期刊文献+
共找到1篇文章
< 1 >
每页显示 20 50 100
Institutional Incentives, Game Equilibrium and Social Justice: Toward a Unified Theory of Pure Jurisprudence 被引量:1
1
作者 Ding Li 《Social Sciences in China》 2017年第4期85-102,共18页
This article seeks to make a constructive advance in jurisprudential theory by employing the unified analytical framework of modern social science. We first outline the main ideas of individual rational decision-makin... This article seeks to make a constructive advance in jurisprudential theory by employing the unified analytical framework of modern social science. We first outline the main ideas of individual rational decision-making and game theory and of social choice and mechanism design, before offering a preliminary discussion of their application to legal issues. The core thesis is that the law in combination with other social norms provides institutional incentives to all actors in society. Legislators' social justice objectives can be reasonably enforced only as a result of behavioral equilibrium in the social game. 展开更多
关键词 LAW social justice institutional incentive game equilibrium
原文传递
上一页 1 下一页 到第
使用帮助 返回顶部