Modelling the Iranian Petroleum Contract fiscal regime using bargaining game theory to guide contract negotiators

Based on Iran's sixth development plan,the country's oil and gas industry requires an investment of about$200 bn in the next five years to increase production.The Iranian government,to attract and motivate international oil company investment in their oil and gas fields,has presented a new type of risk service contract:the Iranian Petroleum Contract(IPC).This paper summarizes the features of the IPC and presents mathematical models of its fiscal regime for the benefit and guidance of both the National Iranian Oil Company(NIOC)and the contractors.Next,adopting bargaining game theory provides a mathematical model for reaching a win-win situation between the NIOC and the contractor.Finally,a numerical example is given and a sensitivity analysis performed to illustrate the implementation of the proposed models.The contractor and the NIOC may use these models when preparing their proposal and in the course of actual negotiations to calculate their internal rate of return,remuneration fee,and net present value for developing the fields at different conditions of their bargaining power,and derive a logical bargain to protect their best possible interests.

An economic analysis of Iranian petroleum contract

Following three generations of buyback contracts,the new model of Iranian petroleum contracts(IPC) was introduced by the Iranian cabinet to incentivize investments in the country.This paper analyzes the fiscal terms of the contract with technical information from one of the candidate fields for licensing.The financial simulation shows that,in general,the IPC resembles more a service contract than a production sharing contract as the contractor's take is relatively low—below 5% across different scenarios of crude oil price.Second,the IPC is progressive in that as the overall profitability of the project improves the government takes an increasing share of the economic rent.The results are confirmed in a sensitivity analysis of each party's profitability and takes on oil price,CAPEX,OPEX and the fee.

伊朗油气投资环境分析

基于回购合同整体实施效果不佳的现实,结合回购合同的执行经验,分析伊朗油气项目国际合作存在的六大挑战:管理人才奇缺、财税环境不成熟、伊朗承担项目配套的外围工程推进困难重重、超工期责任划分机制不健全、向国际公司偿付条件苛刻、项目资金安全面临严重威胁。新伊朗石油合同的实施,使得在伊油气合作机会增多。对伊朗投资环境的客观认识,对合同模式本质的把握,清晰的风险认知,有效的应对措施,是未来新伊朗石油合同项目成功实施的基础。

伊朗新油气合同模式分析:以南帕斯某大型气田为例

自2015年以来,伊朗政府为解决回购合同模式合作的局限性问题,陆续向外界推出新石油合同作为油气对外合作新模式,一定程度上降低了合同者超工期、超投资、生产操作权等风险,但回购合同监管思维根深蒂固。本文结合新版合同及财税条款,回顾伊朗对外合同历程,梳理新石油合同特征,为国际投资者谈判、执行合同提供决策参考。以南帕斯某大型气田为案例,假定并选取各项参数,运用折现现金流法,计算合同者投资效益,结果显示,合同者投资效益相对乐观、资金风险较低、油价风险降低。新合同模式下,进一步开展不确定性风险分析,建设期、合同期内投资、气产量、油价波动、DCC摊销期、操作费和利率是依次影响合同者效益的关键因素。合同者可通过加快建设工期、节约投资、控制成本获取高额收益,但承担超工期、超投资、费用增加对效益的侵蚀。合同者分享油田生产的长期收益,更有动力选择短期增产以提高自身效益。合同者可从高油价中分享部分超额收益,低油价下亏损的风险相对较低。合同者在投资摊销期和回收上限之间权衡时,更愿意去加快投资回收。

“后制裁元年”伊朗新石油合同的框架解读与实施展望

"后制裁元年",伊朗新版石油合同艰难推进,经修改后再次取得了内阁的批准,即将在第一轮油气招标中应用。从内阁批准的"通用条款"中可大致看出新版石油合同的基本框架,相对于回购合同而言,合同期更长,以审批年度预算取代了固定的资本投资上限,新增了勘探开发与生产一体化和提高采收率合同,报酬费与增产量和油价挂钩,设置了多种激励机制,允许投资者参与生产阶段的作业,鼓励技术转移和与本地企业的合资合作。在具体招标和谈判过程中,投资者需对投标程序和要求以及报酬费的确定、成本摊销期与延付机制、本地伙伴的选择、各方协调和监督机制、关键法律和经济条款等实体问题进行澄清和明确,以尽量争取有利条件。新版石油合同在文本上还存在很大的不确定性,也给各方投标竞争和谈判博弈提供了空间,其能否顺利运用到新项目招商主要受制于伊朗内部的政治斗争和美国对伊政策走势,其具体的实施和引资效果则与伊朗的商务环境和管理体制紧密相关。

伊朗新石油合同与回购合同差异及对经济效益的影响

针对伊朗推出的新石油合同,主要从合同关系、合同期、主体开发方案、投资、工期、产量、报酬费计算与成本回收、作业权等方面分析了与回购合同的差异。伊朗新石油合同与回购合同对于承包商经济效益的影响是不同的,对比分析工期、投资、油价、产量因素对项目内部收益率的影响可以看出,针对超投资、超工期、油价下降、产量下降的风险,伊朗新石油合同的内部收益率下降程度均低于回购合同,能取得比回购合同更好的经济效益,具有较强的抗风险能力。在回购合同下,内部收益率对投资变动最为敏感;在新石油合同下,内部收益率对产量变动最为敏感。