This paper critically reviews a comprehensive and detailed philosophical account of the plausibility and practicability of artificial intelligence （AI）, an emerging field of study which has brought forth a host of t...This paper critically reviews a comprehensive and detailed philosophical account of the plausibility and practicability of artificial intelligence （AI）, an emerging field of study which has brought forth a host of technical, methodological, epistemological and ethical issues across various disciplines. Contrary to the prevailing belief, Wittgenstein＇s legacies are found to have contributed considerably to the philosophical underpinnings for modern Al theory and research. In a thorough scrutiny of the issue, the author extensively examines major philosophical insights engendered by the nexus of interests in the burgeoning AI enterprise, and makes predictions on how close we could ever get to creating human intelligence and its profound practical implications for human existence. Future dimensions of AI research in relation to philosophy and language are further explored with special reference to their potential relevance to natural language processing in Chinese.展开更多
One of the most intriguing problems of philosophy is the question whether the human mind and human consciousness can be completely reduced to matter, namely to the brain. A special problem in this context is what has ...One of the most intriguing problems of philosophy is the question whether the human mind and human consciousness can be completely reduced to matter, namely to the brain. A special problem in this context is what has been called the ＂hard problem.＂ The hard problem denies that it is possible to reduce phenomenal experiences to brain states. The hard problem claims that it is impossible for materialists to explain what it is like to feel something. Here, we will prove that the hard problem is a pseudo problem that is based on errors in logic and language. One of the key arguments for the hard problem, the conceivability of zombies, is logically wrong within naturalism, which most philosophers acknowledge. Nevertheless, generally all questions of the type ＂What is it like to feel something？＂ are either trivial or linguistically impermissible. The core of the ＂hard problem＂ is the mix-up between non-reducibility and non-describability.展开更多
文摘This paper critically reviews a comprehensive and detailed philosophical account of the plausibility and practicability of artificial intelligence （AI）, an emerging field of study which has brought forth a host of technical, methodological, epistemological and ethical issues across various disciplines. Contrary to the prevailing belief, Wittgenstein＇s legacies are found to have contributed considerably to the philosophical underpinnings for modern Al theory and research. In a thorough scrutiny of the issue, the author extensively examines major philosophical insights engendered by the nexus of interests in the burgeoning AI enterprise, and makes predictions on how close we could ever get to creating human intelligence and its profound practical implications for human existence. Future dimensions of AI research in relation to philosophy and language are further explored with special reference to their potential relevance to natural language processing in Chinese.
文摘One of the most intriguing problems of philosophy is the question whether the human mind and human consciousness can be completely reduced to matter, namely to the brain. A special problem in this context is what has been called the ＂hard problem.＂ The hard problem denies that it is possible to reduce phenomenal experiences to brain states. The hard problem claims that it is impossible for materialists to explain what it is like to feel something. Here, we will prove that the hard problem is a pseudo problem that is based on errors in logic and language. One of the key arguments for the hard problem, the conceivability of zombies, is logically wrong within naturalism, which most philosophers acknowledge. Nevertheless, generally all questions of the type ＂What is it like to feel something？＂ are either trivial or linguistically impermissible. The core of the ＂hard problem＂ is the mix-up between non-reducibility and non-describability.
