This paper presents a dynamic closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)model,incorporating a manufacturer,a retailer,and an internet recycling platform(IRP),utilizing differential game theory while considering the forgetting eff...This paper presents a dynamic closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)model,incorporating a manufacturer,a retailer,and an internet recycling platform(IRP),utilizing differential game theory while considering the forgetting effect of consumers.The model encompasses factors such as the quality level of used products and Big Data marketing(BDM),comparing optimal equilibriums under decentralized and cooperative decision scenarios.To effectively coordinate the dynamic CLSC at each time point,we propose a revenue-sharing and cost-sharing(RSCS)combined contract.In addition to ensuring reasonable sharing of revenues and costs,this contract allows the manufacturer to flexibly adjust wholesale prices for final products and transfer prices for used products in order to distribute profits appropriately and achieve Pareto optimality within the CLSC system.Furthermore,our results indicate that there exists a threshold for Big Data marketing efficiency;high-efficiency BDM not only facilitates increased recycling on Internet platforms but also reduces unit recycling costs for enterprises.Interestingly,when implementing the combined contract,Big Data marketing efficiency does not impact the transfer price paid by manufacturers to Internet recycling platforms.展开更多
The popularization of smartphones and the acceleration of their replacement lead to a surge in mobile phone disposal.How to recycle waste mobile phones efficiently becomes a major problem in today’s society.The“Inte...The popularization of smartphones and the acceleration of their replacement lead to a surge in mobile phone disposal.How to recycle waste mobile phones efficiently becomes a major problem in today’s society.The“Internet+”recycling mode is an effective way to solve this problem.The recycling process of waste mobile phones involves retailers,manufacturers,third parties and other recycling parts.Retailers have natural advantages compared with other parts because of their perfect sales network and logistics system.The system dynamics model for“Internet+”recycling of waste mobile phones dominated by retailers is constructed,and the Vensim software is used to simulate the influence of changes in two key factors in“Internet+”recycling environment:Annual operating cost of online platform and offline unit logistics cost on retailers’recycling volume and recycling profit.The results show that the investment of online platform operation cost is conducive to the increase of retailers’online waste mobile phone recycling volume and recycling profit,while the investment of offline logistics cost increases retailers’online waste mobile phone recycling volume,but reduces the recycling profit.展开更多
基金supported by funding from National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.72301087 and 71931009National Social Science Fund of China under Grant No.22CGL014+2 种基金Zhejiang Provincial Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant No.LQ23G010002Zhejiang Provincial Philosophy and Social Sciences Planning Project under Grant No.24NDQN007YBResearch Start-up fund of Hangzhou Normal University under Grant No.4135C50221204091.
文摘This paper presents a dynamic closed-loop supply chain(CLSC)model,incorporating a manufacturer,a retailer,and an internet recycling platform(IRP),utilizing differential game theory while considering the forgetting effect of consumers.The model encompasses factors such as the quality level of used products and Big Data marketing(BDM),comparing optimal equilibriums under decentralized and cooperative decision scenarios.To effectively coordinate the dynamic CLSC at each time point,we propose a revenue-sharing and cost-sharing(RSCS)combined contract.In addition to ensuring reasonable sharing of revenues and costs,this contract allows the manufacturer to flexibly adjust wholesale prices for final products and transfer prices for used products in order to distribute profits appropriately and achieve Pareto optimality within the CLSC system.Furthermore,our results indicate that there exists a threshold for Big Data marketing efficiency;high-efficiency BDM not only facilitates increased recycling on Internet platforms but also reduces unit recycling costs for enterprises.Interestingly,when implementing the combined contract,Big Data marketing efficiency does not impact the transfer price paid by manufacturers to Internet recycling platforms.
基金Supported by National Social Science Foundation“Research on the Innovation and Promotion Strategy of China’s E-waste Recycling Model under the‘Internet+’Strategy”(18BGL182)。
文摘The popularization of smartphones and the acceleration of their replacement lead to a surge in mobile phone disposal.How to recycle waste mobile phones efficiently becomes a major problem in today’s society.The“Internet+”recycling mode is an effective way to solve this problem.The recycling process of waste mobile phones involves retailers,manufacturers,third parties and other recycling parts.Retailers have natural advantages compared with other parts because of their perfect sales network and logistics system.The system dynamics model for“Internet+”recycling of waste mobile phones dominated by retailers is constructed,and the Vensim software is used to simulate the influence of changes in two key factors in“Internet+”recycling environment:Annual operating cost of online platform and offline unit logistics cost on retailers’recycling volume and recycling profit.The results show that the investment of online platform operation cost is conducive to the increase of retailers’online waste mobile phone recycling volume and recycling profit,while the investment of offline logistics cost increases retailers’online waste mobile phone recycling volume,but reduces the recycling profit.