This paper considers the two-part tariff licensing by an innovating firm to its potential competitor in a differentiated mixed duopoly, in which one firm sets a quantity and the other firm charges a price. Based on th...This paper considers the two-part tariff licensing by an innovating firm to its potential competitor in a differentiated mixed duopoly, in which one firm sets a quantity and the other firm charges a price. Based on the development cost incurred by the rival, we derive the optimal behavior of the firms under full information case and partial information case respectively. Information difference on the equilibrium strategies is also investigated.展开更多
Retail price and promotional effort are two important parameters on which demand of a commodity largely depends. This paper develops and analyzes a two-echelon supply chain where market demand depends on both retail p...Retail price and promotional effort are two important parameters on which demand of a commodity largely depends. This paper develops and analyzes a two-echelon supply chain where market demand depends on both retail price and sales effort. The centralized model is studied as the benchmark case, and the wholesale price-only contract is studied as the base case in which each entity tries to maximize its individual profit. Different contract mechanisms are implemented to outperform the base case in terms of both total chain＇s as well as individual profits. Comparisons among the coordinating contracts are provided so that any entity may choose the better one from available contracts after the contract parameters are negotiated. The model is extensively examined through a numerical example.展开更多
基金Supported by Students’Innovation and Entrepreneurship Training Program of Liaoning Province(201710165000243)Liaoning Normal University(cx20170342)
文摘This paper considers the two-part tariff licensing by an innovating firm to its potential competitor in a differentiated mixed duopoly, in which one firm sets a quantity and the other firm charges a price. Based on the development cost incurred by the rival, we derive the optimal behavior of the firms under full information case and partial information case respectively. Information difference on the equilibrium strategies is also investigated.
基金Research of the second author is funded by the University Grants Commission(UGC),India
文摘Retail price and promotional effort are two important parameters on which demand of a commodity largely depends. This paper develops and analyzes a two-echelon supply chain where market demand depends on both retail price and sales effort. The centralized model is studied as the benchmark case, and the wholesale price-only contract is studied as the base case in which each entity tries to maximize its individual profit. Different contract mechanisms are implemented to outperform the base case in terms of both total chain＇s as well as individual profits. Comparisons among the coordinating contracts are provided so that any entity may choose the better one from available contracts after the contract parameters are negotiated. The model is extensively examined through a numerical example.
