Emmanuel Levinas： Hermeneutics, Ethics, and Art

This article draws attention to the subject of art in Levinas＇s thinking through consideration of his philosophical language, which is aided by images, metaphors, and idioms of art. The primary image that will accompany our discussion throughout this article is the image of art as shadow, which Levinas incorporates into the title of the essay which he devotes to the subject of art： ＂Reality and Its Shadow＂. Thinking about art from the perspective of Levinas means thinking about image and essence, about which is visible before us and which we cannot see, and about the different ways in which art can express itself. Levinas＇s theory of interpretation is grounded in and guided by the field of ethics and addresses the ethical aspects of interpretation. Levinas approaches the discourse of interpretation not out of na＇ivet6 but rather based on a deep understanding of the field of hermeneutics, with all its shortcomings and challenges. Thinking of hermeneutics from an ethical perspective is no mere addition to the discussion but the very crux of the matter. An attempt to understand interpretation as an act of exposing the truth encounters serious philosophical and logical difficulties, whether we are seeking to discover the intention of the artist, the intent of a specific work of art, or a hidden form within the work itself. The engagement with Levinas＇s theory of hermeneutics, however, raises a different question which is the focus of this article： Can Levinas＇s theory of interpretation be applied to the realm of artistic creation, and if so, how？ This question is sharpened by the difficulties that Levinas himself poses to his readers by designating art as the ＂shadow＂ of reality and drawing attention to the egoistic dimension of the artistic act.

Levinas’Ethics for the Other in Communication and Interpretation

Levinas regarded language as transcendental way for the subject to build ethical relationship with the other.Language for the other can lead to infinity as long as it is related to the other.Metaphor contains veiled transcendental essence,which can be disclosed by connecting with the other.As for dialogue,communication with the other can realize the intersubjectivity between the subject and the other,which shows the highness of the other and builds the subjectivity for the self at the same time.And for interpretation aspect,Levinasdevotion to exegesis of Talmud leads an ethical perspective for reading sacred text.

“此在”还是“我在此”?——随海德格尔与勒维纳斯一道思考“人之为人”

"人之为人"究竟何在,自古就是西方哲学的基本问题之一。对于这一问题,海德格尔与勒维纳斯给出了两种截然不同的回答:海德格尔把人规定为"此在",而勒维纳斯则把人规定为"我在此"。这两种对于人之为人的不同理解源自两种不同的视野:一是从人与存在的关系出发理解人之为人;一是从我与他人的关系出发理解人之为人。前者导致把人的本质理解为存在的澄清;后者导致把人的本质理解为他人的本质。这两种理解标志着西方思想在理解人之为人问题上的两种极端。

Stuck with the Sur-face： An Ethical Approach to Facial Disfigurement in Willa Cather＇s ＂The Profile＂

The human face consists of three dimensions： （1） the visible, static sur-face, （2） the mobile dimension, which communicates thoughts, emotions, and states of mind, and （3） the invisible dimension, the face aspars-pro-toto for the whole person who owns the face. In this latter sense, the human face is at the center of Emmanuel Levinas＇ theory of ethics： We encounter each other face-to-face, he argues, and it is the other＇s face that calls for my ethical response to the holiness of his/her wholeness and essence. The primary ethical imperative is： ＂Thou shalt not kill.＂ When we encounter a facially disfigured person, we usually fail to respond ethically because we concentrate on the disfigurement. The second dimension, as a result of the disfigurement, is often impaired and thus incapable of communicating in such a way that we can ＂read＂ the face. With our gaze fixed on the disfigured part of the face, we lose sight of the person as a whole. Metaphorically speaking, we could even say that we ＂kill＂ the person. Levinas conceives of the other＇s face not in its plastic manifestation. But the encounter with the other does at first take place as embodiment. According to Merleau-Ponty, this encounter is by definition interactive and dialogical. In Willa Cather＇s short story ＂The Profile,＂ young beautiful Virginia marries a portrait painter after he has finished her portrait in profile. The left side of her face is severely disfigured because of a burn. Her husband is waiting impatiently for her to talk about ＂it＂ and the suffering it must cause her in order to ＂heal＂ her with his love, but she behaves as if it did not exist and even likes to dress extravagantly. In the following analysis of the short story, it will be illustrated how the husband fails to respond to his wife＇s face＇s invitation to interact with it and get in touch with the wholeness of her person that it stands for. Instead, he reduces her to the disfigurement. When he finally names the scar, he metaphorically ＂kills＂ her, as well as their marriage.

The Face/Facelessness of the Other-A Levinasian Reading of the Ethical of the Zhuangzi

Emmanuel Levinas＇ ethical phenomenology offers a new understanding of what constitutes the core issue of ethics. For Levinas, the word ＂ethics＂ i,eeomes a question about the ＂wholly Other,＂ the entity that challenges the self-qua-being, thus diverging from the traditional ontological framework of Being in the West, that is, sameness or totality. At first glance, Zhuangzi seems to have little in common with Levinas： The former irreverently mocks all moral principles and ethical norms whereas the latter takes ethics as first philosophy; the former speaks of the faceless as the model of Daoist authenticity whereas the latter speaks of the face as the symbol of moral obligation. Nevertheless, there are plenty of chapters in the Zhuangzi which illustrate how a self-being experiences a profound transfiguration through its encounter with the Other, a constellation which resonates with Levinas＇ theme. In this paper, the issue ofrelationality in the Zhuangzi will be analyzed in light of Levinas＇ espousal of alterity, with the purpose of explicating the Daoist appropriation of what I will call ＂the philosophy of difference.＂ I will submit the argument that the Zhuangzian notion of freedom and the Daoist conception of a well-lived life are both based upon this philosophy of difference. I will also argue that Daoist ethics, particularly the version expressed by the Zhuangzi, is best understood as a form of＂negative ethics.＂

The De of Levinas： Cultivating the Heart-Mind of Radical Passivity

This essay explores the early Chinese text Guanzi to address the question of ethical responsibility in the work of Emmanuel Levinas. We begin with the premise that being responsive to the other, feeling the impossibility of renouncing ethical obligation, and experiencing the basic moral asymmetry at the heart of Levinas＇s project all rely on the welcome openness of the subject that Levinas describes as the subject＇s ＂radical passivity.＂ However, his emphasis on infinite responsibility, coupled with the theme of radical passivity, gives the problematic impression that ethics amounts to a never-ending to-do list for the other, and certainly this is not what Levinas means. We turn to the Guanzi, which recommends that the ethically efficacious sage-prince must cultivate a state of passive stillness and inner vacuity. Only because the sage-prince maintains this deferential heart-mind is he freely open and responsive to others. Here the sage-prince looks strikingly like a good Levinasian： He is deferential, sensitive to context, and hyper-aware of the limits of his own knowledge. The Guanzi goes on to describe specific practices the sage-prince can employ to cultivate his ethical prowess, including practices of meditation and gentle physical exercises. Taking this insight into Levinas＇s context, we suggest that such practices of self-regulation are necessary to enable effective responsiveness to the other. From this perspective, responsibility is ＂infinite＂ not because I am perpetually beholden to the other＇s whims, but because I am perpetually accountable for calming and clearing my own mind of the unstable emotions, selfish desires, and intellectual machinations that prevent the welcome openness of radical passivity.

17anmingand the Other： Rethinking the Source of Responsibility in the ZhongYongand Emmanuel Levinas

＂Everyone will readily agree that it is of the highest importance to know whether we are not duped by morality,＂ says Emmanuel Levinas in the preface to Totality and Infinity. Why is ethical inquiry a meaningful and necessary task？ This is a universal question with which all contemplation of ethics should grapple. This paper aims to show that both the Other in Levinas and the ＂Heavenly-command （tianming 天命）＂ in the Zhong Yong 中庸 indicate that human beings are called to be passively ethical. The passivity of ethical responsibility is, however, not caused by a divine moral power, but can be seen in three characteristics that mark ethics： 1） the exposure to the other, 2） the time of diachrony and 3） the aporetic moment of ethical response. Ethical responsibility is commanded before one＇s initiative to be ethical and is therefore prior to moral subjectivity. Moreover, a moral life is accomplished only in sincerely responding to this command of ethical responsibility. This opens up a kind of activity called ＂sincerity （cheng 誠）.＂ The source of responsibility therefore lies in a passive ethical situation that calls upon an active ethical response. This ethical responsibility is the foundation of all ethical inquiry.

布朗肖的“间隔诗学”

这一间距使作品远离一切作者,也不再考虑为它所付出的一切心血,从而成就了作品之所是。……这一作品与自身、与读者、与世界建构、与其他作品之间的间距,恰恰造成了阅读的天真,同时也决定了责任与危险。看起来,保持这样的间距非常困难。有人对虚空深感厌恶和恐惧,于是一定要用价值判断来填充这个间距。

Humanity and Paternal Eros: The Father-Son Relationship in Comparative Perspective

This paper examines the human relational patterns presented in the philosophical writings of the Confucian thinker Dai Zhen (戴震1724-77) and the Jewish philosopher Emmanuel Levinas’s (1906-95) Totality and Infinity to uncover the ethical significance of the father-son relationship. I argue that for both thinkers the father-son relation is not just one type of human relationship among other social dyads, but rather, of greater significance, serves as the paradigmatic model of the ethical human relationship in bringing to light the idea of the ethical self as a responsible being in relation to others.

对总体的反抗与超越的经验主义——论罗森茨威格对列维纳斯的贡献

导言罗森茨威格(Franz Rosenzweig)与列维纳斯(Emmanuel Levinas)是现代犹太神哲学的两个重要人物。列维纳斯在哲学与神学许多思想主题上深受罗森茨威格的影响,最为突出的一点是"反抗总体"(opposition to the idea of totality)。列维纳斯多次在其著作和访谈中明确罗森茨威格在这个主题上给予的贡献,①并在三篇文章中专门介绍和解读罗森茨威格,反复强调罗森茨威格在反抗总体上对自己的影响。