Game Analysis of Regulation for Online Prescription Drugs under Customer Feedback Mechanism

Objective To study the way to better regulate the online sales of prescription drugs,and to provide reference for the adjustment of relevant policies since the online sales of prescription drugs has become an inevitable trend.Methods A game model was constructed for the strategy choice of pharmaceutical e-commerce platform,customers and government departments based on differential game theory and Nash equilibrium game model to analyze the pure strategy Nash equilibrium,Nash equilibrium dominant strategy of each subject and the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium under different conditions.Besides,Matlab was used to carry out simulation analysis.Results and Conclusion The study shows that:(1)Improving the credibility of the government and reducing the cost of government regulation can not only make the pharmaceutical e-commerce platform operate with high quality,but also give greater play to government functions;(2)The greater the influence of social evaluation on pharmaceutical e-commerce platforms,the lower the cost of high-quality operation of pharmaceutical e-commerce platform,and the greater the probability of customer choosing real evaluation strategy;(3)The greater the customers’perception of potential risk,the greater the compensation,and the lower the cost of reporting.Then,the greater the probability that government departments will choose strict regulation.Finally,the model solution and simulation analysis are combined to provide countermeasures and suggestions for the safety regulation of online sales of prescription drugs.

On Topics in Quantum Games

This work concentrates on simultaneous move non-cooperating quantum games. Part of it is evidently not new, but it is included for the sake self consistence, as it is devoted to introduction of the mathematical and physical grounds of the pertinent topics, and the way in which a simple classical game is modified to become a quantum game (a procedure referred to as a quantization of a classical game). The connection between game theory and information science is briefly stressed, and the role of quantum entanglement (that plays a central role in the theory of quantum games), is exposed. Armed with these tools, we investigate some basic concepts like the existence (or absence) of a pure strategy and mixed strategy Nash equilibrium and its relation with the degree of entanglement. The main results of this work are as follows: 1) Construction of a numerical algorithm based on the method of best response functions, designed to search for pure strategy Nash equilibrium in quantum games. The formalism is based on the discretization of a continuous variable into a mesh of points, and can be applied to quantum games that are built upon two-players two-strategies classical games, based on the method of best response functions. 2) Application of this algorithm to study the question of how the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium is related to the degree of entanglement (specified by a continuous parameter γ ). It is shown that when the classical game GC has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium that is not Pareto efficient, then the quantum game GQ with maximal entanglement (γ = π/2) has no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. By studying a non-symmetric prisoner dilemma game, it is found that there is a critical value 0γc such that for γγc there is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium and for γ≥γc there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium. The behavior of the two payoffs as function of γ starts at that of the classical ones at (D, D) and approaches the cooperative classical ones at (C, C) (C = confess, D = don’t confess). 3) We then study Bayesian quantum games and show that under certain conditions, there is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in such games even when entanglement is maximal. 4) We define the basic ingredients of a quantum game based on a two-player three strategies classical game. This requires the introduction of trits (instead of bits) and quantum trits (instead of quantum bits). It is proved that in this quantum game, there is no classical commensurability in the sense that the classical strategies are not obtained as a special case of the quantum strategies.

Autonomous Maneuver Decisions via Transfer Learning Pigeon-Inspired Optimization for UCAVs in Dogfight Engagements

This paper proposes an autonomous maneuver decision method using transfer learning pigeon-inspired optimization(TLPIO)for unmanned combat aerial vehicles(UCAVs)in dogfight engagements.Firstly,a nonlinear F-16 aircraft model and automatic control system are constructed by a MATLAB/Simulink platform.Secondly,a 3-degrees-of-freedom(3-DOF)aircraft model is used as a maneuvering command generator,and the expanded elemental maneuver library is designed,so that the aircraft state reachable set can be obtained.Then,the game matrix is composed with the air combat situation evaluation function calculated according to the angle and range threats.Finally,a key point is that the objective function to be optimized is designed using the game mixed strategy,and the optimal mixed strategy is obtained by TLPIO.Significantly,the proposed TLPIO does not initialize the population randomly,but adopts the transfer learning method based on Kullback-Leibler(KL)divergence to initialize the population,which improves the search accuracy of the optimization algorithm.Besides,the convergence and time complexity of TLPIO are discussed.Comparison analysis with other classical optimization algorithms highlights the advantage of TLPIO.In the simulation of air combat,three initial scenarios are set,namely,opposite,offensive and defensive conditions.The effectiveness performance of the proposed autonomous maneuver decision method is verified by simulation results.