Marriage Market with Indifferences: A Linear Programming Approach

We study stable and strongly stable matchings in the marriage market with indifference in their preferences.We characterize the stable matchings as integer extreme points of a convex polytope.We give an alternative proof for the integrity of the strongly stable matching polytope.Also,we compute men-optimal(women-optimal)stable and strongly stable matchings using linear programming.When preferences are strict,we find the men-optimal(women-optimal)stable matching.

Changes in union formation patterns in a context of male marriage-squeeze:an exploratory survey in rural Shaanxi,China

Starting from the postulate that formation of heterosexual unions is necessarily affected by a numerical imbalance between the sexes in the marriage market,this paper uses data from a survey conducted in 2014-2015 in three rural counties of Shaanxi,China,to analyse the mechanisms to cope with this rather particular socio-demographic situation and with the poverty that is endemic in the survey area,in order to achieve marriage by any means.This empirical study based on individual quantitative data analyses the consequences of the male marriage-squeeze from the point of view of married men.The difficulty of getting married is identified and taken into account to analyse three specific adaptation mechanisms:demographic adaptations,changes in social norms regarding mate selection criteria,and economic adaptations.Findings demonstrate that marriage timing and age gap between spouses are levers that enable men to enlarge their pool of potential mates.But monetization of marriage is one of the most immediate consequences of the competition between the men seeking to marry.In sum,the men who reported difficulties getting married did so later than the other men,have greater age-gap with their spouse,and are in a disadvantaged position when negotiating the terms of their marriage.We conclude that the male marriage-squeeze has to be understood not only in relation to how marriage is constructed as a family and social institution,but also as a catalyst for other inequalities,especially in terms of social and economic capital.

The Competitive Saving Motive： Concept, Evidence, and Implications

This short essay surveys recent literature on the competitive saving motive and its broader economic implications. The competitive saving motive is defined as saving to improve one＇s status relative to other competitors for dating and marriage partners. Here are some of the key results of the recent literature： （i） cross-country evidence show that greater gender imbalances tend to correspond with higher savings rates; （ii） household-level evidence suggest that： （a） families with unmarried sons in rural regions with more skewed sex ratios tend to have higher savings rates, while savings rates of families with unmarried daughters appear uncorrelated with gender imbalances; and （b） savings rates of families in cities tend to rise with the local sex ratio; （iii） rising sex ratios contribute nearly half of the rise in housing prices in the People＇s Republic of China; and （iv） families with sons in regions of greater sex ratios are more likely to become entrepreneurs and take risky jobs to earn more income.