This paper discusses Penelope Maddy＇s （b. 1950） naturalistic philosophy of mathematics, which is one of the most influential forms of post-Quinean naturalism in the philosophy of mathematics. Two defining features ...This paper discusses Penelope Maddy＇s （b. 1950） naturalistic philosophy of mathematics, which is one of the most influential forms of post-Quinean naturalism in the philosophy of mathematics. Two defining features of Maddy＇s theory, namely the methodological autonomy of mathematics and the equivalence of Thin Realism and Arealism, are analyzed, and some criticisms of them are posed from within the naturalistic line of thought itself. In the course of this analysis and criticism, the paper will also consider Maddy＇s objections to the Quinean Indispensability Argument, which are the starting point of her own version of naturalism.展开更多
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the identification and characterization of the various types of intuition put forward by Poincar6, taking his texts as a laboratory for looking for what intuition might be. I ...The aim of this paper is to contribute to the identification and characterization of the various types of intuition put forward by Poincar6, taking his texts as a laboratory for looking for what intuition might be. I will stress that these diverse conceptions are mainly formulated in the context of Poincar6＇s controversies in opposition to logicism, to formalism, and in the context of Poincar6＇s very peculiar conventionalism. I will try to demonstrate that, in each case, Poincar~ comes close to a specific tradition （Kant, of course, but also Leibniz and Peirce）.展开更多
This paper compares Frege＇s philosophy of mathematics with a naturalistic and nominalistic philosophy of mathematics developed in Ye （2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2011）, and it defends the latter against the former. The pa...This paper compares Frege＇s philosophy of mathematics with a naturalistic and nominalistic philosophy of mathematics developed in Ye （2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2011）, and it defends the latter against the former. The paper focuses on Frege＇s account of the applicability of mathematics in the sciences and his conceptual realism. It argues that the naturalistic and nominalistic approach fares better than the Fregean approach in terms of its logical accuracy and clarity in explaining the applicability of mathematics in the sciences, its ability to reveal the real issues in explaining human epistemic and semantic access to objects, its prospect for resolving internal difficulties and developing into a full-fledged theory with rich details, as well its consistency with other areas of our scientific knowledge. Trivial criticisms such as ＂Frege is against naturalism here and therefore he is wrong＂ will be avoided as the paper tries to evaluate the two approaches on a neutral ground by focusing on meta-theoretical features such as accuracy, richness of detail, prospects for resolving internal issues, and consistency with other knowledge. The arguments in this paper apply not merely to Frege＇s philosophy. They apply as well to all philosophies that accept a Fregean account of the applicability of mathematics or accept conceptual realism. Some of these philosophies profess to endorse naturalism.展开更多
文摘This paper discusses Penelope Maddy＇s （b. 1950） naturalistic philosophy of mathematics, which is one of the most influential forms of post-Quinean naturalism in the philosophy of mathematics. Two defining features of Maddy＇s theory, namely the methodological autonomy of mathematics and the equivalence of Thin Realism and Arealism, are analyzed, and some criticisms of them are posed from within the naturalistic line of thought itself. In the course of this analysis and criticism, the paper will also consider Maddy＇s objections to the Quinean Indispensability Argument, which are the starting point of her own version of naturalism.
文摘The aim of this paper is to contribute to the identification and characterization of the various types of intuition put forward by Poincar6, taking his texts as a laboratory for looking for what intuition might be. I will stress that these diverse conceptions are mainly formulated in the context of Poincar6＇s controversies in opposition to logicism, to formalism, and in the context of Poincar6＇s very peculiar conventionalism. I will try to demonstrate that, in each case, Poincar~ comes close to a specific tradition （Kant, of course, but also Leibniz and Peirce）.
文摘This paper compares Frege＇s philosophy of mathematics with a naturalistic and nominalistic philosophy of mathematics developed in Ye （2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2011）, and it defends the latter against the former. The paper focuses on Frege＇s account of the applicability of mathematics in the sciences and his conceptual realism. It argues that the naturalistic and nominalistic approach fares better than the Fregean approach in terms of its logical accuracy and clarity in explaining the applicability of mathematics in the sciences, its ability to reveal the real issues in explaining human epistemic and semantic access to objects, its prospect for resolving internal difficulties and developing into a full-fledged theory with rich details, as well its consistency with other areas of our scientific knowledge. Trivial criticisms such as ＂Frege is against naturalism here and therefore he is wrong＂ will be avoided as the paper tries to evaluate the two approaches on a neutral ground by focusing on meta-theoretical features such as accuracy, richness of detail, prospects for resolving internal issues, and consistency with other knowledge. The arguments in this paper apply not merely to Frege＇s philosophy. They apply as well to all philosophies that accept a Fregean account of the applicability of mathematics or accept conceptual realism. Some of these philosophies profess to endorse naturalism.
