Bank loan information and information asymmetry in the stock market:evidence from China

In this study,we use bank loan information to construct proxies for corporate transparency and examine whether these measures reflect information asymmetry in the stock market.Our analysis is based on a novel dataset of stock transactions and bank loans of all publicly listed firms on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange,covering January 2008 to June 2013.We find that firms with outstanding loans have a lower level of information asymmetry in the stock market,whereas firms with defaulted loans have a higher level of asymmetry.Further evidence demonstrates that the effect of loan default on information asymmetry in the stock market is more pronounced when these loans are borrowed from joint-equity commercial banks or multiple banks and when the default occurs under inactive market conditions.Our results remain robust to a series of endogeneity and sensitivity tests and provide suggestive evidence of a close connection between the credit loan and stock markets.

Effects of information asymmetry on cooperation in the prisoners' dilemma game

Effects of inforination asymmetry on cooperation in the prisoners＇ dilemma game are investigated. The amplitude A is introduced to describe the degree of information asymmetry. It is found that there exists an optimal value of amplitude Aopt at which the fraction of cooperation reaches its maximal value. The reason lies in that cooperators on the two-dimensional grid form large clusters at Aopt. In addition, the theoretical analysis in terms of the mean- field theory is used to understand this kind of phenomenon. It is confirmed that the information asymmetry plays an important role in the dynamics of the dilemma games of spatial prisoners.

Survey on Resistance Emotion of NCMS in Information Asymmetry and Countermeasures

Through survey on current situation of NCMS construction in Guangxi, we analyze deep reasons for farmers' resistance to NCMS. Major reasons include inadequate propaganda and training effort; narrow compensation scope influencing institutional functions; unreasonable reimbursement mechanism; low level of informatization management; imperfect supervision mechanism; and imperfect laws and regulations. In these situations, we put forward following countermeasures and suggestions: enhance training to ensure working efficiency; expand compensation scope to raise security level; adjust compensation standard to raise reimbursement proportion; lift level of informatization management to reduce costs for institutional operation; strengthen organizational construction to reinforce fund management; open up fund-raising channels to perfect legal system.

Cooperation Mechanism Design for Integrated Electricity‑Heat Systems with Information Asymmetry

Cooperation between electric power networks(EPNs)and district heating networks(DHNs)has been extensively studied under the assumption that all information exchanged is authentic.However,EPNs and DHNs belonging to different entities may result in marketing fraud.This paper proposes a cooperation mechanism for integrated electricity-heat systems(IEHSs)to overcome information asymmetry.First,a fraud detection method based on multiparametric programming with guaranteed feasibility reveals the authenticity of the information.Next,all honest entities are selected to form a coalition.Furthermore,to maintain operational independence and distribute benefits fairly,Benders decomposition is enhanced to calculate Shapley values in a distributed fashion.Finally,the cooperative surplus generated by the coalition is allocated according to the marginal contribution of each entity.Numerical results show that the proposed mechanism stimulates cooperation while achieving Pareto optimality under asymmetric information.

Empirical Study on Information Asymmetry Based on Chinese Forward Exchange Rate Market

Many published studies have considered information asymmetry between domestic and foreign investors about local assets in the stock market, particularly in developed markets. The present study proposes a new perspective to address the issue in the case of China ＂s forward exchange rate market. Following the framework of Clarida and Taylor （1997）, the term structures of exchange rates in the domestic forward and the non-deliverable forward markets are constructed and then applied to predict future spot exchange rates based on a vector equilibrium correction model By comparing the forecast accuracy on the basis of the root mean square error and the mean absolute error, it is shown that dynamic out-of- sample forecasts of the domestic forward market are superior to those of the non-deliverable forward market, suggesting that domestic investors are better informed than foreign investors. The result has several important policy implications, especially for exchange rate determination.

Information asymmetry, mutual funds and earnings management: Evidence from China

This paper investigates how information asymmetry and mutual fund ownership affect listed companies' earnings management. We show that(1) reducing information asymmetry improves firms' earnings management behavior;(2)relative to short-term mutual funds, long-term mutual funds promote earnings quality by adopting a monitoring role; and(3) by dividing firms into high/low information asymmetry groups, we find that the information environment significantly increases the effect of long-term mutual funds on firms' earnings management. In this paper, we provide new evidence for the role that institutional investors play in a typical emerging capital market. Our results have clear policy implications: to increase earnings quality, it is essential to improve information transparency and develop long-term institutional investors.

The impact of XBRL on information asymmetry:evidence from loan contracting

This paper examines whether and how the adoption of eXtensible Business Reporting Language(XBRL)reduces information asymmetry in loan contracting.We hypothesize that the adoption of XBRL can enhance information dissemination and mitigate the information asymmetry problem between borrowers and lenders.Using a sample of 554 US bank loan contracts,we find that borrowers who adopt XBRL enjoy more favourable price and nonprice terms of bank loan contracts.Additional analyses indicate that the relations among XBRL adoption and bank loan price vary with loan structure.Overall,this research provides evidence that technology advancements such as XBRL reduce cost of bank loans by decreasing information asymmetry between borrowers and lenders.

The Impacts of State Ownership on Information Asymmetry:Evidence from an Emerging Market

This study examines the effect of corporate ownership on information asymmetry as measured by bid-ask spread in the emerging markets of China. Government ownership has significant and positive impacts on bid-ask spread during the period 1995-2000, but disappears afterward during 2001-2003. The finding that state ownership raised bid-ask spread in the early period is consistent with recent studies on emerging markets including China, which indicate that firms with higher state ownership tend to have a greater deviation between cash flow rights and control rights(eg, Wei et al., 2005). This implies that lower state ownership is associated with lower information asymmetry in the market, an economic consequence of significant economic reform and privatization regarding the market microstructure. However, with more active control transfers andemergence of private controlling shareholders, regulatory changes in ownership structure and corporate governance mechanisms, and thus an improved legal and institutional environment, the link between the government ownership and information asymmetry turns to be insignificant in the later period. These results have important implications for transparency and information disclosure policies as well as privatization in emerging markets.

Tunneling, Information Asymmetry, and Private Placement Discounts

Private placement has become an increasingly important method of equity refinancing for regulators, listed companies, and investors. This paper analyzes factors influencing private placement discounts based on the controlling shareholder＇s opportunistic behavior and information asymmetry. Our findings indicate that the type of subscriber is a key determinant of the private placement discount, particularly when the subscriber is the controlling shareholder. Asymmetric information between listed companies and investors is another important determinant： The higher the degree of information asymmetry, the greater the private placement discounts.

The Operation Mechanism of Agricultural Products Supply Chain and Profit Allocation Model in the Context of Asymmetric Information

The research performed analysis on causes of asymmetric information of agricultural product supply chain and made conclusion on operation mechanism and characteristics of supply chain based on asymmetric information. Finally, the research detailed profit sharing of agricultural product supply chain in the context of asymmetric information and proposed suggestions, providing references of pricing and profit sharing of supply chains of agricultural products.

Strategic Contracting for Software Upgrade Outsourcing in Industry 4.0

The advent of Industry 4.0 has compelled businesses to adopt digital approaches that combine software toenhance production efficiency. In this rapidly evolving market, software development is an ongoing process thatmust be tailored to meet the dynamic needs of enterprises. However, internal research and development can beprohibitively expensive, driving many enterprises to outsource software development and upgrades to externalservice providers. This paper presents a software upgrade outsourcing model for enterprises and service providersthat accounts for the impact of market fluctuations on software adaptability. To mitigate the risk of adverseselection due to asymmetric information about the service provider’s cost and asymmetric information aboutthe enterprise’s revenues, we propose pay-per-time and revenue-sharing contracts in two distinct informationasymmetry scenarios. These two contracts specify the time and transfer payments for software upgrades. Througha comparative analysis of the optimal solutions under the two contracts and centralized decision-making withfull-information, we examine the characteristics of the solutions under two information asymmetry scenarios andanalyze the incentive effects of the two contracts on the various stakeholders. Overall, our study offers valuableinsights for firms seeking to optimize their outsourcing strategies and maximize their returns on investment insoftware upgrades.

Supply chain coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information with retailer cost disruptions

A two-level supply chain model involving one supplier and one retailer with linear demand is developed, and supply chain coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information （the retailer＇ s cost structure is asymmetric information） are proposed by employing game theory in two scenarios： coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information in a regular scenario （without disruption）; and coordination mechanisms under asymmetric information in an irregular scenario （ with retailer cost disruptions）. It is optimal for the supply chain to maintain the original production plan and to guarantee a steadily running system if variations of retailer costs are sufficiently low and do not exceed an upper bound. This shows that the original production plan has certain robustness under disruptions. Decisions must be re-made if a retailer＇ s cost change is greater and exceeds an upper bound. Impacts of retailer cost disruptions on the order quantity, the retail price, the wholesale price and each party＇ s as well as the system＇ s expected profits are investigated through numerical analyses.

Coordinating pricing strategies in supply chain under asymmetric information and disruptions

The coordinating pricing strategies with asymmetric cost information under disruptions are investigated in a one-supplier-one-retailer supply chain system.While the retailer's cost structure is asymmetric information,supply chain pricing contract models(a wholesale price contract and an all-unit quantity discount contract)under asymmetric information are proposed by employing the principal-agent principle in a regular scenario.When the retailer's cost distribution is fluctuated by disruptions,we obtain the optimal emergency strategies of the supply chain under asymmetric information by considering deviation costs and show how to effectively handle the cost uncertainty.Using numerical methods,impacts of cost disruptions on the optimal wholesale price,the retailer price,the order quantity and the expected profits of the retailer,the supplier,as well as the total system are analyzed.It is found that the all-unit quantity discount policy can obtain better performance than the wholesale pricing policy.

A blockchain and IoT-based lightweight framework for enabling information transparency in supply chain finance

Supply Chain Finance(SCF)refers to the financial service in which banks rely on core enterprises to manage the capital flow and logistics of upstream and downstream enterprises.SCF adopts a self-testing and closed-loop credit model to control funds and risks.The key factor in a successful SCF service is the deployment of SCF businessoriented information systems that allow businesses to form partnerships efficiently and expedite cash flows throughout the supply chain.Blockchain Technology(BCT),featuring decentralization,tamper-proofing,traceability,which is usually paired with the Internet of Things(IoT)in real-world contexts,has been widely adopted in the field of finance and is perfectly positioned to facilitate innovative collaborations among participants in supply chain networks.In this paper,we propose a BCT and IoT-based information management framework(named BC4Regu),which works as the regulatory to improve the information transparency in the business process of SCF.With BC4Regu,the operation cost of the whole supply chain can be significantly reduced through the coordination and integration of capital flow,information flow,logistics and trade flow in the supply chain.The contributions in this paper include:(1)proposing a novel information management framework which leverages Blockchain and IoT to solve the problem of information asymmetry in the trade of SCF;(2)proposing the technical design of BC4Regu,including the Blockchain infrastructure,distributed ledger-based integrated data flow service,and reshaped SCF process;and(3)applying BC4Regu to a group of scenarios and conducting theoretical analysis by introducing the principal-agent model to validate the BC4Regu.

The ＂Production＂ of Accounting Information Between Regulatory and Free Market Approach： An （Eternally） Open Issue

Accounting information has gained utmost importance over the years, and it now plays a vital role in our society. Indeed, the trends of a global economy, especially one relying on a capital market-based financial system, are greatly influenced by reliable accounting information. However, it is sometimes difficult to assess the ＂reliability＂ of such information, given the clear differences in the needs and goals of its different users. In this respect, the possible ways to guarantee the appropriateness of the accounting information provided to users doubtlessly deserve a careful investigation. The second half of the 1970s can be considered as the starting point of a debate, within the Anglo-Saxon accounting literature, concerning the most effective methods to provide users with accounting data effectively meeting their very specific needs. In this context, two antithetical schools of thought developed： （1） free market approach; and （2） regulatory approach. Although it is possible to state that accounting regulation has now become a concrete reality both inside and outside the Anglo-Saxon accounting context, after more than halfa century, its efficacy is still an open issue.

The Impact of Cost Information Sharing on Procurement Contract Design

In this paper,we provides contract design mechanisms and analysis for manufacturers to manage decentralized supply chain.Suppose the manufacturer’s final product consists of components,each produced by a different supplier,and the manufacturer first purchases components from suppliers,then assembles them into final product and meet demands aftermarket realization.While supply chain’s internal cooperation always benefits both,suppliers are often reluctant to proactively share their own production cost structure,otherwise manufacturers may depress purchase prices,which may reduce supplier’s profit.Manufacturers on the other hand,prefers to be informed of true cost information in order to gain greater revenues.We takes manufacturer’s perspective and design the optimal contract menu for suppliers,both to enable suppliers to disclose private cost information and to maximize the benefits.We start by modeling the original problem and find that the original problem is a complex multidimensional optimization problem.We then examine the nature of the original problem solving and devise the solution algorithm to arrive at the optimal contract menu.This algorithm reduces the complexity of the original question from o(2 n)to o(n).We further investigate the influence mechanism of model parameters on the results and find that when market demand increases or the selling price of the final product increases,value of private information increases significantly.However,if market demand uncertainty increases,the value of information may increase or decrease for both sides.

Investigation of Enterprise Informationization Project Risk

The enterprise informationization （El） project has already become modernization level and synthesis power of the enterprise. However, information project risk. In order to reduce the El project risk, it is necessary to adopt reasonable incentive and constraint effectively and to structure perfect market environment. an urgent work to raise the asymmetry increases the EI investment mode, to carry on incentive and constraint effectively and to structure perfect market environment.

The Information Risk in the Latest Crisis： A Driver or a Driven Factor for Global Financial Markets Equilibrium？

The latest financial crisis has been impressive for strength, impact, duration, and reduced efficacy of the economic and financial policies adopted by the authorities. We use an original information risk model to contribute to the analysis of the crisis and to suggest some approaches for a possible early diagnosis. Using data referred to the three main financial markets and comparing the latest crisis with the previous one and with long-term quantitative evidence, we find out that the 2007-2009 crisis was very different in the information risk quality. That gap affected the market risk aversion and its equilibrium, reducing the efficacy of the authorities＇ intervention tools mainly based on payoff risk control and efficient market restoration. Since information risk is an endogenous element of the market dynamics that can be independent form contingent levels of market efficiency. Drivers of information risk in the European Markets differed strongly from the US and Japanese ones; that is why some global decisions had low impact while opportunities of local intervention were missed.

Behavior characteristics and market operation problems of existing building energy-saving renovation market

The long-term and effective implementation of the existing building energy efficiency renovation depends on the development of the existing building energy efficiency renovation market.The key to the development of the existing building energy efficiency renovation market is the joint role of the market players.Starting with the analysis of the externalities and information asymmetry of the existing building energy efficiency renovation market,this paper analyzes the behavioral characteristics and influencing factors of the existing building energy efficiency renovation market entities(central government,local government,owners,energy conservation service enterprises,third-party evaluation institutions,and other market entities),and reveals the problems of the existing building energy efficiency renovation market,such as the absence of government,the lack of main power,and the lack of financing channels,Thus,it lays a platform foundation for the research on the behavior strategy and security system of the existing building energy-s aving renovation market.

Bargaining strategy of oil companies in international oil and gas development Projects-Based on a bilateral bargaining model

Bargaining between the host country and oil companies is very common to international oil and gas development projects.The existence of information asymmetry gives the host country an endogenous bargaining advantage.Foreign oil companies might change their unfavorable negotiating position by changing the order of bidding and adjusting bidding strategies.This paper introduces both factors into a bilateral bargaining model to study the impact of information asymmetry and bidding order on the strategy and equilibrium returns of oil companies.According to the ownership of the right to bid first,two scenarios are designed for the model to compare the equilibrium returns of the host country and oil companies.The results show that:1)There is a first-mover advantage in the process of bilateral bidding,so oil companies better bid first;2)The information asymmetry will lead to a higher nominal income ratio of oil companies and a lower nominal income ratio of the host country,but it doesn’t affect the total income ratio at all.