Concerns Affecting Behaviors of Independent Directors

This paper tries to find out whether some individual concerns will affect the behaviors of independent directors, specifically voting against proposals during the board meeting.We analyze career concern,compensation concern,reputation concern and term concern.The results show that individual director with longer career horizon,who is better compensated,with less board seats in other firms,and whose term is earlier than that of the board chairman is more likely to dissent.

Does the system of independent directors help improve the quality of accounting information： From the perspective of earnings conservatism

Based on the sample data of the listed firms on the A stock market, we analyze how the system of independent directors influence the earning conservatism from 4 dimensions designed to measure the monitoring power of these independent directors： Percentage within BDs, professional capacities, stimulation and work conditions. From the empirical results, we conclude that the more powerful of the independent directors, the better the accounting conservatism, and that their positive impact increases along with the improvement on corporate governance, meanwhile the work conditions plays the most important role, and then are the percentage within BDs and their professional capacities, the stimulation and personal reputation appear the least importance.

Board of Directors, Independent Directors and Audit Fees： Based on the Empirical Data of the GEM of China

As one of the alternative variables of audit quality, audit fees have been researched widely in the Mainboard of China stock market, but empirical research based on the GEM （Growth Enterprise Market） of China is very few. From the perspective of GEM of China, this article observes and studies the impact of corporate governance structure represented by board of directors and independent directors on audit fees. This article selects the data of 348 listed companies in the GEM of China in 2012, proves that there is a positive correlation between the number of meetings, independent directors＇ salaries and audit fees through the use of multiple linear regression model, and accordingly proposed suggestions that improve the corporate governance structure of the GEM of China.

The Criterion of weighting the independence of non-executive directors

Non-executive directors are now very well established in Chinese business. The uniform and final criterion of weighting the independence of non-executive directors is not available. It will be valuable to draw an analogy with the criterion of weighting the independence of non-executive directors in the UK, where over a dozen different criterions are applied.

Study on the Current Implementation Situation of the Independent Director System in China＇s Listed Companies

The independent director system, as an effective measure to improve the corporation governance structure of China＇ s listed companies, is focused by more and more people at the capital market. In this paper, the proportion of independent directors in the board of directors, and the actual condition, compensation, and duties performing of independent directors are analyzed by taking A-share listed companies in Shanghai Stock Exchange as an example, so that the current implementation situation of the independent director system in China＇ s listed companies is analyzed deeply through the empirical method. Finally, suggestions for its imorovement are orooosed.

The Effect of the Board of Directors and Audit Quality on Disclosure of Internal Control Practices: Evidence from European Companies

The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of the board of directors,namely board size,board independence,and CEO duality,as well as audit quality on the disclosure of internal control information.The sample consists of 164 European companies listed in the STOXX Europe 600.Based on positive agency theory,the authors posit that board of directors and audit quality influence corporate internal control disclosure practice.The content analysis and the design of the evaluation criterion were used to calculate the disclosure index of internal control.Thus,multiple regression analysis is utilized to analyze the results of this paper.The average internal control information disclosure index was 0.285,indicating that most of the companies in our sample do not disclose enough information about the internal control.This low level of forward-looking information disclosure makes it very difficult for corporate stakeholders to determine the future performance of the company.Multivariate results indicate that internal control disclosure is positively and significantly associated with board independence,CEO duality,and audit quality.This study contributes to the literature on the various governance characteristics and disclosure by showing that the disclosure of internal control information in European countries is positively and significantly associated with board independence,separation of duties,and audit quality.Our study was based on a sample of European companies including countries regulating IC disclosure as well as unregulated settings.As noted by Bedard and Graham(2014),regulatory differences in countries can contribute insights on the costs and benefits of disclosure.Findings also have policy implications for investors,managers,and regulators.

Coping strategy of independent directors for job-fulfillment risk under different ownership types and enforced legal environments

Ownership type,legal system evolution and their interaction significantly affect the incentives and behaviors of independent directors.We use the 2019 Securities Law revision as an exogenous shock to examine how state-owned enterprises(SOEs)versus non-SOEs and their independent directors respond to variations in regulatory compliance risk.Following the revision,SOEs are more likely to purchase directors’and officers’liability insurance to provide job security for independent directors.Non-SOEs are more likely to compensate for independent directors’fulfillment risk by increasing salaries and their independent directors are more likely to resign to avoid litigation risk.The coping strategies for SOEs,non-SOEs and independent directors are dynamic under different compliance risk stages and are affected by firm-level and director-level characteristics.

Voluntary resignation of independent directors and auditor responses:Empirical evidence from Chinese A-share listed firms

We examine auditor responses to the voluntary resignation of independent directors.We show that auditors respond by increasing audit fees or rescinding engagement with their clients,but not by increasing their audit effort.Mechanism tests reveal that independent directors’voluntary resignation leads to increased regulatory sanctions and negative media coverage,these relationships are more pronounced after the New Securities Law.Auditor response strategies follow an order of priority:at an acceptable level of perceived risk,auditors increase audit fees;when perceived risk exceeds this level,auditors will discontinue the client relationship.Auditors associate greater risk with firms that have(vs.have not)experienced consecutive voluntary resignations by independent directors.Mandatory resignation has no such effect.

The Use of Field Dependence/Independence in Language Acquisition

Field dependence/independence in Language Acquisition are discussed by many language learners.In this article,we will mainly focus on talking about the cognitive style,including the concept of Field-dependence/independence,their character istics and differences and functions in language acquisition.

Are academic independent directors punished more severely when they engage in violations?

We use a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2003 to 2013 to explore the reputation damage and overflow effect of academic independent directors who have received supervisory punishment. We find that when companies violate information disclosure rules, the market punishes academic independent directors more severely than nonacademic independent directors for these violations. Furthermore, companies employing punished academic directors face greater declines in their stock price than companies employing punished nonacademic independent directors during a relatively short window before or after the punishment is announced. The punishment of academic independent directors influences the employment of other scholars in the same field and results in a negative overflow effect. This study provides evidence of the market's differential reactions to independent directors with different backgrounds; the findings reflect the double-edged sword of one individual's reputation on organizations.

Independent directors' board networks and controlling shareholders' tunneling behaviorq

As one of the channels by which board directors build important relationships,board networks can affect the governance role of independent directors. Defining director board networks as their connections based on direct ties they establish when serving on at least one common board, this paper explores the role of the network centrality of independent directors in restraining tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders in the Chinese capital market.Our empirical evidence shows that tunneling behavior by controlling shareholders is negatively related to the network centrality of independent directors and that this relationship is stronger when non-operating fund occupation is used as the measure of tunneling. The results of our study show that board networks can help independent directors to restrain tunneling behavior by large shareholders, which plays a positive role in corporate governance.ó 2013 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of China Journal of Accounting Research. Founded by Sun Yat-sen University and City University of Hong Kong.

Ownership balance, supervisory efficiency of independent directors and the quality of management earnings forecasts

In the Chinese securities market, with its characteristics of influence through personal relationships(Guanxi) and underdeveloped standards of law and enforcement, can independent directors play the supervisory role expected by securities regulators? In this study we use the degree of precision and accuracy in corporate earnings forecasts as proxies for the quality of information disclosure by listed companies and examine the supervisory efficiency of independent directors with respect to information disclosure. Using data from 2007to 2009, we find that in the absence of ownership balance, independent directors have a significant positive effect on the accuracy of management forecasts.In addition, the personal backgrounds of independent directors have specific effects on management earnings forecasts. Directors with certified public accountant(CPA) expertise significantly improve the precision of management forecasts. However, directors with industrial expertise significantly reduce the precision of management forecasts. In other words, having directors with CPA expertise improves the independence of boards, but having independent directors with industrial expertise has the opposite effect.

Do independent directors play a political role? Evidence from independent directors' death events

We propose that independent directors are likely to play a political role in an institutional setting featuring weak investor protection and strong government intervention. Using Chinese data for 2001–2014, we investigate whether the stock price reaction to an independent director's death is related to his or her political connection. We find a stronger negative reaction to the death announcements of politically connected than politically unconnected independent directors. The magnitude of the reaction is positively related to directors' political rank, and cannot be offset by their firms' political capital. However,we document no evidence of politically connected independent directors exhibiting superior monitoring or consulting performance. Additional analyses show that firms are more inclined to appoint a politically connected independent director as a successor if his or her predecessor also had political connections. Our study broadens scholarly understanding of independent directors' role in a non-Anglo-American setting.

Independent technical directors and their effect on corporate innovation in China

As outside advisors,independent directors serve as both consultants and monitors.Based on empirical studies of corporate innovation and independent directors,we used data from listed firms in China from 2007 to 2017 to examine the effect of hiring independent technical directors on the board of directors.This study focused on a firm’s innovation performance and the extent to which this performance is influenced by the relevance of a director’s expertise to the activities of the firm.The results show that when the technical expertise of an independent director is relevant to the operational field of the firm,the firm should perform better in terms of innovation.This result is still significant when applying the two-stage instrumental variable method,showing a higher significance when using the exogenous event of the 2014 Wenfeng.plc case.Moreover,independent technical directors influence innovation primarily by encouraging firms to deepen their current field of research rather than expanding to other fields.Our findings can guide corporations to hire more relevant independent technical directors and can help the government design more accurate policies that promote innovation and entrepreneurship.

Does independent directors' monitoring affect reputation? Evidence from the stock and labor markets

Using novel data on independent directors' opinions in China, we investigate the stock and labor market effects prompted by independent directors publicly saying ‘‘no" to major board decisions. We find that the market reacts negatively to modified director opinions, but positively to firms interlocked with the directors who said ‘‘no." We further find substantial turnover and decline in board seats after independent directors issue modified opinions. Overall, we identify a dilemma in China whereby the labor market does not reward vigilant directors for standing up to firm insiders, although investors add a premium to effective board monitoring.

Concurrent independent directors in the same industry and accounting information comparability

Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies during the 2008–2019 period,we explore the impact of concurrent independent directors in the same industry(hereafter CIDSI)on accounting information comparability.We find that CIDSI can effectively promote accounting information comparability and that this effect is realized mainly through inhibiting earnings management.We also find that CIDSI can provide broader industry perception of the company’s board reports.Variations in concurrent companies and internal and external environments have significant moderating effects on the relationship between CIDSI and accounting information comparability.This relationship contributes to reducing audit fees and the possibility of receiving nonstandard unqualified audit opinions.Our findings have implications for companies by demonstrating the importance of recruiting independent directors.

Does the reputation mechanism apply to independent directors in emerging markets?Evidence from China

We examine whether reputable independent directors improve firm performance and governance quality in emerging markets,using data from China.Firms with such directors,measured as the number of directorships in other listed firms,have higher profitability,operating efficiency and productivity.They suffer from fewer agency problems,pay more cash dividends and have lower likelihoods of receiving modified audit opinions and participating in financial disclosure-related irregularities than their counterparts.In China’s unique institutional context,the reputation mechanism for independent directors applies to firms in regions with weak marketization environments,nonstate-owned enterprises and firms without political connections;it also applies when external governance is weak.Overall,reputable independent directors appear to occupy valuable advising and monitoring roles and compensate for weak institutions and governance in China.

Resignation of officials as independent directors and firm performance

In 2013,the Chinese government implemented Rule No.18,which suspended the directorships of incumbent government officials and precluded those who retired within the past three years from serving as independent directors for listed firms.The surprise implementation of Rule No.18 triggered a wave of resignations among official independent directors(OIDs).The event provided a unique opportunity to examine the impacts of the political connections of board members on firm performance.We applied a difference-in-difference technique to empirically investigate the effect of OID resignations on firm performance from the perspectives of resource dependence theory and social capital theory.The results indicate that the resignation of OIDs had a significantly negative effect on firm performance,as measured by Tobin's 0 and firm leverage.This also confirmed the importance of independent directors'political connection on firm performance,as discovered in prior research.However,this influence varied across OIDs'heterogeneity,external environment and firm ownership.The results indicate that political connections may not be necessary channels for firms to achieve success.

教育学自主知识体系的本质特征和建构规律

教育学自主知识体系是教育主体自主建构的全面深入反映教育本质和规律的知识系统;是在海内外文化、不同学科知识相互影响、交融中形成的知识体系;是合目的与合规律、价值追求与思维逻辑统一的知识体系;是继承与发展、守正与创新结合形成的知识体系。这既是教育学自主知识体系的本质,也决定了它形成的规律和原则、方式、途径。

新时代法学基本范畴的重构——构建中国自主法学知识体系要论

在新时代背景下对法学基本范畴的内涵和体系进行重构,是构建中国自主法学知识体系的“成事之要”。“政治新时代”和“科技新时代”的到来,为法学基本范畴的重构提供了背景和动因。法学基本范畴从法学学科体系看构成了近代法律科学的“通用语汇”,从法学学术体系看可谓是法学理论创新的“思想芯片”,从法学话语体系看形塑了中国法学对外传播的“基本语法”。为了重构法学基本范畴,一方面要进行理论上的融会贯通,即贯通马克思主义、中华传统优秀法治文明和西方优秀法治文化三个传统,另一方面要对历史和当下的法治实践予以归纳提炼,并通过建构性解释上升为法学概念和范畴。重构的核心任务在于构筑兼具普遍性与中国性的法学基本范畴体系,为此既要加强对原创性概念和范畴的研究,也要加强对普遍法学概念和范畴的新内涵的研究,并按科学严密的内在结构构筑起以“法”和“法治”为核心、兼具静态性和动态性的二元法学基本范畴体系。