This study investigates the earnings performance of 418 initial public offerings （IPOs） listed on the stock exchange of Hong Kong. By analyzing several profitability measures of these 1PO companies from the third ye...This study investigates the earnings performance of 418 initial public offerings （IPOs） listed on the stock exchange of Hong Kong. By analyzing several profitability measures of these 1PO companies from the third year prior to listing up to the fifth year post-listing, it is found that IPO companies＇ operating performances as a whole peak in the year of listing or the year preceding the listing, but exhibit a fall in post-issue profitability with the decline being most pronounced in the first financial year following the year in which the listing take place. Over 30% of these IPOs suffer a loss three years after the offerings. Deterioration of post-issue performance is found to be more severe for smaller finns, highly-geared companies, fast-growing enterprises, companies with lower ownership retention by original shareholders, and companies which have managed earnings upwards at the time of listing. These observations are consistent with the higher agency costs when firms go public and that managers have timed the issue at the peak of the companies＇ long-run performance. Further investigation confirms that IPO companies in general make use of income-increasing accruals to manage their earnings upwards in the year when they go public. The reversal of the accruals in post-issue years further exaggerates the decline in their profitability.展开更多
This study empirically investigates the impact of managerial entrenchment on firm financial performance of Chinese firms initial public offerings （IPOs）. Using 142 firms listed in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange （SZSE...This study empirically investigates the impact of managerial entrenchment on firm financial performance of Chinese firms initial public offerings （IPOs）. Using 142 firms listed in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange （SZSE）, which was collected from the Guotaian Research Service Center （GTA-RSC） databases, this study uses two proxies to measure firm performance and three proxies to measure managerial entrenchment. The two proxies for firm performance are Tobins＇ Q and return on assets （ROA）, and the three proxies for managerial entrenchment are entrenchment 1, entrenchment 2, and entrenchment 3. These three entrenchment proxies are derived from the principal component analysis （PCA）. Though previous studies of managerial entrenchment and firm performance variables suffer from endogeneity, with respect to the corporate governance it is unclear as to which variables are endogenous and which are exogenous. This study confirms that the data are linear and no endogeneity issue should be address in this study, but only heteroskedasticity, non-normality for Tobins＇ Q are a problem, therefore, the regression method employed for Tobins＇ Q is the generalised least square （GLS） and the ordinary least square （OLS） between estimators for ROA. The regression result for Tobins＇ Q reveals that managerial entrenchment is negatively impact on firm performance. The results are in contradiction to the stewardship theory for new firms whereas the managerial entrenchment for new firms is positive. Furthermore, only one entrenchment proxy yields a significant coefficient. In conclusion, the negative results of entrenchment proxies were caused by the different institutional structures and legal systems which are the Chinese corporations that are still largely owned and controlled by a state and hence the centralised state controlled was responsible for all managerial actions.展开更多
文摘This study investigates the earnings performance of 418 initial public offerings （IPOs） listed on the stock exchange of Hong Kong. By analyzing several profitability measures of these 1PO companies from the third year prior to listing up to the fifth year post-listing, it is found that IPO companies＇ operating performances as a whole peak in the year of listing or the year preceding the listing, but exhibit a fall in post-issue profitability with the decline being most pronounced in the first financial year following the year in which the listing take place. Over 30% of these IPOs suffer a loss three years after the offerings. Deterioration of post-issue performance is found to be more severe for smaller finns, highly-geared companies, fast-growing enterprises, companies with lower ownership retention by original shareholders, and companies which have managed earnings upwards at the time of listing. These observations are consistent with the higher agency costs when firms go public and that managers have timed the issue at the peak of the companies＇ long-run performance. Further investigation confirms that IPO companies in general make use of income-increasing accruals to manage their earnings upwards in the year when they go public. The reversal of the accruals in post-issue years further exaggerates the decline in their profitability.
文摘This study empirically investigates the impact of managerial entrenchment on firm financial performance of Chinese firms initial public offerings （IPOs）. Using 142 firms listed in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange （SZSE）, which was collected from the Guotaian Research Service Center （GTA-RSC） databases, this study uses two proxies to measure firm performance and three proxies to measure managerial entrenchment. The two proxies for firm performance are Tobins＇ Q and return on assets （ROA）, and the three proxies for managerial entrenchment are entrenchment 1, entrenchment 2, and entrenchment 3. These three entrenchment proxies are derived from the principal component analysis （PCA）. Though previous studies of managerial entrenchment and firm performance variables suffer from endogeneity, with respect to the corporate governance it is unclear as to which variables are endogenous and which are exogenous. This study confirms that the data are linear and no endogeneity issue should be address in this study, but only heteroskedasticity, non-normality for Tobins＇ Q are a problem, therefore, the regression method employed for Tobins＇ Q is the generalised least square （GLS） and the ordinary least square （OLS） between estimators for ROA. The regression result for Tobins＇ Q reveals that managerial entrenchment is negatively impact on firm performance. The results are in contradiction to the stewardship theory for new firms whereas the managerial entrenchment for new firms is positive. Furthermore, only one entrenchment proxy yields a significant coefficient. In conclusion, the negative results of entrenchment proxies were caused by the different institutional structures and legal systems which are the Chinese corporations that are still largely owned and controlled by a state and hence the centralised state controlled was responsible for all managerial actions.
