Does investor protection affect the choice of earnings management methods through real activity manipulation and accrual manipulation？ Asian comparison

This paper examines systematic differences in earnings management through real activity manipulation and accrual manipulation across 7 Asia countries. The study proposes arguments that in economies with high investor protection, managers prefer to manage earnings through real activity manipulation rather than through accrual manipulation because accrual manipulation is more likely to draw auditors or regulators scrutiny than real decisions about pricing and production. The study findings are consistent with prediction. Despite being in economies with high investor protection, managers still have bigger discretion in managing earnings through real activities rather than accrual manipulation.

Investor Protection, Deviation of Local Accounting Standards From IFRS, and the Effectiveness of the IFRS Adoption

The objective of this study is to examine the effect of accounting standards and investor protection on value relevance of earnings and book value of equity among European Union countries during the years 1999-2007. The results indicate that the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards [IFRS] leads to improvement in value relevance, particularly on earnings. We also examine the impact of investor protection and the deviation of local accounting standards from IFRS on the effectiveness of the IFRS adoption. The results show supporting evidence for investor protection but inconclusive evidence for accounting standard deviation. However, additional analysis indicates that the countries which apparently benefit from adopting IFRS are those with high deviation of local accounting standards from IFRS and high investor protection. The findings imply that adopting IFRS alone cannot improve value relevance of accounting information, but standard setters and regulators need to strengthen their investor protection mechanisms in order to improve the quality of accounting information.

Investor Protection,Ownership Structure and Corporate Valuation

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationship between investor protection, ownership structure and corporate valuation. La Porta showed that there existed a simple linear relationship between corporate valuation and the holding percentage of controlling shareholders. But recent empirical evidence does not support it. A nonlinear relationship is proved between ownership structure and corporate valuaton by relaxing the assumption of La Porta＇s model in this paper. There exists a positive relation between investor protection and corporate valuation. Our empirical research shows that this relation is significantly positive indeed.

Tunneling, overlapping owner and investor protection： Evidence from merger and acquisition in Asia

Tunneling is to describe transfer resource out of the firm for benefit of their controlling shareholders. Better legal protection and stronger social norms improve minority shareholders＇ protection from expropriation. They consequently reduce the private benefits of controlling shareholders （La Porta, 1999）. This study aims to investigate tunneling in the context merger and acquisition （M＆A） and to examine whether tunneling occurs only in emerging markets with poor law enforcement or whether it also occurs in developed countries. This study documents that managers are more likely to overpay target in merger and acquisition with high overlapped owner which have stakes in bidder and target firm. That overpayment, a transfer of wealth from owners of bidder＇s firm to overlapping owners, is a type of tunneling. This study concludes that tunneling occurs in nations not only with low investor protection, but also with high investor protection.

Private Benefits of Control,Growth Opportunities and Investor Protection

We develop a model to illustrate that controlling shareholders choose the level of investor protection that maximizes their own interests. Controlling shareholders in companies with complicated control structures can easily extract private benefits and are thus reluctant to enhance investor protection which would necessitate increased transparency. In contrast, controlling shareholders in companies with valuable growth opportunities are willing to improve investor protection so that they can benefit from the increased value resulting from the lower cost of capital. We test this prediction using firm-level data in China. The results show that the level of investor protection increases with decreases in control structure opacity and increases in growth opportunities. The correlation is more significant for enforcement than for the mechanisms of investor protection.

INVESTOR PROTECTION IN CHINA＇S SECURITIES MARKETS： MARGINALIZATION OF THE JUDICIARY AND UTILIZATION OF POLITICAL RESOURCES

China＇s securities markets have been experiencing high growth this year. The Shanghai Stock Exchange is now ranked as the fourth largest stock exchange of the world. So, who is protecting the Chinese investors in this fast growing and potentially volatile market？ The Incomplete Law Theory of Pistor and XU contends that regulators, as they are more efficient, play a more dominate role than the judiciary in protecting investors in the securities markets. This theory to some extent explains why the China＇s judiciary has been inactive in protecting investors in China, the host of the third largest securities market in the world. However, this article finds that the theory is not able to adequately explain the investor protection mechanism in China. We find that by deploying various political resources, the Chinese state plays a direct role in protecting the interest of investors that is often more significant than that played by judicial or regulatory authority action.

Does Structural Matching between Finance and Law Promote Economic Development?

Financial systems generally operate under two different models:one where capital markets play a primary role in financial transactions and resource allocation(market-oriented model),and another where banks are the central institutions for these activities(bank-oriented model).The degree of investor protection afforded by the legal system varies across these systems.What is the most efficient alignment between financial structure and investor protection?This paper attempts to quantify the structural matching relationship between the financial structure and investor protection in various countries,and examines empirically the impact of this relationship on economic development.Using a sample of cross-country panel data,it finds that the degree of structural matching was positively related to economic development.Both the combination of a securities market and strong investor protection and the combination of a banking system and weak investor protection can contribute to promoting economic development.It extends the law and finance theory framework,enhances the analysis of scenarios with weak alignment between financial structure and investor protection,explains the growth path of developing countries,and highlights the diversity and the dynamic nature of the optimal financial structure.

Foreign institutional investors and stock return comovement

We investigate whether foreign institutional investors facilitate firm-specific information flow in the global market. Specifically, using annual institutional ownership data from firms across 40 countries, we find that foreign institutional ownership is negatively associated with excess stock return comovement. Our results are more pronounced when foreign institutional investors originate from common-law countries and hold a large equity stake in invested firms; and when the invested firms are located in civil-law countries. Overall, the evidence suggests that foreign institutional investors from countries with strong investor protection play an important informational role in mitigating excess stock return comovement around the world.

Large Shareholder Tunneling and Risk of Stock Price Crash： Evidence from China

Although several studies have examined the economic consequences of large shareholders＇ tunneling behavior, little attention has been paid to the negative effects of tunneling on firms＇ extreme events. In this article, we investigate how tunneling behavior affects firm-level stock price crashes. The findings indicate that the probability of stock price crashes is positively associated with the extent of tunneling behavior by large shareholders. The positive relationship is more pronounced after the split of share structure reform and is moderated by the firm＇s financial conditions. This study contributes to the emerging body of literature focusing on the economic consequences of tunneling and stock price crashes. The conclusions drawn from the study also provide a frame of reference for investor protection and investment portfolios based on large shareholders＇ tunneling behavior in China.