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Effect of Employees’ Pay-performance Sensitivity on Future Firm Performance: Evidence from State-owned Listed Enterprises in China over 2007-2015
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作者 Changzheng Zhang Gaimei Yang 《Journal of Business Administration Research》 2019年第3期25-36,共12页
Taking a balanced panel data consisting of 4365 firm-year observations drawn from the listed state-owned enterprises in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange over 2007-2015 as the research sample,the paper examines the... Taking a balanced panel data consisting of 4365 firm-year observations drawn from the listed state-owned enterprises in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchange over 2007-2015 as the research sample,the paper examines the effect of the employees’pay-performance sensitivity(PPS)on the future firm performance from the two competing perspectives of“incentive effect”and“risk-aversion effect”,adopting the method of multiple regression analysis based on OLS and applying the SPSS23 as the data processing tool.Theoretical analysis and empirical results demonstrate that there is a positive link between the employees’PPS and the future firm performance.To improve the employees’PPS can stimulate the engagement of the employees,improve their working quality,enrich their workplace innovative behavior,and further lead to higher future firm performance.Meanwhile,the positive effect of the employees’PPS on the future firm performance is,on average,lower than that of the top executives’PPS on the future firm performance.Implications of the findings are provided in the end. 展开更多
关键词 Employees’pay-performance sensitivity(pps) FUTURE firm performance STATE-OWNED enterprises China Incentive EFFECT RISK-AVERSION EFFECT
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年报审计与薪酬契约优化 被引量:4
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作者 陈宋生 严文龙 李文颖 《会计研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2020年第10期177-192,共16页
利用会计师事务所向监管部门报备的年报审计调整数据,发现治理层利用审计信息动态优化薪酬契约,抑制管理道德风险行为。基于上市公司货币性薪酬结构多为"固定薪酬+基于业绩的激励薪酬+调整项",在当期,治理层利用审计调整信息... 利用会计师事务所向监管部门报备的年报审计调整数据,发现治理层利用审计信息动态优化薪酬契约,抑制管理道德风险行为。基于上市公司货币性薪酬结构多为"固定薪酬+基于业绩的激励薪酬+调整项",在当期,治理层利用审计调整信息修正薪酬契约中的"调整项",使得发生审计调整的公司业绩—薪酬敏感性高于审计无调整公司,相对于审计下调,审计上调的公司业绩—薪酬敏感性更高;在下一期,治理层根据前期审计调整方向,判断原有薪酬政策是否存在激励过度(审计下调方向)或激励不足(审计上调方向),"纠偏"薪酬契约中"基于业绩的激励薪酬"部分。在特殊盈余操纵动机及两职合一情形下,审计对薪酬契约的信息治理作用减弱。研究结论对于治理层动态优化薪酬契约、拓展货币薪酬激励的有效性有一定理论与现实意义。 展开更多
关键词 审计调整 业绩—薪酬敏感性 道德风险 盈余操纵
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Geographical relationships and CEO compensation contracts 被引量:1
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作者 Junli Yu Wei Xu Ping Zhang 《China Journal of Accounting Research》 2017年第2期127-139,共13页
In this paper, we empirically analyze the effects that the geographical relationships between chairman and CEO have on the latter's compensation contracts,based on samples of listed A-share private firms from 2005... In this paper, we empirically analyze the effects that the geographical relationships between chairman and CEO have on the latter's compensation contracts,based on samples of listed A-share private firms from 2005 to 2014. We find that geographical relationships are related to lower pay–performance sensitivity, and that the correlation mainly exists in poor performance periods,suggesting that geographical relationships weaken the effectiveness of compensation contracts. We also find that geographical relationships can be substituted by external formal institutions. 展开更多
关键词 Geographical relationships CULTURE CEO compensation payperformance sensitivity
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