The randomness and uncertainty of renewable energy generation are expected to significantly change the optimal decision-making of trans-provincial electricity market subjects.Therefore,it is beneficial to optimize the...The randomness and uncertainty of renewable energy generation are expected to significantly change the optimal decision-making of trans-provincial electricity market subjects.Therefore,it is beneficial to optimize the interests of each of these subjects,considering the unpredictable risks of renewable energy under the renewable portfolio standards(RPS)and researching their effects on the optimal decision-making of transprovincial electricity market multi-subjects.First,we develop a trans-provincial trading market mechanism for renewable energy and clarify the electricity supply and demand relation and the green certificates supply and demand relation of trans-provincial electricitymarketmulti-subjects.Then,under the RPS,we construct a multi-subject game model of the power supply chain that recognizes the risks,and adopt the reverse induction method to discuss the optimum risk-taking judgment of each subject in the trans-provincial electricity market.Finally,we useMATLAB to verify the viability and efficacy of the proposed gamemodel,and obtain a certain reference value for the optimal decision-making of trans-provincial electricity market subjects.In summary,we consider the uncertainty risks of renewable energy under RPS,study the effects of the green certificate price and risk aversion coefficient in the RPS mechanism on the optimal decisionmaking of trans-provincial electricity market subjects,and obtain the changing trends of two different power products and those of different electricity market subjects under the influence of the green certificate price and risk aversion coefficient,which have a certain reference value for studying the factors affecting the optimal decision-making of trans-provincial electricity market subjects.展开更多
The paper firstly analyzes selection factors for market subjects of agricultural industrial development in China. From the political aspect, it is required to take account of features of subjects of agricultural indus...The paper firstly analyzes selection factors for market subjects of agricultural industrial development in China. From the political aspect, it is required to take account of features of subjects of agricultural industrial development at current stage. From economic aspects, we should adheres to the two-tier management system that integrates unified with separate management on the basis of household contract management in the countryside, and cultivate and foster subject enterprises according to features of most important market subjects in market economy. From natural aspects, it is proposed to consider features of agricultural industry and inherent advantages of agricultural resources in China. From social aspects, it is essential to draw on successful experience of developed countries in developing market subjects of agricultural industry.展开更多
Consumers and developers are the market transaction subjects which drive the development of building energy efficiency market. High energy prices, unreasonable heating system, information asymmetry of building energy ...Consumers and developers are the market transaction subjects which drive the development of building energy efficiency market. High energy prices, unreasonable heating system, information asymmetry of building energy suppress demand of energy efficiency construction; high technical risk and construction cost, nonstandard market restrict the supply of energy efficiency construction. To promote the development of building energy efficiency, we must set up effective incentive policies for both sides of the market transaction, improve the supervisory system, promote the technological progress, build the information sharing platform, so as to achieve the purpose of cultivating and improving the building energy efficiency market system, regulating the behavior of supply and demand subject, building the mutually beneficial and cooperative partnership, and realizing the balance of interests.展开更多
In order to analyze the deep-routed reason for the failure of the real estate market regulation policy, this paper established an incomplete information tri-game model in which central government, local government and...In order to analyze the deep-routed reason for the failure of the real estate market regulation policy, this paper established an incomplete information tri-game model in which central government, local government and the real estate developer were chosen as three main research objects. Based on the analysis of their interest appeals under the assumption of rational economic man, we found that it was the difference of interest appeals of central and local governments as well as the real estate developers that caused the game among the three participants. This, however, led to the failure of the macro-control at last. Strengthening the supervision of central government and reducing its cost at the same time, what’s more, improving the efficiency of the supervision and increasing the punishment of the rent-seeking behavior between local government and the real estate developers will contribute to improve the implementation status of the regulation and control policy. We suggest the authorities improve the government political achievement appraisal system and reform the current system of benefits distribution;moreover, reform the existing regulatory system and strength the regulatory role of media and the third-party so as to promote the healthy development of the real estate market.展开更多
基金This work was supported by Project of Philosophy and Social Science Foundation of Shanghai,China(Grant No.2020BGL011).
文摘The randomness and uncertainty of renewable energy generation are expected to significantly change the optimal decision-making of trans-provincial electricity market subjects.Therefore,it is beneficial to optimize the interests of each of these subjects,considering the unpredictable risks of renewable energy under the renewable portfolio standards(RPS)and researching their effects on the optimal decision-making of transprovincial electricity market multi-subjects.First,we develop a trans-provincial trading market mechanism for renewable energy and clarify the electricity supply and demand relation and the green certificates supply and demand relation of trans-provincial electricitymarketmulti-subjects.Then,under the RPS,we construct a multi-subject game model of the power supply chain that recognizes the risks,and adopt the reverse induction method to discuss the optimum risk-taking judgment of each subject in the trans-provincial electricity market.Finally,we useMATLAB to verify the viability and efficacy of the proposed gamemodel,and obtain a certain reference value for the optimal decision-making of trans-provincial electricity market subjects.In summary,we consider the uncertainty risks of renewable energy under RPS,study the effects of the green certificate price and risk aversion coefficient in the RPS mechanism on the optimal decisionmaking of trans-provincial electricity market subjects,and obtain the changing trends of two different power products and those of different electricity market subjects under the influence of the green certificate price and risk aversion coefficient,which have a certain reference value for studying the factors affecting the optimal decision-making of trans-provincial electricity market subjects.
基金Supported by Research on Development Strategy,Thought,Model,Approach and Policy of Modern Circular Agriculture in Jiangsu Province(2010ZDAXM016)Philosophical and Social Science Research Project in Colleges and Universities of Jiangsu Province (2011SJD630029)
文摘The paper firstly analyzes selection factors for market subjects of agricultural industrial development in China. From the political aspect, it is required to take account of features of subjects of agricultural industrial development at current stage. From economic aspects, we should adheres to the two-tier management system that integrates unified with separate management on the basis of household contract management in the countryside, and cultivate and foster subject enterprises according to features of most important market subjects in market economy. From natural aspects, it is proposed to consider features of agricultural industry and inherent advantages of agricultural resources in China. From social aspects, it is essential to draw on successful experience of developed countries in developing market subjects of agricultural industry.
基金supported by Nature Science Foundation of China (Grant No. 71171141)Soft Science Research Project of MOE (Grant No. 2013-R1-14)Social Science Planning Project in Tianjin City (Grant No. TJGLHQ1403)
文摘Consumers and developers are the market transaction subjects which drive the development of building energy efficiency market. High energy prices, unreasonable heating system, information asymmetry of building energy suppress demand of energy efficiency construction; high technical risk and construction cost, nonstandard market restrict the supply of energy efficiency construction. To promote the development of building energy efficiency, we must set up effective incentive policies for both sides of the market transaction, improve the supervisory system, promote the technological progress, build the information sharing platform, so as to achieve the purpose of cultivating and improving the building energy efficiency market system, regulating the behavior of supply and demand subject, building the mutually beneficial and cooperative partnership, and realizing the balance of interests.
文摘In order to analyze the deep-routed reason for the failure of the real estate market regulation policy, this paper established an incomplete information tri-game model in which central government, local government and the real estate developer were chosen as three main research objects. Based on the analysis of their interest appeals under the assumption of rational economic man, we found that it was the difference of interest appeals of central and local governments as well as the real estate developers that caused the game among the three participants. This, however, led to the failure of the macro-control at last. Strengthening the supervision of central government and reducing its cost at the same time, what’s more, improving the efficiency of the supervision and increasing the punishment of the rent-seeking behavior between local government and the real estate developers will contribute to improve the implementation status of the regulation and control policy. We suggest the authorities improve the government political achievement appraisal system and reform the current system of benefits distribution;moreover, reform the existing regulatory system and strength the regulatory role of media and the third-party so as to promote the healthy development of the real estate market.
