An Empirical Research on the Relationship between Board of Directors Governance and Corporate Performance of Chinese Public Companies

Board of directors is an important component part of corporate governance. As a governance mechanism, we empirically study relationship among the scale of the board of directors, the structure of the board of directors and the duality leadership structure with corporate performance in Chinese public companies. The result shows that the smaller scale of the board of the directors is, the better performance is. With the ownership structure changing better, the structure of the board of directors will change better and promote the performance. The duality leadership structure doesn＇t affect the corporate performance. The fundamental method for the governance effectiveness of the board is to set up the reasonable ownership structure and the marketing mechanism for occurrences in human .

Research on the Influence of Equity Structure on Corporate Performance

Equity structure constitutes a crucial component of corporate internal governance.A scientifically and reasonably structured equity system aids in enhancing the level and efficiency of corporate governance.Through empirical analysis of data spanning from 2013 to 2022,the study aims to verify the influence mechanism of equity structure on corporate performance.The results indicate that enhancing equity concentration and balance positively impacts corporate performance,with this effect persisting over time.Consequently,optimizing the degree of equity concentration,shareholder types,and the board of directors’structure can assist enterprises in maximizing long-term value.

The Impact of Corporate Governance on Banks Performance and Loan Quality： Evidence From Italian Cooperative Banks

In the banking system, a context characterized by growing instability and by the speed of evolution of business dynamics, the system of corporate governance plays a key role, both for large banks and for banks with a smaller size. The paper aims to investigate the influence of corporate governance of the banks that operate in the cooperative credit system on performance and quality of loans, over the years 2010-2011-2012. In order to achieve this aim, the following research hypotheses have been formulated： There is a statistically significant relationship between the size and the structure of the board and banks Performance operating in the cooperative credit system; there is a statistically significant relationship between the size and structure of the board and the credit quality of banks operating in the cooperative credit system. The analysis is conducted on a sample composed of 48 Italian banks, divided into 24 cooperative banks and 24 popular banks. The sample is made up of banks from all over Italy and very different in terms of dimension. For the sample construction, data relative to governance of banks were collected from the balance sheets in the period from June to August 2014. Financial-economic data were collected from the Financial Statements and from Bankscope database. The methodology of analysis is based on multivariate OLS （ordinary least squares） regression models. The main results refer to the presence of significant relationships between board dimension and the quality of loans and among the number of committees and performance and the quality of loans. The presence of a significant and negative relationship between the board dimension and the ratio of impaired loans to gross loans indicates the possibility that enlargement of board dimension allows a better quality of loans. The presence of a positive relationship between the number of committees and the ratio of impaired loans to gross loans signals the possibility that a greater number of committees can produce a worse quality of loans. The presence of a negative relationship between the number of committees and bank performance suggests to limit and manage the complexity of governance in banks operating in the cooperative credit system.

Corporate governance mechanisms and performance： Analysis of Malaysian family and non-family controlled companies

Most study concentrating on family and non-family companies is conducted overseas with little research carried out in Malaysia. This study examined the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on family and non-family controlled companies＇ performance. The sample size of this study is 730 companies listed on Bursa Malaysia from 2003 to 2007. The findings reveal that corporate governance mechanisms influence the family and non-family controlled companies＇ performance. But not all corporate governance mechanisms are significant. The significant variables differ between family and non-family controlled companies. Thus, regulators need to be vigilant that family and non-family controlled companies practise differently and to set different code needed for each type of families.

Relationships Between Corporate Governance and Perceived Financial Performance of Firms： A Study

Corporations should have strong capital to sustain their operations. Investors should feel safe and be able to have access to accurate information about firms to invest their capital in those firms. These two factors are vital issues for the sustainability of corporations in the 21st century business. With the proper establishment of corporate governance practices, investors will be protected and feel safe and then a trust will develop, capital inflow will be facilitated and ultimately corporations with stronger financial foundations will emerge. A questionnaire was applied in this study to investigate the relationships between the corporate governance and perceived financial performance of the top 100 manufacturing firms operating in the Kayseri Organized Industrial Region. The results revealed that the number of employees had significant effects on the corporate governance and perceived financial performance scores of the firms and institutionalization level also affected perceived financial performance. The other independent variables （sectoral distribution, finn age, and export/revenue ratio） did not have any significant effects on corporate governance and perceived financial performance scores of the firms.

Do Company Directors Underestimate the Adoption of Corporate Governance Provisions？ A Survey Approach

This paper examines whether company directors underestimate the adoption of corporate governance provisions within Ghanaian listed firms. Using a survey approach, the respondents, who were company executives and non-executive directors with knowledge of the Ghanaian Code and its provisions, regard the code as a benchmark for good corporate governance practices within Ghanaian listed firms. They also report some improvement in the standard of corporate governance in their companies since the introduction of the Code. Many of the company directors indicated their preparedness to comply with further corporate governance requirements, such as the adoption of a formal nomination committee something not been currently included in the Ghanaian Code. However, the directors noted that they receive inadequate support from the regulatory and institutional bodies for the implementation of the Ghanaian Code provisions. Many of the directors also supported the review of the Ghanaian Code by an independent committee. With regard to the adoption of the Ghanaian Code and its influence on firm performance, the respondents indicated that the adoption of the specific governance provisions in the area of chief executive officer （CEO）/chairman roles separation, having a balance of executive and non-executive directors on the board, the establishment of audit and remuneration committees, and the full adoption of the Ghanaian Code provisions were all influential in determining firm performance. They, however, did not support the adoption of the board size provision as influential to firm performance. This raises questions about the usefulness of the range of board size as recommended by the Ghanaian Code.

A Study of the Role of the Board of Directors in Corporate Governance Based on UK Listed Companies

Companies are directed and controlled by corporate governance.It acts on the company internally and externally.The board of directors is responsible for the governance of the company;that is to say,the board of directors is the brain of the company,while corporate governance is the blood distributed throughout the company,which not only supplies blood to the whole,but also reflects the situation.Therefore,with regard to the role of the board of directors in corporate governance,this paper objectively analyzes the importance of the board of directors in corporate governance from theory to practice and from the internal composition of the board of directors to the impact of the board’s actions on the enterprise as a whole based on United Kingdom(UK)listed companies.

The effects of corporate governance compliance on market valuation in Malaysia

This study investigates the effects of corporate governance compliance on market valuation in Malaysia using a sample of 164 companies listed on the Main Board in Bursa Malaysia from 5 different industries （consumer, trading ＆ services, industrial, constructions and properties） within 2001 to 2005. Throughout, this study will use correlation and regression analysis in the SPSS software to determine the effects of corporate governance practices on Market Valuation. In analyzing firms＇ market valuation, we will use the Tobin＇s Q formula and for the corporate governance compliance, we will look at 4 criteria to compare with market valuation, which are （1） Board of Director＇s composition, （2） Board of Director＇s remuneration （salaries）, （3） Board of Director＇s training and development, （4） Board of Director＇s meeting. In order to determine the effects between the corporate governance compliance and market valuation, we will use regression analysis. Based on the correlation analysis, the first null hypothesis must be rejected and the alternative hypothesis is accepted, in which dependent variable and independent variables are significantly correlated with BOD remuneration and BOD training availability. Overall, there is a significant relationship between Tobin＇s Q and independent variables （BOD remuneration and BOD training）. This study also recommends that for the company who did not comply with the code, they should follow the best practice because it will be a pivotal weapon in facing with the fierce competition in era globalization.

A New Latent Class Stochastic Frontier Model for the Best Practices ofUSA＇s Corporate Governance

In this paper, the authors study the association between firms＇ specific characteristics and performances for a sample of 320 American firms using a governance efficiency index, calculated by the stochastic frontier analysis. The use of a latent class in the specification of the model, allowed detecting two groups of firms according to their specific characteristics： the firm size, the leverage, the dividend yield, and the return on equity （ROE）. The results of affectation equation show that the probability to be in the second group （the most efficient） is more important when the firm size, the dividend yield, and the ROE are high, while a high leverage level decreases the chance to be in the first group （the less efficient）.

Approaching Corporate Governance Structure

Corporate governance structure system, or corporate organization system, which is a management model and system on the basis that the investment and control are separate, is the rules of setting up and operating the corporate organizations which is specified in Company laws among counties around the world. This article introduces the five parts of corporate governance structure system and discuses the function.

Study on the Current Implementation Situation of the Independent Director System in China＇s Listed Companies

The independent director system, as an effective measure to improve the corporation governance structure of China＇ s listed companies, is focused by more and more people at the capital market. In this paper, the proportion of independent directors in the board of directors, and the actual condition, compensation, and duties performing of independent directors are analyzed by taking A-share listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange as an example, so that the current implementation situation of the independent director system in China＇ s listed companies is analyzed deeply through the empirical method. Finally, suggestions for its imorovement are orooosed.

The Impact of Shareholder Activism on Corporate Performance——Evidence from China

The separation of ownership and management of companies results in agency problems between shareholders and management to some extent.In Western countries,shareholders usually actively participate in the company’s management and monitor management issues in order to enhance the company’s performance.At present,China’s securities market,as well as institutional investors are undergoing a rapid development,while problems of governance among listed companies in China have been negatively affecting the development of capital markets.Institutional investors have developed to form a certain scale.Moreover,national policies,as well as the split-share structure reform,further encourage the growth of institutional investors,and their active participation in corporate governance in order to better promote the development of capital markets.A great deal of research pertains to the effects of shareholder activism on corporate performance in Western countries.However,research on shareholder activism in China is scanty.Furthermore,chances are that in some specific Chinese regions and industries circumstances are unique,in which the well-established theories cannot be effectively applied.Therefore,this paper empirically analyzes the correlation between shareholder activism and corporate performance so as to examine how effective China’s institutional investors participate in the governance of listed companies.This paper empirically tests the impact of shareholder activism on corporate performance.In this paper,an unbalanced panel data set consisting of observation is constructed.Then,in order to insure validity of results,a series of preliminary tests are conducted.Furthermore,Panel data method and robustness check are performed for empirical analysis.Finally,the result of the empirical tests shows that there is a positive correlation between Chinese institutional shareholding ratio and corporate performance of listed companies.This indicates that shareholder activism can definitely promote the corporate governance and corporate performance in China.

Corporate Governance and Firm Performance: A Sociological Analysis Based on Chinese Experience

Based on the 1997-2007 panel data of 676 listed companies and in-depth interviews with the senior executives, independent directors, fund managers and securities analysts of these companies, this paper tries to analyze the relationship between corporate govemance and firm performance from a sociological perspective. The results show that the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance in the Chinese institutional environment is sharply different from the predictions of the agency theory. The empirical findings from China lend strong support to the new institutional argument that ＂besf＇ corporate governance practices are socially ＂constructed＂ by various social forces and interests groups in specific social, political and cultural contexts, and how ＂good＂ a corporate governance practice is depends to a large extent on whether it fits in with the institutional environment in which it is embedded. There exists no universally ＂best＂ model of corporate governance across the world. Our empirical sociological study based on Chinese experience offers new perspectives and evidence for deconstructing the global myth ofcoroorate ~ovemance.

Effects of Location Diversification and Corporate Governance on Multinational Enterprises＇ Financial Performance and Risk-taking： Evidence from Taiwan Residents Enterprises

This study investigates the location choice performance of foreign direct investment （FD1） originating from small- and medium-sized multinational enterprises established in newly industrialized economies. In this study we integrate location diversification, breadth and corporate governance to examine the performance of Taiwan Residents enterprises investing in Chinese mainland. Examining Taiwan Residents manufacturing enterprises from foundational, traditional and high-technology aspects, our findings demonstrate the following： （i） diversifying the location choice negatively affects the return of assets; （ii） investments in regions with an abundant population positively affect the performance of Taiwan Residents traditional manufacturing enterprises; and （iii） a higher percentage of insider hoMings in Taiwan Residents enterprises results in better FDl performance. We conclude that the performance of FDI originating from Taiwan Residents enterprises varies depending on industrial and governance characteristics. We suggest that the location choice for Taiwan FDI in Chinese mainland should be determined by the characteristics of the industry. Chinese mainland should attract multinational enterprises from emerging markets according to the characteristics of regions.

Corporate Board Structure and Corporate Performance:Empirical Analysis of Listed Companies in China

Using cross section data of 3 years 2000,2007,and 2014 for non-financial listed firms in China,this study quantitatively analyzes the relationship between government-affiliated corporate executives and corporate performance.We classify the sample firms into two groups,based on whether their chief executive officers(CEOs)and independent directors are prior government officials or not.Then,we empirically examine the difference in corporate performance between the two groups.We find that the appointment of CEOs and directors of listed companies in China is significantly affected by government shareholders.The results also suggest that prior to 2000 government-affiliated CEOs impaired corporate performance.But with the establishment of State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Committee and the completion of the Split-Share Structure Reform in 2006,government as a shareholder began to give priority to corporate value maximization,and government-affiliated CEOs began to help improve corporate performance.However,due to the slowdown of economic growth after 2012,problems such as inefficiency and corruption brought by government-affiliated executives manifested again,and therefore,corporate performance deteriorated.Meanwhile,government-affiliated independent directors have limited influence on these factors.

Female directors in the boardroom and intellectual capital performance:Does the“critical mass”matter?

This research aims to investigate the influence of female directors on Intellectual Capital Performance(ICP)using a sample of manufacturing-listed companies in China.Our study investigates the link between having two or more female directors and the Modified Value-Added Intellectual Coefficient(MVAIC)methodology,employing the critical mass theory from 2004–2017.We find that having a critical mass of female directors(three or more)shows a significant positive impact on MVAIC and its components,including human capital efficiency,structural capital efficiency,relational capital efficiency,and physical capital efficiency,with physical capital being the critical driver.Our study reveals that the critical mass participation of female directors substantially influences the IC efficiency of privately owned companies compared to state-owned companies.Moreover,the number of female directors also affects the IC performance of manufacturing companies in multiple regions.Our findings support the validity of group classification identified by Kanter and Critical Mass Theory.To the best of our knowledge,this is one of the few pieces of research that studies the role of female board directors in IC performance and Chinese manufacturing firms using MVAIC as an IC measure.

Impact of Multiple Directorships on Performance for Companies Listed on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange （JSE）

The study investigates the plausible link between multiple directorships and company performance for Johannesburg Stock Exchange （JSE） listed companies in South Africa. This study also interrogates whether companies with busy boards perform better or worse than non over-boarded companies. The incidence of multiple directorship on JSE is low, therefore the hypothesis is rejected at 5%. Over-boarded company directors attend significantly less board meetings. The Pearson correlation between connectedness and log-transformed financial ratios is not significant between all the six financial ratios. The study finds no difference in performance between over-boarded and non over-boarded companies, and no association between multiple directorships and company performance.

Causal Relationship Model of Firm Characteristics Factors and Good Cooperate Governance Affecting the Performance of the Companies Listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand

The objective of this research was to develop the causal relationship model of firm characteristics factors and good corporate governance affecting the performance of the companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand. The developed model consisted of three latent variables and eight observable variables. The sample of this study was 338 companies listed on the Stock Exchange of Thailand. Data are from annual reports （form-56）, annual financial statements and notes to the fmancial statements during the years 2010-2013. The statistics used in this study were descriptive statistics. The causal model was analyzed through a path analysis with LISREL 8.80 Student Edition. The results showed as follows. By testing the consistence of the causal model of finn characteristics （CHA）, the assumed model was consistent with empirical data. Based on the statistical test, the Chi-Square was 22.08. The statistical probability （p） was 0.077, the degree of freedom （dO was to 0, 2/2 was 1.58, RMSEA was 0.041, SRMR was 0.037, GFI was 0.98, CFI was 0.99, AGFI was 0.96. The latent variable of firm characteristics （CHA） had directly negative impact on performance （PAL） with a statistical significance level of 0.01. A path coefficient was 0.18. However, CHA variable did not indirectly influence performance （PAL） and it had directly negative impact on good corporate governance （GGN） with a path coefficient of 0.02 without statistical significance level. The latent variable of good corporate governance （GGN） had directly positive impact on the performance （PAL） with a statistical significance level of 0.05, with a path coefficient of 0.18.

Is there a peer effect on corporate ESG performance?Evidence from China’s capital market

Corporate ESG performance is an important way for stakeholders to understand the corporate environment,social responsibility,and governance behavior.Under China’s implementation of the“carbon peak and carbon neutrality”dual carbon strategic background,ESG has become an important tool to promote the achievement of the“dual carbon”goals and high-quality development.How enterprises can reasonably and effectively improve their ESG performance and promote their green and sustainable development has become a major practical problem that urgently needs to be solved.Based on social learning and dynamic competition theories,this study takes Shanghai-Shenzhen A-share listed companies from 2011 to 2021 as research samples,empirically tests whether there is a peer effect in the ESG performance of listed companies in China,and examines the generation mechanism and influencing factors of the peer effect in the ESG performance of enterprises.The results show that:(i)There is an industry and regional peer effect on the ESG performance of enterprises,where the average ESG performance of other enterprises in the same industry and region,except for the focus enterprise,significantly affects the ESG performance of the focus enterprise.This core conclusion still holds true after robustness tests such as instrumental variable method,propensity score matching method,and first order difference method to eliminate endogeneity issues,replace key measurement indicators,and control for macro factors.(ii)The mechanism analysis results show that the“information learning”and“competitive pressure”mechanisms promote the peer effect of ESG performance.(iii)Further research has found that institutional investors’attention and government environmental regulations positively and significantly impact the peer effect of corporate ESG performance.(iv)Heterogeneity analysis shows that the ESG performance peer effect is more significant for large-scale,eastern,and state-owned enterprises than for small-scale,central,western,and non-state-owned enterprises.This study expands the boundaries of current ESG theory and empirical research,and the conclusions provide important policy implications for governments and enterprises.