Leakage-Resilient Signature Scheme Based on BLS Signature

Digital signature,one of the most important cryptographic primitives,has been commonly used in information systems,and thus enhancing the security of a signature scheme can benefit such an application.Currently,leakage-resilient cryptography is a very hot topic in cryptographic research.A leakage-resilient cryptographic primitive is said to be secure if arbitrary but bounded information about the signer's secret key(involving other states) is leaked to an adversary.Obviously,the leakage-resilient signature is more secure than the common signature.We construct an efficient leakage-resilient signature scheme based on BLS signature in the bounded retrieval model.We also prove that our scheme is provably secure under BLS signature.

A leakage-resilient certificateless public key encryption scheme with CCA2 security

In recent years,much attention has been focused on designing provably secure cryptographic primitives in the presence of key leakage.Many constructions of leakage-resilient cryptographic primitives have been proposed.However,for any polynomial time adversary,most existing leakage-resilient cryptographic primitives cannot ensure that their outputs are random,and any polynomial time adversary can obtain a certain amount of leakage on the secret key from the corresponding output of a cryptographic primitive.In this study,to achieve better performance,a new construction of a chosen ciphertext attack 2(CCA2)secure,leakage-resilient,and certificateless public-key encryption scheme is proposed,whose security is proved based on the hardness of the classic decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption.According to our analysis,our method can tolerate leakage attacks on the private key.This method also achieves better performance because polynomial time adversaries cannot achieve leakage on the private key from the corresponding ciphertext,and a key leakage ratio of 1/2 can be achieved.Because of these good features,our method may be significant in practical applications.

Updatable Identity-Based Hash Proof System Based on Lattices and Its Application to Leakage-Resilient Public-Key Encryption Schemes

Identity-based hash proof system is a basic and important primitive. Ittographic schemes and protocols that are secure against key-leakage attacks. In thisupdatable identity-based hash proof system, in which the related master secret keyis widely utilized to construct cryp-paper, we introduce the concept ofand the identity secret key can beupdated securely. Then, we instantiate this primitive based on lattices in the standard model. Moreover, we introduce anapplication of this new primitive by giving a generic construction of leakage-resilient public-key encryption schemes withanonymity. This construction can be considered as the integration of the bounded-retrieval model and the continual leakagemodel. Compared with the existing leakage-resilient schemes, our construction not only is more efficient but also can resistmuch more key leakage.

Practical continuous leakage-resilient CCA secure identity-based encryption

Leakage of private information including private keys of user has become a threat to the security of computing systems.It has become a common security requirement that a cryptographic scheme should withstand various leakage attacks.In the real life,an adversary can break the security of cryptography primitive by performing continuous leakage attacks.Although,some research on the leakage-resilient cryptography had been made,there are still some remaining issued in previous attempts.The identity-based encryption(IBE)constructions were designed in the bounded-leakage model,and might not be able to meet their claimed security under the continuous-leakage attacks.In the real applications,the leakage is unbounded.That is,a practical cryptography scheme should keep its original security in the continuous leakage setting.The previous continuous leakage-resilient IBE schemes either only achieve chosen-plaintext attacks security or the chosen-ciphertext attacks(CCA)security is proved in the selective identity model.Aiming to solve these problems,in this paper,we show how to construct the continuous leakage-resilient IBE scheme,and the scheme’s adaptive CCA security is proved in the standard model based on the hardness of decisional bilinear Diffie-Hellman exponent assumption.For any adversary,all elements in the ciphertext are random,and an adversary cannot obtain any leakage on the private key of user from the corresponding given ciphertext.Moreover,the leakage parameter of our proposal is independent of the plaintext space and has a constant size.

Continual auxiliary leakage-resilient attribute-based broadcast encryption with constant size ciphertexts

Attribute-based broadcast encryption(ABBE) under continual auxiliary leakage-resilient(CALR) model can enhance the security of the shared data in broadcasting system since CALR model brings the possibility of new leakage-resilient(LR) guarantees. However, there are many shortcomings in the existing works, such as relying on the strong assumptions, low computational efficiency and large size of ciphertexts, etc. How to solve the trade-off between security and efficiency is a challenging problem at present. To solve these problems, this paper gives an ABBE scheme resisting continual auxiliary leakage(CAL) attack. ABBE scheme achieves constant size ciphertexts, and the computational complexity of decryption only depends on the number of receivers instead of the maximum number of receivers of the system. Additionally, it achieves adaptive security in the standard model where the security is reduced to the general subgroup decision(GSD) assumptions(or called static assumptions in the subgroup). Furthermore, it can tolerate leakage on the master secret key and private key with continual auxiliary inputs. Performance analysis shows that the proposed scheme is more efficient and practical than the available schemes.

Threshold public key encryption scheme resilient against continual leakage without random oracles

Threshold public key encryption allows a set of servers to decrypt a ciphertext if a given threshold of authorized servers cooperate. In the setting of threshold public key encryption, we consider the question of how to correctly decrypt a ciphertext where all servers continually leak information about their secret keys to an external attacker. Dodis et al. and Akavia et al. show two concrete schemes on how to store secrets on continually leaky servers. However, their construc- tions are only interactive between two servers. To achieve continual leakage security among more than two servers, we give the first threshold public key encryption scheme against adaptively chosen ciphertext attack in the continual leak- age model under three static assumptions. In our model, the servers update their keys individually and asynchronously, without any communication between two servers. Moreover, the update procedure is re-randomized and the randomness can leak as well.

Attribute-based encryption resilient to continual auxiliary leakage with constant size ciphertexts

For leakage-resilient ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption （CP-ABE） at present, the size of the ciphertexts in most of them relies on the number of attributes. How to overcome this shortcoming is a challenge problem. Based on the Goldreich-Levin theorem and dual system encryption, an efficient CP-ABE scheme with constant size ciphertexts is proposed in this paper. It can tolerate leakage on master secret key and attribute-based secret keys with auxiliary inputs. Furthermore, the proposed scheme can be realized as resilience against continual leakage if keys are periodically updated. Under some static assumptions instead of other strong assumptions, the introduced scheme achieves adaptively security in the standard model.