Ownership type,legal system evolution and their interaction significantly affect the incentives and behaviors of independent directors.We use the 2019 Securities Law revision as an exogenous shock to examine how state...Ownership type,legal system evolution and their interaction significantly affect the incentives and behaviors of independent directors.We use the 2019 Securities Law revision as an exogenous shock to examine how state-owned enterprises(SOEs)versus non-SOEs and their independent directors respond to variations in regulatory compliance risk.Following the revision,SOEs are more likely to purchase directors’and officers’liability insurance to provide job security for independent directors.Non-SOEs are more likely to compensate for independent directors’fulfillment risk by increasing salaries and their independent directors are more likely to resign to avoid litigation risk.The coping strategies for SOEs,non-SOEs and independent directors are dynamic under different compliance risk stages and are affected by firm-level and director-level characteristics.展开更多
This paper explores the labour market segmentation by ownership type and its impact on the gender wage gap in urban China.Using the latest data of the China Household Income Project(CHIP)survey conducted in 2014(CHIP2...This paper explores the labour market segmentation by ownership type and its impact on the gender wage gap in urban China.Using the latest data of the China Household Income Project(CHIP)survey conducted in 2014(CHIP2013)and based on the Brown et al.model,I employ the decomposition analysis in this study.It is found that although both inter-sector differentials and intra-sector differentials affect the gender wage gap,the effect of intra-sector differentials is greater.In addition,in considering the effect of intra-sector differentials,the influence of unexplained differentials is greater than that of explained differentials.The results indicate that when other factors are held constantly,discrimination against female workers in a given sector is more serious,which is the main factor that causes the gender wage gap in urban China.展开更多
This paper presents a measurement of the technical efficiency of textile industries with 4-digit codes in China by using the cross-section data from 2002 and 2007 and a fully nonparametric stochastic frontier estimati...This paper presents a measurement of the technical efficiency of textile industries with 4-digit codes in China by using the cross-section data from 2002 and 2007 and a fully nonparametric stochastic frontier estimation approach. The technical efficiency of these textile industries is compared across six economic ownership types and across seven regions in China. This uncovers the effects of the proprietary characteristics and the location of a firm on its technical efficiency performance. The nonparametric estimation provides some interesting findings. First, textile production in China performs with a decreasing return to scale. The difference between the output elasticity of labor and that of capital decreases from the year 2002 to 2007. Second, the technical efficiency of the 4-digit textile industry in China is significantly contingent on its ownership and location. Privately-run textile enterprises on average perform with the highest level of technical efficiency among the six ownership types while state-owned enterprises perform with the lowest level of technical efficiency, whether or not the location dummies are accounted for. Third, the technical efficiency evaluated by regions follows the order: "eastern area 〉 southern area 〉 central area 〉 northern area," which remains unchanged across the two years.展开更多
We explore the relation between government integrity and firms' investment efficiency in the context of China's deepening reforms and its strengthening the social credit system. We find that government integri...We explore the relation between government integrity and firms' investment efficiency in the context of China's deepening reforms and its strengthening the social credit system. We find that government integrity is positively associated with the investment efficiency of listed companies in China. Government integrity is negatively related to corporate underinvestment, but insignificantly related to corporate overinvestment. Higher government integrity reduces underinvestment in non-state-owned firms, but this relation is not significant in state-owned firms. Furthermore, we find that the negative relation between government integrity and underinvestment is only significant for firms in industries that receive supportive government policies. This study enriches research on corporate investment by adopting the perspective of government integrity, and supplements the literature on government integrity and its economic consequences. Our study also provides micro-level empirical evidence that strengthening government integrity will promote the economic transformation of China.展开更多
This paper explores how the influences corporate donations, based on political identity of top managers upper echelons theory (UET). The results show that the political identity of the top manager has a significant ...This paper explores how the influences corporate donations, based on political identity of top managers upper echelons theory (UET). The results show that the political identity of the top manager has a significant impact on the donation behavior of a company, especially in areas with poor institutional environments. Corporate donations depend not only on whether the top manager has a political identity but also the type of this identity. Furthermore, the impact differs significantly between companies with different ownership structures. This study enriches our knowledge of corporate philanthropy by demonstrating that corporate donation practices are shaped by a range of contextual factors. Corporate giving behaviors in emerging economies such as China are differently motivated according to the fundamentally different aspects of their institutional settings.展开更多
基金support of the Guangdong Basic and Applied Basic Research Foundation(Grant No.2023A1515010802)the Guangdong Province Universities and Colleges Pearl River Scholar Funded Scheme 2019 and the National Natural Science Foundation of China(NSFC Grant No.72132010)。
文摘Ownership type,legal system evolution and their interaction significantly affect the incentives and behaviors of independent directors.We use the 2019 Securities Law revision as an exogenous shock to examine how state-owned enterprises(SOEs)versus non-SOEs and their independent directors respond to variations in regulatory compliance risk.Following the revision,SOEs are more likely to purchase directors’and officers’liability insurance to provide job security for independent directors.Non-SOEs are more likely to compensate for independent directors’fulfillment risk by increasing salaries and their independent directors are more likely to resign to avoid litigation risk.The coping strategies for SOEs,non-SOEs and independent directors are dynamic under different compliance risk stages and are affected by firm-level and director-level characteristics.
基金This research is supported by Japan Society for the Promotion of Science(JSPS)KAKENHI(Grand Number JP16K03611)the project fund of Joint Usage and Research Center,Institute of Economic Research,Hitotsubashi University。
文摘This paper explores the labour market segmentation by ownership type and its impact on the gender wage gap in urban China.Using the latest data of the China Household Income Project(CHIP)survey conducted in 2014(CHIP2013)and based on the Brown et al.model,I employ the decomposition analysis in this study.It is found that although both inter-sector differentials and intra-sector differentials affect the gender wage gap,the effect of intra-sector differentials is greater.In addition,in considering the effect of intra-sector differentials,the influence of unexplained differentials is greater than that of explained differentials.The results indicate that when other factors are held constantly,discrimination against female workers in a given sector is more serious,which is the main factor that causes the gender wage gap in urban China.
文摘This paper presents a measurement of the technical efficiency of textile industries with 4-digit codes in China by using the cross-section data from 2002 and 2007 and a fully nonparametric stochastic frontier estimation approach. The technical efficiency of these textile industries is compared across six economic ownership types and across seven regions in China. This uncovers the effects of the proprietary characteristics and the location of a firm on its technical efficiency performance. The nonparametric estimation provides some interesting findings. First, textile production in China performs with a decreasing return to scale. The difference between the output elasticity of labor and that of capital decreases from the year 2002 to 2007. Second, the technical efficiency of the 4-digit textile industry in China is significantly contingent on its ownership and location. Privately-run textile enterprises on average perform with the highest level of technical efficiency among the six ownership types while state-owned enterprises perform with the lowest level of technical efficiency, whether or not the location dummies are accounted for. Third, the technical efficiency evaluated by regions follows the order: "eastern area 〉 southern area 〉 central area 〉 northern area," which remains unchanged across the two years.
基金financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China (No.71272198,No.71332004,No.71472047,No.71572038)the Young Scholar Research Project of the Ministry of Education(13YJC630080)+3 种基金the Project of the Priority Academic Program Development of Jiangsu Higher Education Institutions(PAPD)Accounting Master Training Project of the Ministry of Finance(MOF No.15,2016)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities(No.16wkjc01)Big Research Team Training Project of Sun Yat-sen University
文摘We explore the relation between government integrity and firms' investment efficiency in the context of China's deepening reforms and its strengthening the social credit system. We find that government integrity is positively associated with the investment efficiency of listed companies in China. Government integrity is negatively related to corporate underinvestment, but insignificantly related to corporate overinvestment. Higher government integrity reduces underinvestment in non-state-owned firms, but this relation is not significant in state-owned firms. Furthermore, we find that the negative relation between government integrity and underinvestment is only significant for firms in industries that receive supportive government policies. This study enriches research on corporate investment by adopting the perspective of government integrity, and supplements the literature on government integrity and its economic consequences. Our study also provides micro-level empirical evidence that strengthening government integrity will promote the economic transformation of China.
基金Acknowledgements We thank the editor and two anonymous reviewers for their many insightful and constructive suggestions. This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (71372166, 71502174) and the Research Base on Low-carbon Economy for Guangzhou Area.
文摘This paper explores how the influences corporate donations, based on political identity of top managers upper echelons theory (UET). The results show that the political identity of the top manager has a significant impact on the donation behavior of a company, especially in areas with poor institutional environments. Corporate donations depend not only on whether the top manager has a political identity but also the type of this identity. Furthermore, the impact differs significantly between companies with different ownership structures. This study enriches our knowledge of corporate philanthropy by demonstrating that corporate donation practices are shaped by a range of contextual factors. Corporate giving behaviors in emerging economies such as China are differently motivated according to the fundamentally different aspects of their institutional settings.