Broaching Political and Theoretical Divides through Deliberation

Commitment to deliberative democracy as a tool for social and political ordering is shared by political philosophers from many traditions. This paper examines John Rawls and Iris Marion Young＇s respective commitments to deliberative democracy in hopes of finding a methodological proposal for peace between followers of Rawls, the greatest liberal political philosopher of the 20th century, and Young, the late anti-liberal and anti-oppression theorist. While there are important differences between their respective positions, this paper posits that deliberative democracy can appease adherents of both thinkers, providing a shared method for determining conflicts between them. Liberal democracy is preferable, partly since it creates a place for anti-liberal positions （viz., Young＇s position can exist within the larger Rawlsian framework）, but deliberative democracy can succeed even if one is not a liberal democrat.

Justice and Civic Friendship： An Aristotelian Critique of Modern Citizenry

Modem moral and political theorists make a sharp separation between justice and civic friendship, arguing that justice deals with the fair terms of co-operation in the social sphere whereas civic friendship is about an individual＇s contingent affections in the political domain. In addition, they also argue that the principles of justice must determine the nature and function of civic friendship in modem liberal society. Even though the historical origin of the above view can be traced to the writings of Immanuel Kant （2007）, John Rawls provides us with its most cogent formulation in recent times. In his book A Theory of Justice （1971）, Rawls argues that the considerations of right are prior to the considerations of good; therefore the principles of justice must determine the limits of civic friendship. Against RaMs, I argue that justice and civic friendship are intrinsically connected and that they cannot be separated in experience. I draw upon Aristotle＇s theory of virtue to strengthen my arguments. Following Aristotle, I show that both justice and friendship are virtues and that all virtues hold together. The Aristotelian coherence of virtues, I argue, can be useful in redefining the obligations of justice and civic friendship in contemporary liberal democracies.

From Primary Goods to Capability

While being generally appreciative of John Rawls' theory of justice,this paper aims to describe and compare the two metrics of justice—primary goods and capability,and through critiques and responses between Amartya Sen and John Rawls,I argue that the capability metric is a better project than the social primary goods metric insofar as it can provide a more practical path for rethinking the concept of social justice,as well as a better approach in resolving fundamental social justice issues in China.

Confucian Political Philosophy for Non-Confucians

Contemporary proponents of Confucian political philosophy often ignore the fact that any sizeable future Confucian political order will have to accommodate many “non-Confucians.” The guiding question of this paper is therefore the following: how could a Confucian political philosophy, if it can at all, adequately take into account a plurality of comprehensive worldviews? I first turn to John Rawls and his account of these terms and of reasonable pluralism more generally. I then examine some particularly relevant developments and criticism of Rawls’ account. Finally, I offer a discussion of some recent proposals for a Confucian political philosophy, and examine to what extent each recognizes the fact of pluralism, sees it as a challenge, and deals with it in a persuasive manner. The paper concludes with a depiction of two major stumbling blocks that might stand firmly in the way of such a pluralism-accommodating political Confucianism.