Since the Modbus RTU wired communication protocol of Siemens variable frequency motors is unstable and lacks a protection mechanism, there is a risk of user information leakage. Aiming at the problems of insufficient ...Since the Modbus RTU wired communication protocol of Siemens variable frequency motors is unstable and lacks a protection mechanism, there is a risk of user information leakage. Aiming at the problems of insufficient flexibility of traditional defense methods and poor defense effects, The present work proposed a new dual detection method based on MODBUS RTU, which combines the dual monitoring mechanism of “Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) request detection” and “ARP response detection”. In order to improve detection efficiency, two real-time updated linear tables are introduced, which can effectively deal with the three ARP spoofing methods of updating the ARP buffer. Based on the analysis of the hidden dangers of the Modbus RTU wired communication protocol, a wired connection between the S7-1200 PLC and the variable frequency motor was established, and a real experimental platform was constructed to demonstrate the attack. The intensity of ARP attacks has gradually increased over time. Through comparative experiments with traditional defense methods, it is proved that the algorithm enhances the protocol mechanism in principle, and is more flexible and reliable than traditional methods.展开更多
This paper aims at analyzing the security issues that lie in the application layer (AL) protocols when users connect to the Internet via a wireless local area network (WLAN) through an access point. When adversaries l...This paper aims at analyzing the security issues that lie in the application layer (AL) protocols when users connect to the Internet via a wireless local area network (WLAN) through an access point. When adversaries launch deauthentication flood attacks cutting users' connection, the connection managers will automatically research the last access point's extended service set identifier (ESSID) and then re-establish connection. However, such re-connection can lead the users to a fake access point with the same ESSID set by attackers. As the attackers hide behind users' access points, they can pass AL's authentication and security schemes, e.g. secure socket layer (SSL). We have proved that they can even spy on users' account details, passwords, data and privacy.展开更多
文摘Since the Modbus RTU wired communication protocol of Siemens variable frequency motors is unstable and lacks a protection mechanism, there is a risk of user information leakage. Aiming at the problems of insufficient flexibility of traditional defense methods and poor defense effects, The present work proposed a new dual detection method based on MODBUS RTU, which combines the dual monitoring mechanism of “Address Resolution Protocol (ARP) request detection” and “ARP response detection”. In order to improve detection efficiency, two real-time updated linear tables are introduced, which can effectively deal with the three ARP spoofing methods of updating the ARP buffer. Based on the analysis of the hidden dangers of the Modbus RTU wired communication protocol, a wired connection between the S7-1200 PLC and the variable frequency motor was established, and a real experimental platform was constructed to demonstrate the attack. The intensity of ARP attacks has gradually increased over time. Through comparative experiments with traditional defense methods, it is proved that the algorithm enhances the protocol mechanism in principle, and is more flexible and reliable than traditional methods.
基金the National Science Council (No. NSC-99-2219-E-033-001)the Foundation of the Chung Yuan Christian University (1004) (No. CYCU-EECS.9801)
文摘This paper aims at analyzing the security issues that lie in the application layer (AL) protocols when users connect to the Internet via a wireless local area network (WLAN) through an access point. When adversaries launch deauthentication flood attacks cutting users' connection, the connection managers will automatically research the last access point's extended service set identifier (ESSID) and then re-establish connection. However, such re-connection can lead the users to a fake access point with the same ESSID set by attackers. As the attackers hide behind users' access points, they can pass AL's authentication and security schemes, e.g. secure socket layer (SSL). We have proved that they can even spy on users' account details, passwords, data and privacy.
