Determinism, Free Will, and Moral Responsibility

Human beings live amidst several bonds. These bonds often place both internal and external limitations that apparently create the view that a human being has no free will but is determined. This paper explores the controversial issue whether a human being possesses free will to make free choices or is determined. It is the stance of this study that if one does not have free will then one cannot be morally responsible for one＇s actions and consequently praise and blame would then have no value. The paper, therefore, is of the view that notwithstanding the many bonds within which they live, humans, with their special dignity, have free will that operate within the respective constraints set by the bonds of human life. Furthermore, since morality involves good and bad, the paper asserts that for an act to be designated as morally good or bad, it implies that the agent was free to perform the said act or do otherwise to merit praise or blame respectively. Thus, for human freedom to be significant, it must be responsible.

Extended Moral Responsibility for Kantian Agents

When two Kantian agents engage in inter-dependent transactions with one another, each agent has the responsibility to assure the morality of the other＇s maxim of action and means to implement the maxim. This proposition is proven to be a logical consequence of Kant＇s moral system and stated formally as the K-Completeness theorem. Transactions that satisfy the theorem are called ＂K-Complete.＂ The theorem is generalized to cover transactions with many agents. The paper then models multi-agent K-Complete transactions using mathematical graph theory and shows that such transactions are distinguished from Kant＇s kingdom of ends. Finally, the paper shows that the extended morality provides Kant＇s moral system with the resources to define an ethical community in such as the one in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason without the introduction of God and a church.

Situationism and Moral Responsibility

In section 1, I will describe how moral responsibility requires normative competence. In section 2, I will introduce an influential social psychology experiment and consider one of its philosophical interpretations, situationism. In section 3, I will discuss the possession response in defense of normative competence. This is an approach to save normative competence via possession, and in turn the concept of the morally responsible agent, by relinquishing the need for exercising normative competence. After discussing its pros and cons, section 4 will focus on the exercise response, which emphasizes each singular exercise of normative competence. Given these two responses, I will argue that we are faced with a dilemma. If we admit that the concept of the morally responsible agent is grounded in the mere possession of normative competence, then the concept becomes useless in a practical sense, forcing us to embrace a concept that is tied to the exercise of normative competence. If we admit that the morally responsible agent is grounded in only the exercise of normative competence, the concept of the morally responsible agent no longer aligns with common sense.

The Concept of Non-violence in the Philosophy of the Imperial Stoa

In the moral philosophy of the late Stoa, there is a significant turn to the recognition of non-violence values. Starting from the point where the philosophers of the Ancient and the Middle Stoa acknowledge man＇s relation with the Cosmos and with each human being separately, the Stoics of Rome （namely, Seneca, Marcus Aurelius, Epictetus, but even Cicero who fosters many of the earlier Stoic ethical views） enrich the content of this theorization by offering an expansion of the concept of the Greek philanthropy. Through the practical means of individual correction, which leads to the therapy of passions, the stoic sage returns to society in order to emancipate the human being and to ensure that man will recover his ontological dignity. This effort is grounded on benevolent and mild action, which aims to correct rather than to discipline in a punitive way. It is their contribution to philosophy that the author aims to discuss in connection with the recording of their thought on issues directly related with a non-violent and eudaimonistic way of life in the context of social peace.

Philosophy and Science Dialogue： Free Will

In this dialogue Derk Pereboom and Marcel Brass discuss the free will problem from the perspective of philosophy and cognitive neuroscience. First, they give their opinion on how the two disciplines contribute to the free will problem. While Pereboom is optimistic regarding the contribution of science, Brass is more pessimistic and questions the usefulness of an empirical approach to the question whether free will exists or not. Then they outline their position on the free will problem. The idea of a transcendental agent is discussed in more detail. Furthermore, it is discussed whether free will scepticism is a politically, socially, psychologically viable position. Pereboom argues that promoting the idea of free will scepticism can have a positive impact on retributive emotions and the political practice regarding retributive punishment. Brass argues that retributive emotions are deeply rooted in evolution and therefore difficult to change via high-level beliefs about free will. Finally, the future of the free will debate is discussed. Both agree that the dialogue between philosophy and psychology should be intensified. Philosophy can benefit from taking empirical research more seriously. Psychology and neuroscience can benefit from philosophy by appreciating the sophistication and conceptual clarity of the philosophical debate. Both have to find a common language and define common problems that can be tackled from both perspectives.

A Theoretical Framework for Demystifying the Causes of Dysfunction and Disorder in the Chinese Market Economy:A Weberian Perspective Huangnan

This paper explores a theoretical framework for demystifying the causes of the dysfunction and disorder of the present Chinese market economy.It is posited that Max Weber’s classification of the two potentially conflicting ethics he associates with the behaviour of politicians,the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility offers the basis for a more thorough and accurate account of the dysfunction and disorder within China’s current markets and political economy.Indeed,this paper contends that cultural determinism and neo-institutional economics fail to capture the contextual factors influencing the transition from the Maoist era of state control to contemporary China’s market led economy(following the opening-up of the country since 1978)than a wider reaching Weberian analysis of the contextual factors involved might achieve.This paper proposes that the distinct ethical foundation for the Chinese market economy is based upon the ethic of conviction,which is the continuity of the philosophical underpinnings of the national ideology during the Maoist era.In turn,this has led to the distortion of the incentives for firms in China to provide high-quality goods and services.This paper also conducts a study of the ethical foundations of the present Chinese economy from the comparative perspectives of Smith’s concept of the market economy and from a Confucian perspective.Through this comparative examination,it will be demonstrated that the ethical feature of the modern market economy,stemming from Smith and Confucianism,is based on the ethic of responsibility,which is a mutually opposed concept to the ethic of conviction;therefore,firms whose business ethics are founded upon the ethic of“responsibility”are less prone to deceive consumers as they adhere to a contractual“responsibility”towards the consumer that many Chinese firms still see as of secondary importance as the ethic of“conviction”still dominating the policies,society and culture of the centralist economic post-Maoist state.This paper further reveals that larger firms tend to have more corporate social responsibility due to their established branding effect,thus reflecting a more pervasive sense of the ethic of responsibility and vice versa for firms of a smaller size.This paper concludes with an economic model acting as a quantitative framework which further supports the theories proposed.