Contract Mechanism of Water Environment Regulation for Small and Medium Sized Enterprises Based on Optimal Control Theory

The small and scattered enterprise pattern in the county economy has formed numerous sporadic pollution sources, hindering the centralized treatment of the water environment, increasing the cost and difficulty of treatment. How enterprises can make reasonable decisions on their water environment behavior based on the external environment and their own factors is of great significance for scientifically and effectively designing water environment regulation mechanisms. Based on optimal control theory, this study investigates the design of contractual mechanisms for water environmental regulation for small and medium-sized enterprises. The enterprise is regarded as an independent economic entity that can adopt optimal control strategies to maximize its own interests. Based on the participation of multiple subjects including the government, enterprises, and the public, an optimal control strategy model for enterprises under contractual water environmental regulation is constructed using optimal control theory, and a method for calculating the amount of unit pollutant penalties is derived. The water pollutant treatment cost data of a paper company is selected to conduct empirical numerical analysis on the model. The results show that the increase in the probability of government regulation and public participation, as well as the decrease in local government protection for enterprises, can achieve the same regulatory effect while reducing the number of administrative penalties per unit. Finally, the implementation process of contractual water environmental regulation for small and medium-sized enterprises is designed.

Bipartite consensus problems of Lurie multi-agent systems over signed graphs: A contraction approach

This paper examines the bipartite consensus problems for the nonlinear multi-agent systems in Lurie dynamics form with cooperative and competitive communication between different agents. Based on the contraction theory, some new conditions for the nonlinear Lurie multi-agent systems reaching bipartite leaderless consensus and bipartite tracking consensus are presented. Compared with the traditional methods, this approach degrades the dimensions of the conditions, eliminates some restrictions of the system matrix, and extends the range of the nonlinear function. Finally, two numerical examples are provided to illustrate the efficiency of our results.

DIRECTED HYPERGRAPH THEORY AND DECOMPOSITION CONTRACTION METHOD

A new branch of hypergraph theory-directed hyperaph theory and a kind of new methods-dicomposition contraction(DCP, PDCP and GDC) methods are presented for solving hypernetwork problems.lts computing time is lower than that of ECP method in several order of magnitude.

Supply Chain Commitment Contract Model Based on Uncertainty Theory under Uncertain Market Information

Based on the uncertainty theory, market demand information updating as the background, we study the coordination and optimization problem of three-stage supply chain in this paper. In half a asymmetric market information, participants are risk neutral;under the situation of the manufacturers and wholesalers having twice pre-season decision-making opportunity, wholesalers can be replenished in the season;manufacturers join the lowest supply contract of commitment: manufacturers for exchanging the information that they cannot get directly from the market will promise wholesalers to have a season lowest supply in pre-season. According to this contract, we establish optimization models of manufacturers and wholesalers respectively, and get the optimal strategy of supply chain members by analyzing the supply chain system. Finally, by giving a numerical example and comparing the results with that under random circumstances, the result is reasonable.

Modelling the Iranian Petroleum Contract fiscal regime using bargaining game theory to guide contract negotiators

Based on Iran's sixth development plan,the country's oil and gas industry requires an investment of about$200 bn in the next five years to increase production.The Iranian government,to attract and motivate international oil company investment in their oil and gas fields,has presented a new type of risk service contract:the Iranian Petroleum Contract(IPC).This paper summarizes the features of the IPC and presents mathematical models of its fiscal regime for the benefit and guidance of both the National Iranian Oil Company(NIOC)and the contractors.Next,adopting bargaining game theory provides a mathematical model for reaching a win-win situation between the NIOC and the contractor.Finally,a numerical example is given and a sensitivity analysis performed to illustrate the implementation of the proposed models.The contractor and the NIOC may use these models when preparing their proposal and in the course of actual negotiations to calculate their internal rate of return,remuneration fee,and net present value for developing the fields at different conditions of their bargaining power,and derive a logical bargain to protect their best possible interests.

Diversification or splitting-an explanation based on Contract Theory

By inserting the variable of the exactness of corporate valuation into the classic model of Contract Theory, this paper, on the bases of the interaction of the variables of the veraciousness of corporate valuation, managerial incentives and operational risks, explores the deep-seated reasons for changes in corporate structures, and draws the conclusion that the divestment of the subsidiary is beneficial to shareholders when the parent corporate is undervalued and that the relation between the parent and the subsidiary is disordered, or vice versa. This conclusion is consistent with the motives of many divestiture cases in reality.

Contractions of Certain Lie Algebras in the Context of the DLF-Theory

Contractions of the Lie algebras d = u(2), f = u(1 ,1) to the oscillator Lie algebra l are realized via the adjoint action of SU(2,2) when d, l, f are viewed as subalgebras of su(2,2). Here D, L, F are the corresponding (four-dimensional) real Lie groups endowed with bi-invariant metrics of Lorentzian signature. Similar contractions of (seven-dimensional) isometry Lie algebras iso(D), iso(F) to iso(L) are determined. The group SU(2,2) acts on each of the D, L, F by conformal transformation which is a core feature of the DLF-theory. Also, d and f are contracted to T, S-abelian subalgebras, generating parallel translations, T, and proper conformal transformations, S (from the decomposition of su(2,2) as a graded algebra T + Ω + S, where Ω is the extended Lorentz Lie algebra of dimension 7).

Contract theory based incentive mechanism design for buffer resource in wireless caching networks

Evidences indicate that,due to the limited caching capacity or inaccurate estimation on users’preferences,the requested files may not be fully cached in the network edge.The transmissions of the un-cached files will also lead to duplicated transmissions on backhaul channels.Buffer-aided relay has been proposed to improve the transmission performance of the un-cached files.Because of the limited buffer capacity and the information asymmetric environment,how to allocate the limited buffer capacity and how to incentivize users in participating buffer-aided relay have become critical issues.In this work,an incentive scheme based on the contract theory is proposed.Specifically,the backlog violation probability,i.e.,the buffer overflow probability,is provided based on the martingale theory.Next,based on the backlog violation probability,the utility functions of the relay node and users are constructed.With the purpose to maximize the utility of the relay node,the optimal contract problem is formulated.Then,the feasibility of the contract is also demonstrated,and the optimal solution can be obtained by the interior point method.Finally,numerical results are presented to demonstrate effectiveness of the proposed contract theory scheme.

A Study on English-Chinese Translation of Business Contracts Based on the Functional Equivalence Theory

This study explores the translation of business English contracts from English to Chinese from the perspective of functional equivalence.The functional equivalence theory involves three aspects of functional equivalence:lexical equivalence,sentential equivalence,and textual equivalence.As far as translation is concerned,translators adopt different translation techniques for different types of texts,striving to achieve equivalence in lexical,sentential,and textual functions.Therefore,translators are to recognize the different characteristics of business English contracts and highlight English translation styles and characteristics with the help of the functional equivalence theory.

Analysis of the development and application of incomplete contract theory based on the basic theory of economics

Incomplete contract theory （GHM-model）, namely, GHM model, Grossman-Hart-Moore model, GHM model or called ownership - control model by Grossman and Hart （Grossman ＆ Hart, 1986）, it is established by Hart and Moore （Hart ＆ Moore, 1990） and other cofounder, so this theory is also known as GHM theory or GHM model. Domestic scholars generally call their theory incomplete contract theory or incomplete contract theory, because the theory is ba^ed on the following analytical framework： They use the incompleteness of contracts for research as starting point to property or （ residual ） optimal control with Ge for research purposes. It is the most important analytical tool for analyze business theory and corporate governance structures with Ge control incentives to obtain the information. GHM model directly inherit the transaction cost theory by Coase, and Williamson, and it is a critical development. Among them, the 1986 model is mainly to solve the integration problem of assets, in 1990, the model evolved into a general model of asset ownership.

A Research on E-C Translation Methods of Business Contracts from the Perspective of Functional Equivalence Theory

As economic globalization continues to develop increasingly,political and economic trade has become more frequent.In international activities,business contracts are important legal documents,and all international business activities require the signing of contracts,which has greatly increased the demand for translation of business contracts.Based on the functional equivalence theory,this paper analyzes the translation of E-C business contracts with the characteristics of business contracts.This paper aims to provide a theoretical basis and a practical translation strategy for E-C translation of business contracts,and to solve problems encountered in the translation practice.

Countermeasures Against Job Burnout Among College and University Administrators from the Perspective of Psychological Contract Theory

Administrators are the implementers of the management in colleges and universities;however,their job scopes are relatively boring and complicated,with heavy workload and high work pressure,causing some of them to be less active and slack off in their careers.Therefore,under the guidance of psychological contract theory,colleges and universities should adopt various measures to deal with job burnout among college and university administrators.In this paper,the main causes of job burnout among college and university administrators are analyzed,and specific countermeasures are proposed from the perspective of psychological contract theory,hoping to help college and university administrators improve their work enthusiasm.

论中国数据跨境制度的现状、问题与纾困路径

中国已经建立了以“安全评估、标准合同、保护认证”为核心、以行业规定为配套的数据跨境制度体系,形成了既保安全又促发展的中国方案。但在具体立法中,该制度在理论与实践上存在双重失衡,在理论上缺乏完善的基础理论支撑,在实践中未能形成系统完整的制度体系,且其在适用关系上出现龃龉,与国际规则之间也存在割裂导致难以衔接,致使数据处理者在合规实践中面临较大成本,难以获得预期成效。不同于美国的“市场话语”和欧盟“权利本位”的数据跨境理论基础,中国应当基于国情明确利益平衡体系下的数据主权理论建构数据出境制度体系,矫正实践中过度保障安全的规制思路,通过单列安全评估、制定行业性与地方性特殊制度等措施,完善相关制度之间、国内法与国际规则之间的适用衔接,着力降低合规成本,保障制度落到实处。

量能度权:集团公司差异化管控的底层逻辑与治理对策

集团公司差异化管控能够优化不同出资主体的权力配置,然而集团公司管控现有研究对有限理性的默认假设缺乏关注,无法为集团公司差异化管控提供理论支持。本文基于不完全契约理论,指出集团公司差异化管控的底层逻辑是实际控制人、子公司其他股东和子公司高管围绕关键资源禀赋、子公司对集团公司的重要程度和依赖程度等影响因素进行剩余控制权优化配置。同时,剩余控制权配置过程会产生异质性配置结果,进而产生不同的管控模式和代理问题,这就需要辅以异质性治理结构与机制安排,以降低潜在治理成本。本文通过解构上述过程,主要回答了集团公司差异化管控的底层逻辑、分类依据和治理对策等三个核心命题,不仅可以助力集团公司差异化管控实践,还能够为完善中国特色现代企业制度、弘扬企业家精神提供有益启示。

基于大数据赋能的重大科技项目监测评估新模式研究

监测评估作为重大科技项目组织实施的重要抓手,在推动完善项目管理、提升管理绩效、构建科技大监督格局方面发挥了重要作用。但是,目前仍存在数字化评估手段有限、对科技决策支撑作用不充分和监测评估效能尚未充分释放等问题。为进一步优化重大科技项目组织实施模式,让数字化、信息化工具更大程度赋能科技评估,以重大科技项目为研究对象,研究了国内外重大科技项目监测评估的模式,围绕中国现阶段重大科技项目监测评估面临的挑战,探讨了大数据赋能监测评估的理论依据、主要特点,探索构建了重大科技项目数据治理新路径,并提出了建立重大科技项目管理新机制、新方法、新模式等有关政策建议。

契约法的当代风貌——内田贵《契约的时代》述评

麦克尼尔以“关系契约论”宣告了“古典契约论”的死亡,但其未能将关系契约论付诸实定法或具体司法实践。日本学者内田贵教授结合长期合同的具体运作,对关系契约论在日本裁判中的适用进行了体系化研究,呈现了司法判决、民众选择以及社会观念对日本民事立法的再造图景。我国《民法典》合同编中包含的诸多“标准”型规则明显体现了关系契约论的理念,但对其如何适用,我国学界与法院仍在探索之中。内田贵教授的研究方法与视角为我国将来的合同法研究提供了富有启发性的参照。

新《职业教育法》视域下高职校企合作“多元共生”治理体系研究

我国高职校企合作在治理的实践层面存在动力不足、内驱力不够、契约意识不强等问题。运用共生理论模型,构建“多元共生”治理体系,从宏观、微观两个层面展开多元共治体制机制的探索。宏观上,强调在校企合作关键环节政府的有效介入,健全完整、一体化、层层落实的制度体系;微观上,完善校企多元主体内部实施机制,锻造契约精神,形成规则意识,促进合作行为的规范化、制度化,形成“多元”治理合力,提升治理效能,最终实现契合需求的高质量技术技能人才培养目标。

试析持股方式调整的所得税政策与税收征管

税收公平原则要求,对于实质相同的经济活动,应当予以相同的税负。本文以具有类似经济实质的持股方式调整活动为研究对象,重点关注直接持股与间接持股转换以及代持股权还原的相关税务案例。基于对案例的分类研究,发现无论是跨类别的持股方式调整案例,抑或同类别调整的不同实例,在税收征管的适用标准和执行力度上均呈现出显著的分歧。本文通过分析我国当前的税收制度与征管现状,对相关差异性进行了思考与探讨,并基于不完全契约理论,从成本视角对相关问题进行分析,给出了理论层面的解决方案。同时,结合法律、现实以及理论层面的考量,提出若干政策建议。

MaaS旅游供应链收益共享契约设计与协调

针对出行即服务(Mobility as a Service,MaaS)提供定制化的出行服务以满足游客差异化的交通需求,构建了由传统旅游供应商和MaaS平台组成的双渠道旅游出行服务链,探讨不同主导权下的集中式决策和分散式决策策略及其效益,并开展以供应商为主导的供应链收益共享契约设计和数值分析。研究结果发现:基于MaaS的旅游供应链集中式决策下的效益大于分散式决策,且集中式决策效益是以供应商为主导的分散式决策效益的3/4。在收益共享契约协调下,供应商利润和MaaS平台利润分别为0.68和0.58,均有所提高,旅游供应链整体效益最大,实现旅游供应链完美协调。

“刚”“柔”并济的新型技术创新风控模式的构建——基于中科金财的探索性案例研究

快速变化的环境加剧了科技型企业的技术创新风险,企业需要构建兼具快变“弹性”和管控“刚性”的新型技术创新风控模式。将不完全契约理论嵌入传统风控理论,通过对中科金财独特的风控模式展开情境化研究,解锁了科技型企业构建“刚”“柔”并济风控模式的过程。具体而言,首先,企业应下沉风控单元,形成“虚拟小微企业”,加快反应速度,获取风控“弹性”,同时通过业绩认证保持必要的财务“刚性”;其次,构建“多层联盟”的风控结构,一方面通过动态调整增加结构“弹性”,另一方面则通过新规则稳固内部关系,既保证管控“刚性”,又实现对创新失败的容错“弹性”;最后,构建了“虚拟小微企业+多层联盟”的新型技术创新风控模式。基于技术创新的本质特征发展了风控理论,同时对不完全契约理论做出了一定的贡献。