This article aims to argue that interpreting liangzhi 良知 as innate, original, or cognitive knowledge is likely to fall into ＂interpretative obfuscation regarding knowledge.＂ First, for Wang, what is inherent in ma...This article aims to argue that interpreting liangzhi 良知 as innate, original, or cognitive knowledge is likely to fall into ＂interpretative obfuscation regarding knowledge.＂ First, for Wang, what is inherent in mankind is moral agency rather than innate or original knowledge. Therefore, the focus ofzhizhi 致知 and gewu 格物 is instead on moral practice and actualization of virtue rather than on either ＂the extension of knowledge＂ or ＂the investigation of things.＂ Apart from that, drawing support from cognitive knowledge to explicate liangzhi also leads to three related but distinct misconceptions： liangzhi as perfect knowledge, the identity of knowledge and action, and liangzhi as recognition or acknowledgement. By clarifying the above misinterpretations, the meaning and implication of liangzhi will, in turn, also become clearer.展开更多
This article examines the criticisms and debates about Cornell realism.While critics,like Shafer-Landau,Tropman,Oliveira and Perrine,reject the claim by Cornell realism that moral knowledge can be empirically investig...This article examines the criticisms and debates about Cornell realism.While critics,like Shafer-Landau,Tropman,Oliveira and Perrine,reject the claim by Cornell realism that moral knowledge can be empirically investigated the same as natural science is,I argue that some of their arguments are not sufficient to refute Cornell realism.What is crucial in assessing Cornell realism is distinguishing normative ethics from empirical science.While ethics is normative in nature,that of empirical science is descriptive and predictive.I also show that the debate between Tropman and Long is at cross purposes in their discussion about the nature of moral knowledge.By clarifying different meanings of moral knowledge,I argue that while arguments by Cornell realism can be applied to moral psychology,the study of normative ethics through empirical investigation still faces the problem of an is-ought gap.Indeed,many of Cornell realist arguments are begging many questions.I have also examined recent debates on normativity objection by Parfit and Copp.I argue that Copp’s naturalism is very similar to Huemer’s intuitionism.Copp’s argument of non-analytical naturalism seems to support rather than refute moral intuitionism.展开更多
文摘This article aims to argue that interpreting liangzhi 良知 as innate, original, or cognitive knowledge is likely to fall into ＂interpretative obfuscation regarding knowledge.＂ First, for Wang, what is inherent in mankind is moral agency rather than innate or original knowledge. Therefore, the focus ofzhizhi 致知 and gewu 格物 is instead on moral practice and actualization of virtue rather than on either ＂the extension of knowledge＂ or ＂the investigation of things.＂ Apart from that, drawing support from cognitive knowledge to explicate liangzhi also leads to three related but distinct misconceptions： liangzhi as perfect knowledge, the identity of knowledge and action, and liangzhi as recognition or acknowledgement. By clarifying the above misinterpretations, the meaning and implication of liangzhi will, in turn, also become clearer.
文摘This article examines the criticisms and debates about Cornell realism.While critics,like Shafer-Landau,Tropman,Oliveira and Perrine,reject the claim by Cornell realism that moral knowledge can be empirically investigated the same as natural science is,I argue that some of their arguments are not sufficient to refute Cornell realism.What is crucial in assessing Cornell realism is distinguishing normative ethics from empirical science.While ethics is normative in nature,that of empirical science is descriptive and predictive.I also show that the debate between Tropman and Long is at cross purposes in their discussion about the nature of moral knowledge.By clarifying different meanings of moral knowledge,I argue that while arguments by Cornell realism can be applied to moral psychology,the study of normative ethics through empirical investigation still faces the problem of an is-ought gap.Indeed,many of Cornell realist arguments are begging many questions.I have also examined recent debates on normativity objection by Parfit and Copp.I argue that Copp’s naturalism is very similar to Huemer’s intuitionism.Copp’s argument of non-analytical naturalism seems to support rather than refute moral intuitionism.
