Constructing a model for international carbon emissions trading is an effective method to curb global warming through a market mechanism.Although the international carbon emissions market generates substantial profits...Constructing a model for international carbon emissions trading is an effective method to curb global warming through a market mechanism.Although the international carbon emissions market generates substantial profits,the relevant trading mechanism has been far from perfect.The perfect mechanism for international carbon emissions trading should be a revealing preference game.In other words,only if all players in this game truly show their information and preferences can the Nash outcome be Pareto efficient and fair.China should actively participate in the international carbon emissions trading game;promote efficiency,justice,rationality,and the quality of being manipulation-free in the carbon emissions market;and play a more important role in perfecting the international carbon emissions trading mechanism.展开更多
The paper focuses on links between the EU ETS （European Union Emissions Trading Scheme） and selected （domestic） greenhouse gas ETS （emissions trading schemes） from Asia and North America which could open up a pe...The paper focuses on links between the EU ETS （European Union Emissions Trading Scheme） and selected （domestic） greenhouse gas ETS （emissions trading schemes） from Asia and North America which could open up a perspective to keep the idea of emissions trading alive on a global scale and confront the actual uncertainty in future climate policy. The approach consists of investigating qualitatively the essential requirements of this alternative bottom-up approach. It is evaluated if variations or inconsistencies in the structure and design of domestic ETS as well as legal and institutional characteristics harm or facilitate the concept of linking with the EU ETS. The evaluation of systems leads to the exclusion of systems with voluntary character, relative caps, unrestricted borrowing and price caps from the group of potential linking candidates.展开更多
基金This work was funded by Humanity and Social Science Youth foundation of Ministry of Education of China:Research on the Practices and Theoretical Innovation of Improving People's Wellbeing in the New Era[Grant number.18YJC710023]Major Projects of Social Science Fund of Jilin University:Research on China's Social Welfare System[Grant number.2019XXJD10]Major Projects of Trade Union of Jilin Province:Research on the Evaluation System of Harmonious Labor Relations[Grant number.2016LD007].
文摘Constructing a model for international carbon emissions trading is an effective method to curb global warming through a market mechanism.Although the international carbon emissions market generates substantial profits,the relevant trading mechanism has been far from perfect.The perfect mechanism for international carbon emissions trading should be a revealing preference game.In other words,only if all players in this game truly show their information and preferences can the Nash outcome be Pareto efficient and fair.China should actively participate in the international carbon emissions trading game;promote efficiency,justice,rationality,and the quality of being manipulation-free in the carbon emissions market;and play a more important role in perfecting the international carbon emissions trading mechanism.
文摘The paper focuses on links between the EU ETS （European Union Emissions Trading Scheme） and selected （domestic） greenhouse gas ETS （emissions trading schemes） from Asia and North America which could open up a perspective to keep the idea of emissions trading alive on a global scale and confront the actual uncertainty in future climate policy. The approach consists of investigating qualitatively the essential requirements of this alternative bottom-up approach. It is evaluated if variations or inconsistencies in the structure and design of domestic ETS as well as legal and institutional characteristics harm or facilitate the concept of linking with the EU ETS. The evaluation of systems leads to the exclusion of systems with voluntary character, relative caps, unrestricted borrowing and price caps from the group of potential linking candidates.
