Contradictory Freedoms？ Kant on Moral Agency and Political Rights

This essay examines the degree to which Kant＇s understanding of external freedom and right are consistent with and can form a part of his moral philosophy. In doing so, this essay begins by looking at the foundation and possibility of moral experience as it is presented in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals. This essay then turns to explore Kant＇s understanding of external freedom and right as set out in The Metaphysics of Morals and examines the apparent inconsistencies that exist between these concepts and Kant＇s explication of moral worth. After pointing out the distinction between right and morality, this essay goes on to argue that, strictly speaking, Kant＇s conception of external freedom and right cannot form part of his moral philosophy （as so defined in the Groundwork）. Finally, this essay concludes by arguing that although right and morality are irreconcilable, Kant＇s account of external freedom and right can nevertheless serve as part of his ＂moral＂ philosophy insofar as these concepts represent Kant＇s attempt to externalize the moral law, or simply expand the definition of morality to cover any action that accords with the right.

Why Free Will Is Logically Not Possible within Naturalism

One of the most intriguing problems of philosophy and of mankind is the question whether humans have a free will. This question is heavily disputed between natural scientists and especially neuroscientists, who deny free will, and philosophers and other groups, who insist on free will. It is perplexing that both sides base their premise on the same precondition, namely naturalism. We will prove that naturalism automatically leads to physicalism, to materialism, and to reductionism. We will also prove here that it is logically not possible to have a free will if naturalism is true. Free will definitely requires an additional substance, a non-material soul, which cannot be part of our universe. This must not be in contradiction to our current knowledge of natural sciences.

Determinism, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility

Human beings live amidst several bonds. These bonds often place both internal and external limitations that apparently create the view that a human being has no free will but is determined. This paper explores the controversial issue whether a human being possesses free will to make free choices or is determined. It is the stance of this study that if one does not have free will then one cannot be morally responsible for one＇s actions and consequently praise and blame would then have no value. The paper, therefore, is of the view that notwithstanding the many bonds within which they live, humans, with their special dignity, have free will that operate within the respective constraints set by the bonds of human life. Furthermore, since morality involves good and bad, the paper asserts that for an act to be designated as morally good or bad, it implies that the agent was free to perform the said act or do otherwise to merit praise or blame respectively. Thus, for human freedom to be significant, it must be responsible.

An Analysis of Milton＇s Free Will Defense From the Two Falls in Paradise Lost

Paradise Lost is a great epic written by John Milton. Deeply influenced by Christian Humanism, Milton fully shows his free will defense in Paradise Lost. Based on the text of Paradise Lost, this paper mainly analyzes the causes of Milton＇s free will defense, his pursuit for free will shown in the two falls in the work： Satan＇s fall and Adam and Eve＇s fall. This paper also discusses the practical meaning of free will defense in Paradise Lost： it reveals his grief and anger of the failure of England revolution and shows the idea that people don＇t have the freedom to interfere or destroy other people＇s free will.

Relativity of a Free Will Concept Depending on Both Conscious Indeterminism and Unconscious Determinism

Free will is difficult to classify with respect to determinism or indeterminism, and its phenomenology in consciousness often shows both aspects. Initially, it is felt as unlimited and indeterminate will power, with the potentiality of multiple choices. Thereafter, reductive deliberation is led by determinism to the final decision, which realises only one of the potential choices. The reductive deliberation phase tries to find out the best alternative and simultaneously satisfying vague motivations, contextual conditions and personal preferences. The essential sense of free will is the introduction of personal preferences, which allows a higher diversity of reactions to vague motivations. With an oversimplified model of determinism as a chain of events, incompatibilists define ＂free＂ as ＂undetermined＂ so that determinism becomes incompatible with any free choice between alternatives. In consciousness, free will requires a more complex model of network determinism as well as the consideration of unconsciousness as a causal factor. When ＂free＂ defined as ＂undetermined＂ is applied to the context of consciousness, it should be reinterpreted as ＂unconscious of being determined＂ or not aware of underlying determinism. Lacking information on determinism generates a feeling of ＂free＂ in consciousness and, therefore, gives the impression of indeterminism. Lacking information may be induced by an uncertain future without determined events--an unconscious past with biological reactions suddenly emerging from the unconsciousness or an unknown present unable to distinguish determinism of complex events. Therefore, at the level of human consciousness, the experience of free will is associated with apparent indeterminism although it is based on unconscious determinism. The concepts of compatibilism and incompatibilism are only two different aspects of the same phenomenon and correspond to consciousness and unconsciousness. Nevertheless, they can be considered together with a free will concept based on relativity depending on two different reference frames--the first person＇s experience frame or the Laplace＇s demon frame with knowledge on every molecule of the universe. Only relativity of the free will concept avoids the contradiction between ＂free＂ and ＂unfree＂ for the same phenomenon and could be a compromise for considering compatibilism and incompatibilism equally.

Henry Fleming's Assertion of Free Will in an Indifferent Universe

Different from his naturalistic followers,Stephen Crane develops his naturalism in a restricted and special sense that contains many non-naturalistic elements.In his masterpiece The Red Badge of Courage,Crane scrutinizes the position of man in the universe through the depiction of a youthful private's war experience and spiritual growth.Despite the fact that war is extremely cruel and Nature is indifferent to man's sufferings,the protagonist Henry Fleming,after a series of trials and mental struggles,finally succeeds in asserting his free will.Seen in this light,this novel can be read as a piece that transcends the boundaries of Determinism and reflects the author's not altogether pessimistic tendency in spite of the naturalistic features in his writing.

弹性地基上四边自由矩形薄板振动分析的Kantorovich法

利用延展的Kantorovich法推导出弹性地基上四边自由矩形薄板振动问题的解析解表达式。由于薄板振动的固有频率和振型都用初等函数表达出来,所以,在计算中不需要人为地选取挠度函数,并且只要进行初等函数的迭代计算,同时计算精度是可以控制的。最后还给出了计算实例来验证本文所采用的方法以及所推导的公式的正确性。

Signs of the Concept of Chaos in Kant’s Thinking and Its Relationship with Jorge Luis Borges’Thinking

The concept of chaos is present in man from the origins of mankind.Philosophy is alien to this concept and proceeds to speculate about its reality.Both Kant and Borges were not indifferent to this speculation and in their works,we can find“the effort to explain or to approach”the concept of chaos.Our first aim is to demonstrate in Kant’s The Critique of Judgement,and more precisely in The Analytic of the Sublime,what Kant understands as“chaos.”Our second aim is to establish a relationship between Kant and Borges in some of Borges’tales.Finally,we aim at establishing whether this“language of chaos”can refer to a sort of communication which exceeds logic language,i.e.,a sort of“mute logos.”

Why Hollywood Hates Business： Immanuel Kant＇s Role in Avatar.＂ Movie Reviewed by Adam Smith

One of cinematic science fiction＇s most popular plot lines is to imagine an invasion of earth by an advanced alien species. James Cameron＇s Avatar turns the tables on that premise. Humans attack a peaceful, less technologically sophisticated race in order to exploit their natural resources. Driving the assault is a mining company hell-bent on improving its bottom line. The villain of Avatar is not a person, but those people who seek profit. To put it starkly, business is evil. But why has the entertainment business cast business as a heavy？ Hollywood has now made Immanuel Kant as the director of moral sentiment. Not, of course, directly, but rather the ghostwriter of Hollywood＇s ideas about morality. The works of Kant are not discussed or debated in the public arena, but their principles have influenced the way people think about what is just and good. The ideas of Kant have filtered into the contemporary discourse and are one of the key ingredients in the national dialogue over what it means to be moral. The categorical imperative holds that an action is moral only if it is free from calculation of reward or gain. To be truly, moral people must abandon all practical considerations of need or desire; they must be directed by pure good will alone. Business people can never measure up to Kant＇s standard. They always make choices based on cost and benefit. Their businesses would quickly go bankrupt, if they made decisions on good will rather than interest. Kant＇s principles have raised the moral standard so high that even the common inclination to seek one＇s own benefit is looked on with some mistrust. In Kantian-influenced movies, business people have come to play the evil antagonist; they seek gain instead of the good. How would Adam Smith, the father of economic rationality, respond to popularized Kantian morality？

Bodies, Persons, and Respect for Humanity： A Kantian Look at the Permissibility of Organ Commerce and Donation

Can choosing to sale one＇s kidney be morally permissible？ ＂No＂, Kant would answer. Humanity, whether in one＇s own person or that of any other, must never be treated merely as a means, but always at the same time as an end, is Kant＇s instruction （Groundwork 4：429）. He thought that organ sale violates this imperative. Lectures on Ethics （27：346） shows that ＂... a man is not entitled to sell his limbs for money If a man does that, he turns himself into a thing, and then anyone may treat him as they please, because he has thrown his person away....＂ This paper explains Kant＇s reasons against commerce in organs, drawing on his views on prostitution, and the moral impermissibility of sexual use within this context, a case which he himself compares to the selling of one＇s body part（s）. Can choosing to donate one＇s kidney be morally permissible？ If we take Kant＇s views at face value, it would follow that organ donation is on a par with morality only if it takes place in a context where people have gained rights over each other＇s persons （for example, in a marital context）. In this context, however, a person has a right to her partner＇s kidney should she happen to need it, which can open the path to bodily violation. Moreover, this view severely restricts the permissibility of organ donation. In this paper, I argue that a closer examination of Kant＇s views on what is involved in the idea of respecting humanity could reveal that organ donation does not violate the categorical imperative. In fact, it could be said to follow from such an imperative that we actually have a duty to organ donation.

The False Promise of Kant＇s Humanity Formula

Kant＇s Humanity Formula of the Categorical Imperative is arguably its most widely preferred formulation, having been defended as a moral principle and employed in the evaluation of particular moral problems by a number of leading contemporary ethicists. For them and many other readers of Kant, the idea that we are not to treat persons as mere means to our own ends but are rather to respect their rational agency as intrinsically valuable holds great promise for qualifying as, in Kant＇s words, ＂the supreme principle of morality.＂ In the present paper I argue that the Humanity Formula cannot deliver on this promise. After setting forth three conditions of adequacy for any genuine supreme principle of morality, I argue that the Humanity Formula, on three textually grounded interpretations each of which has been advocated by a prominent Kantian ethicist, does not satisfy these conditions. Whichever of these textually grounded interpretations is taken, the Humanity Formula is open to compelling counterexamples.

Extended Moral Responsibility for Kantian Agents

When two Kantian agents engage in inter-dependent transactions with one another, each agent has the responsibility to assure the morality of the other＇s maxim of action and means to implement the maxim. This proposition is proven to be a logical consequence of Kant＇s moral system and stated formally as the K-Completeness theorem. Transactions that satisfy the theorem are called ＂K-Complete.＂ The theorem is generalized to cover transactions with many agents. The paper then models multi-agent K-Complete transactions using mathematical graph theory and shows that such transactions are distinguished from Kant＇s kingdom of ends. Finally, the paper shows that the extended morality provides Kant＇s moral system with the resources to define an ethical community in such as the one in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason without the introduction of God and a church.

Kantian Cosmopolitan Ideal in Disciplining the World Literature： Cosmopolitanism in Hong Kong Poetry in the Early 1990s

This article looks at how cosmopolitanism--the notion of universality within a diversity of multi-cultures---has been shaping the discipline of world literature. The article encompasses chiefly three parts. The first part offers an overview of the debates on the discipline widely discussed by literary scholars such as Franco Moretti, David Damrosch and Emily Apter. I take issue with the harmonic co-existence of both local and global elements---and what I define as ＂glocality＂---in literatures to exhibit the inevitable trend of the trans-cultural, supranational and cross-historical interactions among multiple centres and/or various cities especially in the twenty-first century. I thereby argue in the second part using Leung Ping Kwan （1949-2013）＇s ＂Images of Hong Kong＂ （1992） and Louise Ho＇s two poetry pieces written in 1994 to prove how Kantian Cosmopolitan elements have deeply embedded in the poem written in a city where the West frequently interacts with the East. I conclude by stepping in further to argue that only through tolerating and mediating between the region and the globe can world literature as a discipline find its way out without fear for marginalising any of the literary pieces.

Schmitt, Kant, and the Theory of International Relations： Reflecting the Problems of Just War, Unipolarism, and Political Realism

Concerning international relations theory, the work of Immanuel Kant was hitherto reflected in terms of the liberal paradigm, particularly of the democratic peace, whereas Carl Schmitt was predominantly associated with the assumptions of political realism or--at least for a short period Nazi imperialism. However, these differences seem to have taken a back seat since both thinkers have been adopted to legitimate the convictions of imperial liberalism. In contrast, this article will show that Schmitt and Kant have essentially more in common than generally assumed but do precisely argue against just war theory, humanitarian interventions, and a unipolar world. On the other hand, Kant＇s liberal and Schmitt＇s illiberal theory do not apply to the classical paradigms of intemational relations. Instead, Schmitt＇s Political Theology and Kant＇s Political Philosophy will be compared along with the antagonistic logic （and ethics） of political existentialism and a peaceful interdependence between states and nations. Considering the contemporary crisis of world order, it should be even plausible that the two dominating paradigms of future international relations might be formed by Kantian and Schmittian premises. Thus, the aim of this paper is not to match Kant and Schmitt once again with the usual approaches in international relations theory but to stretch its theoretical and conceptual spectrum by extracting the inventive contribution both thinkers made to important topics of IR.

Kant, Fichte, and the Act of the I

Fichte＇s various articulations of the Wissenschaftslehre （＂theory of scientific knowledge＂） are self-conscious attempts to systematize Kant＇s critical philosophy. Fichte＇s notion of the pure I （ieh） serves as the theoretical starting-point for his exposition of transcendental idealism, and in many ways this concept is analogous to Kant＇s notion of the transcendental unity of apperception explained in the Critique of Pure Reason. This paper argues that although Fichte and Kant agree on （1） the active nature of the pure I, （2） the distinction between pure and empirical apperception, and （3） skepticism concerning the possibility of theoretical knowledge of any positive （i.e., noumenal） content of the pure I, their respective notions of pure apperception differ in that Kant affirms the conceptual priority of the pure I to its objects while Fichte denies the same. Fichte＇s departure from Kant on this point foreshadows many later recognition theories of consciousness, e.g., those of Hegel and Marx.

A Comparative Study of Kant’s and Hegel’s Aesthetics of Landscape Architecture

Both Kant and Hegel showed their attention to landscape architecture art in their aesthetic works,their aesthetic ideas were different but also related.This paper sorted out and interpreted the landscape architecture aesthetics of Kant and Hegel based on relevant aesthetic literature,analyzed the differences between them according to the historical background of landscape architecture development and their philosophic concepts,then summarized the historical causes for the development of their landscape architecture aesthetics.

Tess' s Losing of Virginity in Kant's Eyes

Tess is a pure girl in Hardy's eyes, as it shows in the book's subtitle. She is sinned in Victorian's time, however, she is still pure in Kant's eyes.Key words: Tesss purity;

A Study on Kant’s Views on Humanity in His Aesthetics

A key to understand Immanuel Kant's philosophy is his views on humanity,and the cornerstone of Kant’s philosophy is the idea that“beauty is a symbol of morality”.From the perspective of his views on humanity,we can have a deep understanding of Kant*s analysis of beauty and the sublime and his aesthetics.The focus of Kant's aesthetics is the realization of human freedom and the sublime,and this is of special humanistic feature.

Kant： The Sweet Dream of Perpetual Peace

This essay is a survey upon Kant＇s Sweet Dream of Perpetual Peace. According to Kant, a permanent peace could be achieved under the condition of the creation of a Federation of States. This Federation of States will be rest upon three fundamental requirements--i.e., democracy, reason, universal hospitality. Kant＇s idea of global Federation of States should not be confused with existing nowadays Unions of States, such as European Union, which depend heavily upon a central authority and a complicated bureaucracy.

Tits-Kantor-Koecher李代数的Wakimoto表示

每一个Jordan代数都对应了一个Tits-Kantor-Koecher李代数．在扩张仿射李代数的分类中[1],A_1型李代数的分类依赖于欧氏空间上半格给出的Tits-Kantor-Koecher李代数．另外在相似的意义下,二维欧氏空间R^2中只有两个半格．设S是R^2上的任一半格,T(S)为半格S对应的Jordan代数,G(T(S))为相应的Tits-Kantor-Koecher李代数．利用Wakimoto自由场的方法给出李代数G(T(S))的一类顶点表示．