRP), a nested Stackelberg game is developed. The sharing behavior among users and the rewarding strategy of firms are modeled. The optimal sharin...In order to make strategic decision on firms’ sharing reward program( SRP), a nested Stackelberg game is developed. The sharing behavior among users and the rewarding strategy of firms are modeled. The optimal sharing bonus is worked out and the impact of social relationships among customers is discussed. The results show that the higher the bonus,the more efforts the inductor is willing to make to persuade the inductee into buying. In addition,the firms should take the social relationship into consideration when setting the optimal sharing bonus. If the social relationship is weak,there is no need to adopt the SRP. Otherwise,there are two ways to reward the inductors. Also,the stronger the social relationship,the fewer the sharing bonuses that should be offered to the inductors,and the higher the expected profits. As a result,it is reasonable for the firms to implement SRPs on the social media where users are familiar with each other.展开更多
With introducting two testing indices of ECMRS,behavior modal of the contract enterprise and the state in ECMRS are in our paper,then two connive models of ECMRS are made by introducing an audit technique as a means o...With introducting two testing indices of ECMRS,behavior modal of the contract enterprise and the state in ECMRS are in our paper,then two connive models of ECMRS are made by introducing an audit technique as a means of acquiring information Moreover,a general rule which determines optimal strategy with perfect informtion is also given.展开更多
文摘The designing of incentive strategy when the follower’s objective functions have Parameters unknown to the leader is investigated in this paper. A desinging approach named IncentiveStrategy with Unknown but Bounded error (ISUBB) is proposed. A simple example is given to explain the use of ISUBS.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.61903234 and 61973198the Natural Science Foundation of Shandong Province under Grant No.ZR2021MA066。
文摘This paper designs an incentive Stackelberg strategy for the discrete-time stochastic systems with mean-field terms.Sufficient conditions for the existence of such a design are suggested.Moreover,the incentive strategy is obtained as a feedback form including the deviation of the state and its mathematical expectation.Also,the stability analysis is involved.It is found that the stability can be guaranteed by the follower.In addition,the specific algorithm is proposed and its effectiveness is checked by two examples.
基金The National Social Science Foundation of China(No.17BGL196)the Postgraduate Research&Practice Innovation Program of Jiangsu Province(No.KYLX15_0193)
文摘In order to make strategic decision on firms’ sharing reward program( SRP), a nested Stackelberg game is developed. The sharing behavior among users and the rewarding strategy of firms are modeled. The optimal sharing bonus is worked out and the impact of social relationships among customers is discussed. The results show that the higher the bonus,the more efforts the inductor is willing to make to persuade the inductee into buying. In addition,the firms should take the social relationship into consideration when setting the optimal sharing bonus. If the social relationship is weak,there is no need to adopt the SRP. Otherwise,there are two ways to reward the inductors. Also,the stronger the social relationship,the fewer the sharing bonuses that should be offered to the inductors,and the higher the expected profits. As a result,it is reasonable for the firms to implement SRPs on the social media where users are familiar with each other.
文摘With introducting two testing indices of ECMRS,behavior modal of the contract enterprise and the state in ECMRS are in our paper,then two connive models of ECMRS are made by introducing an audit technique as a means of acquiring information Moreover,a general rule which determines optimal strategy with perfect informtion is also given.
