In the setting of dealing with climate change, this article designs a matching mechanism for global public goods provision with the aggregative game approach. Given endowment and the technology of each country, we pro...In the setting of dealing with climate change, this article designs a matching mechanism for global public goods provision with the aggregative game approach. Given endowment and the technology of each country, we propose the conditions under which the matching mechanism is able to guarantee full participation and Pareto efficient provision, respectively, in the cases with certain and uncertain preference information. These conditions cannot only be adopted in international negotiation and cooperation, but also refines the theory of matching game. In comparative static analyses, we discover that: First, changes of initial stock of climate goods produce a wealth effect and the crowd-out effect is less than 1. Second, climate tax policies affect the supply and welfare of each country only when they produce wealth effects, and if tax revenue is transferred into climate goods with more advanced technology, they will produce positive wealth effects. Third, modifying matching plans dynamically and appropriately can urge countries to improve technology, and especially given a Pareto optimal mechanism, adjusting the matching plan to keep marginal rates of transformation unchanged as technology changes is still able to ensure full participation and efficient supply of climate goods.展开更多
基金supported by National Basic Research Program of China[grant number:2012CB955802],Climate Change and Global Economic Problems in Climate ProtectionNational Natural Science Foundation of China[grant number:71471177],Economic Complexity-Oriented Modeling of Behavior and Computational Experiment with ApplicationsCASS-ESRC Partnership Project of China-UK Governments[grant number:ES/N00762X/1],Behavioural Compatibilitybetween Individual Choice and Collective Action with Applications
文摘In the setting of dealing with climate change, this article designs a matching mechanism for global public goods provision with the aggregative game approach. Given endowment and the technology of each country, we propose the conditions under which the matching mechanism is able to guarantee full participation and Pareto efficient provision, respectively, in the cases with certain and uncertain preference information. These conditions cannot only be adopted in international negotiation and cooperation, but also refines the theory of matching game. In comparative static analyses, we discover that: First, changes of initial stock of climate goods produce a wealth effect and the crowd-out effect is less than 1. Second, climate tax policies affect the supply and welfare of each country only when they produce wealth effects, and if tax revenue is transferred into climate goods with more advanced technology, they will produce positive wealth effects. Third, modifying matching plans dynamically and appropriately can urge countries to improve technology, and especially given a Pareto optimal mechanism, adjusting the matching plan to keep marginal rates of transformation unchanged as technology changes is still able to ensure full participation and efficient supply of climate goods.
