Considering the widening of the peak-valley difference in the power grid and the difficulty of the existing fixed time-of-use electricity price mechanism in meeting the energy demand of heterogeneous users at various ...Considering the widening of the peak-valley difference in the power grid and the difficulty of the existing fixed time-of-use electricity price mechanism in meeting the energy demand of heterogeneous users at various moments or motivating users,the design of a reasonable dynamic pricing mechanism to actively engage users in demand response becomes imperative for power grid companies.For this purpose,a power grid-flexible load bilevel model is constructed based on dynamic pricing,where the leader is the dispatching center and the lower-level flexible load acts as the follower.Initially,an upper-level day-ahead dispatching model for the power grid is established,considering the lowest power grid dispatching cost as the objective function and incorporating the power grid-side constraints.Then,the lower level comprehensively considers the load characteristics of industrial load,energy storage,and data centers,and then establishes a lower-level flexible load operation model with the lowest user power-consuming cost as the objective function.Finally,the proposed method is validated using the IEEE-118 system,and the findings indicate that the dynamic pricing mechanism for peaking shaving and valley filling can effectively guide users to respond actively,thereby reducing the peak-valley difference and decreasing users’purchasing costs.展开更多
In order to solve the issues concerning the cross-unit sharing of information resources in rural areas, we analyze the incentive problem of the sharing of information resources in rural areas using the incentive theor...In order to solve the issues concerning the cross-unit sharing of information resources in rural areas, we analyze the incentive problem of the sharing of information resources in rural areas using the incentive theory method; establish corresponding incentive mechanism model (It is divided into positive incentive model and negative incentive model, and only when the two models guarantee each other and are used at the same time can they be effective). Based on this, we put forward the institutional design for sharing of information resources in rural areas as follows: firstly, establishing an administrative agency of rural information resources sharing, above the authority of all units, responsible for related work on sharing of information resources in rural areas; secondly, establishing and improving the positive and negative incentive mechanisms, to ensure the realization of sharing of information resources in rural areas.展开更多
Equilibrium pricing of credit default swaps(CDS)promotes efficient identification of credit risk in the market,which in turn leads to efficient allocation of resources.However,even when CDS have been priced in equilib...Equilibrium pricing of credit default swaps(CDS)promotes efficient identification of credit risk in the market,which in turn leads to efficient allocation of resources.However,even when CDS have been priced in equilibrium,i.e.,when premiums are equal to anticipated payments,the moral hazard incentives of CDS buyers increase with CDS transactions.Consequentially,it becomes an interesting research direction to study the impact of moral hazard incentives on the trading mechanism or pricing of derivatives(CDS).Most of the existing literature on the impact of moral hazard incentives in CDS pricing on derivatives trading mechanisms takes a macro perspective and focuses on the agreement risk effect.The literature exploring the analysis of the impact of moral hazard on the probability of agreement default from a micro perspective is not yet available.With this in mind,this paper focuses on the mechanisms by which“fraud”,an extreme manifestation of micro-moral hazard incentives,affects the probability of default.This paper introduces for the first time the concept of“claiming fraud”by credit protection buyers,which is different from the macro perspective of moral hazard incentives,and thus defines a specific extreme form of moral hazard incentives.Meanwhile,to address the intrinsic feature of the lack of economic explanatory power of the reduce-form model,this paper introduces a moral hazard incentive factor into the reduce-form model,and proposes a moral hazard state variable as a function of the asset value of the reference entity,which gives the reduce-form model strong economic explanatory power,and the default predictability is reduced by the description of the reduce-form model.In terms of the object of study,this paper considers the issue of moral hazard incentives in the presence of claiming fraud in two reference entities to further explore the impact of moral hazard incentives on default protection at the micro level in terms of cyclic default.Finally,based on the analysis of the results of the numerical simulation experiments,it is proposed that increasing the number of reference assets for CDS buyers will help to reduce the moral hazard incentives of the buyer,and thus the anticipated payments to the buyer,i.e.,we attempt to endogenize the credit risk of an asset by allowing the asset holder to choose the probability of the asset going up or down,which helps to understand the phenomenon of moral hazard incentives in CDS trading.展开更多
Earth’s ionosphere is an important medium for navigation,communication,and radio wave transmission.Total Electron Content(TEC)is a descriptive quantify for ionospheric research.However,the traditional empirical model...Earth’s ionosphere is an important medium for navigation,communication,and radio wave transmission.Total Electron Content(TEC)is a descriptive quantify for ionospheric research.However,the traditional empirical model could not fully consider the changes of TEC time series,the prediction accuracy level of TEC data performed not high.In this study,an improved Extreme Learning Machine(ELM)model is proposed for ionospheric TEC prediction.Improvements involved the use of Empirical Mode Decomposition(EMD)and a Fuzzy C-Means(FCM)clustering algorithm to pre-process data used as input to the ELM model.The proposed model fully uses the TEC data characteristics and expected to perform better prediction accuracy.TEC measurements provided by the Centre for Orbit Determination in Europe(CODE)were used to evaluate the performance of the improved ELM model in terms of prediction accuracy,applicable latitude,and the number of required training samples.Experimental results produced a Mean Relative Error(MRE)and a Root Mean Square Error(RMSE)of 8.5%and 1.39 TECU,respectively,outperforming the ELM algorithm(RMSE=2.33 TECU and MRE=17.1%).The improved ELM model exhibited particularly high prediction accuracy in mid-latitude regions,with a mean relative error of 7.6%.This value improved further as the number of available training data increased and when 20-doys data were trained,achieving a mean relative error of 4.9%.These results suggest the proposed model offers higher prediction accuracy than conventional algorithms.展开更多
With the deepening of electric power market reform in China,the monopoly edge of the state-owned electric power enterprises will lose.On the basis of the existing post performance salary mechanism,Chinese power enterp...With the deepening of electric power market reform in China,the monopoly edge of the state-owned electric power enterprises will lose.On the basis of the existing post performance salary mechanism,Chinese power enterprises need to optimize the incentive mechanism of R&D staff,to arouse the R&D staff's enthusiasm and creativity,to adapt to the new market competition and further improve market value.Whilst the incentive mechanism optimizing processing needs to consider not only the changing market environment but also the personal and working characteristics of R&D staff.This paper summarizes the characteristics of the current Chinese power enterprises' R&D staff:staff's theory quality is high,but insensitive to the market;they are confronted with heavy workload and diversified job choices;managers can observe their behavior choices or not;besides,the process of R&D is complex and the market reactions of R&D achievements are uncertain.Based on the premise of the above features,two incentive models are established in this paper from the point of view of enterprise managers.One is for the situation when staff's behavior choices can be observed;the other is for the situation when staff's behavior choices cannot be observed.Through solving the model,we analyze the optimization path of electric power enterprises R&D staff incentive mechanism under these conditions:(1) when staff's behavior choices can be observed,managers can pay more to the R&D staff who develop products with higher output value,in order to encourage them to work harder.(2) when staff's behavior choices cannot be observed,managers should take reasonable strategies according to the different situations:a.when R&D staff incentive totally depend on the market value of the R&D achievements,managers should allocate workload rationally according to their different technical levels;b.when the market reactions of R&D results become more precarious,managers need to reduce the incentive intensity which based on the market value and raise their fixed salary level;c.when R&D staff become more risk averse,managers should reduce the incentive intensity which based on the market value and raise their fixed salary level;on the contrary,managers should improve the incentive intensity and reduce the fixed salary level.展开更多
基金supported in part by Technology Project of State Grid Jiangsu Electric Power Co.,Ltd.,China,under Grant J2022011.
文摘Considering the widening of the peak-valley difference in the power grid and the difficulty of the existing fixed time-of-use electricity price mechanism in meeting the energy demand of heterogeneous users at various moments or motivating users,the design of a reasonable dynamic pricing mechanism to actively engage users in demand response becomes imperative for power grid companies.For this purpose,a power grid-flexible load bilevel model is constructed based on dynamic pricing,where the leader is the dispatching center and the lower-level flexible load acts as the follower.Initially,an upper-level day-ahead dispatching model for the power grid is established,considering the lowest power grid dispatching cost as the objective function and incorporating the power grid-side constraints.Then,the lower level comprehensively considers the load characteristics of industrial load,energy storage,and data centers,and then establishes a lower-level flexible load operation model with the lowest user power-consuming cost as the objective function.Finally,the proposed method is validated using the IEEE-118 system,and the findings indicate that the dynamic pricing mechanism for peaking shaving and valley filling can effectively guide users to respond actively,thereby reducing the peak-valley difference and decreasing users’purchasing costs.
基金Supported by Soft Science Project of the Ministry of Science and Technology (2011GXS1D003)Soft Science Project of Chongqing Municipality (cstc2011cx-rkxB00008)
文摘In order to solve the issues concerning the cross-unit sharing of information resources in rural areas, we analyze the incentive problem of the sharing of information resources in rural areas using the incentive theory method; establish corresponding incentive mechanism model (It is divided into positive incentive model and negative incentive model, and only when the two models guarantee each other and are used at the same time can they be effective). Based on this, we put forward the institutional design for sharing of information resources in rural areas as follows: firstly, establishing an administrative agency of rural information resources sharing, above the authority of all units, responsible for related work on sharing of information resources in rural areas; secondly, establishing and improving the positive and negative incentive mechanisms, to ensure the realization of sharing of information resources in rural areas.
文摘Equilibrium pricing of credit default swaps(CDS)promotes efficient identification of credit risk in the market,which in turn leads to efficient allocation of resources.However,even when CDS have been priced in equilibrium,i.e.,when premiums are equal to anticipated payments,the moral hazard incentives of CDS buyers increase with CDS transactions.Consequentially,it becomes an interesting research direction to study the impact of moral hazard incentives on the trading mechanism or pricing of derivatives(CDS).Most of the existing literature on the impact of moral hazard incentives in CDS pricing on derivatives trading mechanisms takes a macro perspective and focuses on the agreement risk effect.The literature exploring the analysis of the impact of moral hazard on the probability of agreement default from a micro perspective is not yet available.With this in mind,this paper focuses on the mechanisms by which“fraud”,an extreme manifestation of micro-moral hazard incentives,affects the probability of default.This paper introduces for the first time the concept of“claiming fraud”by credit protection buyers,which is different from the macro perspective of moral hazard incentives,and thus defines a specific extreme form of moral hazard incentives.Meanwhile,to address the intrinsic feature of the lack of economic explanatory power of the reduce-form model,this paper introduces a moral hazard incentive factor into the reduce-form model,and proposes a moral hazard state variable as a function of the asset value of the reference entity,which gives the reduce-form model strong economic explanatory power,and the default predictability is reduced by the description of the reduce-form model.In terms of the object of study,this paper considers the issue of moral hazard incentives in the presence of claiming fraud in two reference entities to further explore the impact of moral hazard incentives on default protection at the micro level in terms of cyclic default.Finally,based on the analysis of the results of the numerical simulation experiments,it is proposed that increasing the number of reference assets for CDS buyers will help to reduce the moral hazard incentives of the buyer,and thus the anticipated payments to the buyer,i.e.,we attempt to endogenize the credit risk of an asset by allowing the asset holder to choose the probability of the asset going up or down,which helps to understand the phenomenon of moral hazard incentives in CDS trading.
基金National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.41474020)。
文摘Earth’s ionosphere is an important medium for navigation,communication,and radio wave transmission.Total Electron Content(TEC)is a descriptive quantify for ionospheric research.However,the traditional empirical model could not fully consider the changes of TEC time series,the prediction accuracy level of TEC data performed not high.In this study,an improved Extreme Learning Machine(ELM)model is proposed for ionospheric TEC prediction.Improvements involved the use of Empirical Mode Decomposition(EMD)and a Fuzzy C-Means(FCM)clustering algorithm to pre-process data used as input to the ELM model.The proposed model fully uses the TEC data characteristics and expected to perform better prediction accuracy.TEC measurements provided by the Centre for Orbit Determination in Europe(CODE)were used to evaluate the performance of the improved ELM model in terms of prediction accuracy,applicable latitude,and the number of required training samples.Experimental results produced a Mean Relative Error(MRE)and a Root Mean Square Error(RMSE)of 8.5%and 1.39 TECU,respectively,outperforming the ELM algorithm(RMSE=2.33 TECU and MRE=17.1%).The improved ELM model exhibited particularly high prediction accuracy in mid-latitude regions,with a mean relative error of 7.6%.This value improved further as the number of available training data increased and when 20-doys data were trained,achieving a mean relative error of 4.9%.These results suggest the proposed model offers higher prediction accuracy than conventional algorithms.
基金supported by 2016 annual North China Electric Power University undergraduate innovative training program research project(Grant No.20162183)
文摘With the deepening of electric power market reform in China,the monopoly edge of the state-owned electric power enterprises will lose.On the basis of the existing post performance salary mechanism,Chinese power enterprises need to optimize the incentive mechanism of R&D staff,to arouse the R&D staff's enthusiasm and creativity,to adapt to the new market competition and further improve market value.Whilst the incentive mechanism optimizing processing needs to consider not only the changing market environment but also the personal and working characteristics of R&D staff.This paper summarizes the characteristics of the current Chinese power enterprises' R&D staff:staff's theory quality is high,but insensitive to the market;they are confronted with heavy workload and diversified job choices;managers can observe their behavior choices or not;besides,the process of R&D is complex and the market reactions of R&D achievements are uncertain.Based on the premise of the above features,two incentive models are established in this paper from the point of view of enterprise managers.One is for the situation when staff's behavior choices can be observed;the other is for the situation when staff's behavior choices cannot be observed.Through solving the model,we analyze the optimization path of electric power enterprises R&D staff incentive mechanism under these conditions:(1) when staff's behavior choices can be observed,managers can pay more to the R&D staff who develop products with higher output value,in order to encourage them to work harder.(2) when staff's behavior choices cannot be observed,managers should take reasonable strategies according to the different situations:a.when R&D staff incentive totally depend on the market value of the R&D achievements,managers should allocate workload rationally according to their different technical levels;b.when the market reactions of R&D results become more precarious,managers need to reduce the incentive intensity which based on the market value and raise their fixed salary level;c.when R&D staff become more risk averse,managers should reduce the incentive intensity which based on the market value and raise their fixed salary level;on the contrary,managers should improve the incentive intensity and reduce the fixed salary level.